3 1761 04726170 3

THE FUTURE OF ENGLAND

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

3745 fu

THE FUTURE OF ENGLAND

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

BY

HON. GEORGE PEEL

AUTHOR OF

'THE ENEMIES OF ENGLAND' AND 'THE FRIENDS OF ENGLAND'

12798 1
20/5/13

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1912

COPYRIGHT

First Edition December 1911
Reprinted January 1912

DA
18.
P44

PREFACE

I PUBLISHED *The Enemies of England* in 1902, and *The Friends of England* in 1905.

I now beg to submit *The Future of England*, the last volume of this short series.

The first two books described the forces of hostility and of friendship which work against us, and for us, from without.

This book purports to give an account of the inward forces determining our future, and attempts to indicate the result.

GEORGE PEEL.

20 MANCHESTER SQUARE, W.,
November 1911.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

On Traitor's Hill 1

CHAPTER II

The Rise of England 4

CHAPTER III

The Principles of England 19

CHAPTER IV

The Present Issue 30

CHAPTER V

Our Industrial Future 44

CHAPTER VI

Our Domestic Future 81

CHAPTER VII

Our International Future 113

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE

Our International Future (*continued*) . . 144

CHAPTER IX

Our Oriental Future 171

CHAPTER X

Our Oriental Future (*continued*) . . . 200

CHAPTER XI

Our Final Future 223

INDEX 227

CHAPTER I

ON TRAITOR'S HILL

THERE is a hill called Traitor's Hill. Such a name has the flavour of those days when treachery was still afoot. But whatever happened once to justify such a title, that was centuries ago. The hill to-day, however compromised at the bar of time by the verdict of history, has long since got its discharge. It stands forward with a respectable appearance, rising up by a gentle slope, and with an air of innocence, from the levels below. Yet there is something strange about it even now; for immediately round its foot beat the waves and tides of a sea.

Viewed under another aspect, and by a different turn of thought, that which lies at the base of Traitor's Hill is rather an army of incalculable strength. It is an infinite array of buildings, a soldiery of bricks and mortar, rank behind rank, with square upon square, and crescent after crescent interspersed in echelon among the serried files of streets, and all advancing and mustering for the assault of Traitor's Hill. The smoke, drawn backward to the horizon of distant hills,

shows that the artillery preparation for the attack is over, while, at the bottom of the descent, yonder grim rows of tenements are the forlorn hope of the escalade.

This sea, this army, is London.

It might be thought that a spectator, standing on such a vantage-ground as Traitor's Hill, on the edge of Highgate, would see below him thoroughfares crowded with citizens, and would hear the noise of the millions at his feet. But such is not the case. The busy hum of men does not reach even hither, and the scene of their hurry and their hubbub might as well be a tomb. A silence weighs from coast to coast, while the eye, ranging from horizon to horizon, lights not in that wilderness of man's handiwork, and amid that chaos of roofs, chimneys, spires, and turrets, upon the presence of a single man. So that this incomparable assembly of the living might be one wide sarcophagus of the dead.

But, if the eye, seeking to penetrate into that nether abyss, is thus baffled, the mind knows of course that here are lives in unique abundance. Are they, and all of us together, moving towards a worse or a better fortune? That is what the spectator on Traitor's Hill looks across the dumb and dreary leagues of the living to know.

Such a theme of observation would be less difficult than it is, if the energies of a people were ever concentrated undividedly on one definite

end. But, in fact, any public object fills only a modified part in the lives of citizens, who are invaded from above and below by two rival interests. From below rise the needs of daily life to distract attention from the common good. From above descends the claim of religion. Those for whom that claim exists look, even though they love their country, towards a commonwealth more august and more enduring yet.

Nevertheless, between these two poles of human interest, nationality, on the equator, is still important. It stands half-way. In that debateable borderland it seeks to erect a middle kingdom, a buffer state, a neutral territory, between the respective frontiers of the spirit and the flesh.

Thus looking over London I tasked myself to find what the national purpose is, and whether it is feasible, and whether it is sufficient.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF ENGLAND

In spite of the summer which drew a circle round Traitor's Hill, the eye, leaving that scene with reluctance, travelled down to the monstrous diagram of London.

The spectacle of London seemed to suggest a certain lesson of its own. In its vastness it appeared to prove that there must have been some master-spell of policy or of power, no trumpery or wily makeshift, to have raised us up. For the gradient of national greatness runs uphill all the way.

It would be well to ascertain the nature of this master-secret of ours. And the next step in thought would be to make clear whether it will prove sufficient for our future. If not, then, lastly, we must consider how to adjust our lives to the new epoch, how to grasp futurity, and how still to lead the world.

In the first place, then, the cause of this country's position is worth a brief examination, in order that it may be set forth and correctly assigned. Several current explanations, each of a

reasonable nature, suggest themselves, and stand for review in turn.

Perhaps wealth is the cause of our importance. Hence our ability to sustain arduous conflicts, and to pursue enterprises financially too exhausting for poorer men. Hence, too, that never-ceasing export of our capital to every region under the sun which has put mankind in our debt.

Nevertheless, a short consideration must make plain that this view, though there is something to be said for it, is inadequate. For the exploitation of our resources and the expansion of our industry only began in earnest at the industrial revolution in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Yet at that date England had already run a distinguished career. Besides, our office as a creditor nation was not established on any very large scale till some time after the close of the Napoleonic struggle, when we began to export capital to build the railways of the continent. Accordingly, in whatever degree wealth may have assisted us, it is evident that it has served us as an adjunct rather than as a principal.

Indeed, the argument might be turned round, and it might be contended that, in the main, what we have done has mostly been accomplished, not by the power of wealth, but at the stimulus of poverty. For it is under the goad of inadequate means of livelihood at home that our people have ranged the globe for commercial profit, and that a quarter of the earth's habitable surface has some-

how fallen into our lap. So that what wealth we have, is rather a result, than the cause, of our place in the world.

If, then, this first account is unsatisfactory, a second presents itself, of a nature opposite to the first. The reason of England's importance might conceivably be traced to her adhesion to the principles of our religion. Nevertheless, it is open to grave doubt whether this is the precise origin of our national prosperity.

For, to begin with, since the empire of Christianity is declared to be not of this world, there is no essential connection between it and national success. But, apart from this, it is a matter of fact that it was not the impulse of the Christian faith which won us so much. Doubtless, great empires have been raised on a directly religious foundation, but not that of England. For, to start with, the latter has been mainly acquired in conflict with the leading powers of Europe, who are Christian like ourselves, so that no religious issue was involved in the struggle between them and us. Then again, if we consider the history of our most important achievement, the Indian Empire, we have always particularly disclaimed, truly enough, any religious motive for our conquest and tenure of Hindustan. Such an announcement is due to our knowledge that any attempt upon the part of our government to proselytise those populations would lead to an explosion of the most dangerous and incalculable kind. That declaration

of our settled intention, though suggested by statesmanship, only represents the reality. In a word, our career of conquest and power has not been inspired, in any direct sense, by Christianity, the principles of which rather point, if anything, another way.

If we look at home, the reason for this absence of religious motive in our national action is apparent. We have been far too much torn within by divergent conceptions of our religion ever to have been animated by the enthusiasm of a national propaganda. With us the Reformers assailed the Canonists, the Sects assailed the Reformers, and the Congregationalists assailed the Sects in turn; then the Deists of the eighteenth century devoured the Sectaries, and finally, Agnosticism devoured the Deists. What a Niagara of warring opinions! What an apocalyptic fall from the Fathers to the philosophers! The sign in which some have conquered became with us rather a sign of intestinal discord and even civil strife.

Thus religion has not created in our case, as in the case of some other peoples, an intense inner union, a fiery coherence, issuing in an unquenchable animosity against others, lighting a fierce blaze in the precincts of other commonwealths, and often finding vent in war. We have erred, no doubt, if this has been due to our coldness and indifference; we have done well, if this has been due to a reluctance to light *autos-da-fé* for our enemies, or to become the inquisitors of mankind.

Or perhaps, thirdly, the real secret of our dominion is force of arms. It may be that we have submitted ourselves to a more iron discipline, and discharged the claims of the national service more fully than other peoples. Thus we have been able to reap a victory over our enemies, war being the substance of our rulership, and our sceptre the sword.

But this third proposition that genius in arms has founded and maintains our fortune, though it too must have some element of truth in it, is not more satisfactory than the others, and cannot stand the test of a cursory glance. For it must be immediately plain to the most casual student of our history that militarism is not our characteristic. The ruler who did his best to instil the genuine martial spirit into the nation was Cromwell, and his failure was so complete that reaction against his system has left a mark scarcely yet effaced upon our policy and character. Of all the measures which accompanied the Restoration, the disbanding of Cromwell's army was the most popular. The two succeeding Stuart sovereigns endeavoured to imitate his example, but the force of men organised by James II. furnished one of the gravest indictments against him. Hence both parties could vie in rebuking and rooting out militarism. One side execrated the Stuarts, and the other anathematised the Protector, so that the army was the scapegoat for the sins of the whole political world.

Yet the close of the seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the initiation of the modern military system in Europe. War for the first time touched hands with science under the guidance of such men as Parma and Turenne, Condé and Vauban. Nevertheless, when to have a highly trained force seemed vital, our Parliament would hardly pass yearly mutiny acts for the essentials of discipline, refused to supply proper quarters, and cut down the army. Later, there were constant efforts made to reduce the standing military forces, and Burke in 1780 could denounce our modest outlay as a "bleeding artery of profusion." Such, in that epoch, was the prevailing spirit, such the reluctance to organise, the distaste for science in warfare, and the aversion to militarism.

But with the closing years of the eighteenth century the new epoch in militarism opened, which is still in full vigour. Europe began to pay an ever closer attention to the science of war, and to adopt that system of conscription which was inagurated in 1798 by the Corps Législatif of France. To-day, of course, a considerable proportion of the combined budgets of Christendom is devoted to military and naval expenditure, and thus the angel of peace may be said to enjoy a comparatively modest pittance, doled out after Bellona has had enough.

There is no need to dwell upon the varying course of military administration which we on our

side of the Channel have pursued during the same period. But bearing it in mind, and contrasting it with the policy of our fellow nations, no one will have the hardihood to contend that, memorable as our achievements have been, military organisation has been our special attribute, that our power is principally due to our concentration on national discipline, and that our heart and genius is in war.

If, then, the eminence of England cannot be justly and acceptably traced to the power of wealth, or to the fervour of religion, or to military organisation, there is, lastly, a fourth possible cause to be considered. Individuals who are neither rich nor spiritual in a marked degree, nor endowed with combative power beyond their fellows, sometimes exercise influence upon their associates, and even upon their epoch, in virtue of a rare disposition. Occasionally this effect of character resides in nations as well as in individuals, and then the sympathy and the goodwill of even alien peoples go out to them, and, bridging the abyss of race or religion or history, make them strong. Aided by the attraction of immemorial prestige or the ties of old association, a nation thus conciliates and captivates mankind.

It is to such a cause as this that Austria, for instance, under the House of Hapsburg, owes so much. That house has for centuries committed political errors, and undergone defeats that would surely have ruined any other state. But Austria

has enjoyed a charmed life. She has waxed vigorous under the weight and tonnage of crushing catastrophes, and this buoyancy has been due to no other sufficient cause than the esteem borne to her reigning house by men who, otherwise, would detest her name only a little less than they detest each other.

This assertion is worth a word of proof. It was at the opening of the seventeenth century that the House of Hapsburg at Vienna seemed to have grown really powerful, and prepared itself for the discharge of its historical mission, the union of Germany under itself. Now that so many other peoples had formed themselves into strong organisations, it was high time for Germany to do the same. Yet from that moment the House of Hapsburg committed a series of blunders so enormous as to begin by ruining Germany in the Thirty Years' War, and to end, in 1870, by enabling the once obscure state of Prussia to seize the headship of the whole. In the phrase of Bismarck, "Austria did my work."

Frederick the Great once remarked of the Emperor Joseph II. that he always took the second step before he had taken the first. In order to make that remark true of the politics of the House of Hapsburg, it would perhaps be right to add that the second step was, on capital occasions, usually the wrong one. For example, the Austrian Hapsburgs had displayed toleration towards the creeds produced by the Reformation up to the

beginning of the seventeenth century. The main political problem for Europe in the century then opening was how to consolidate and perpetuate that principle by settled institutions under which all Germany might dwell and flourish. Yet this was the moment of all others chosen by the Emperor Ferdinand to attempt to render Catholicism dominant by force of arms. It was far too late, and the result was the Thirty Years' War, from which civil strife Germany scarcely recovered for two centuries.

Again, the external function of the House of Hapsburg was an effective resistance to France, to be maintained on behalf of Germany. This was what Germany asked of Austria as the price of primacy among the multifarious Teutonic states, and this is what, on the most critical of all occasions, the Hapsburgs failed to offer. For when, in 1809, the rising of the nations against Napoleon had just commenced, and the spirit of nationality began to move more strongly on the face of the waters, it was then that Austria, after a struggle by no means inglorious, inaugurated a policy of steady acquiescence in the supremacy of France, and pursued in regard to domestic government those reactionary tendencies which were to prove so disastrous during the nineteenth century. Again, as Bismarck put it, "A history of the House of Hapsburg from Charles V. onwards is a whole series of neglected opportunities."

Thus the House of Hapsburg has been rudely

ousted from the primacy of the German race, and its appeal has lain necessarily to aliens, to the Slav and the Magyar, the hereditary enemies of Teutonism. Does any force maintain the uneasy peace among these jarring races more strong than the feeling entertained by its subjects for that lineage, dignified as it has been by its distressful history?

A similar case is furnished by French history. The ascendency exercised by France from the age of Louis XIV. was due neither to her wealth, nor to her religion, nor even mainly to her military strength, formidable as it often was, but rather to the attraction of her civilisation. As Voltaire said in his *History of Morals*, it was then that Frenchmen began to render themselves generally acceptable by the grace and charm of their culture: "it was the dawn of good taste." At that date the rôle of Italy and Spain was over; Germany had not come on; and France filled the scene, enjoying for a time the combined authority which Rome exercised over Greece by her power, and which Greece exercised over Rome by her mind.

In this epoch she produced a literature so close to life that life and literature seemed one. Following on Montaigne, on Descartes, and on Malherbe, there arose a band of men who, numbering Corneille, Bossuet, La Fontaine, Boileau, Molière, and Racine among them, made France the school of Europe, and humanised humanity itself.

The magic of these masters seemed to transcend

frontiers, to cry halt to the divergence of nations, and to draw all men unto it. The love of self, which in its highest phase is nationality, bowed for a time before the love of beauty, which in its highest phase is art. Lit by the hand of genius, the fire of Apollo outshone, even for us barbarians, the fire of war.

Thus France denationalised Germany. Till 1760 at any rate, and the rise of Lessing, the Teuton owned the dominion of the Latin, and even Lessing avowed himself a cosmopolitan, that is, a Frenchman. The outbreak of the Revolution found a Germany more French than German in its patriotism. Her weightiest minds, Herder and Schilling, Kant and Hegel and Goethe, taught Germans to look with reverence across the Rhine.

To apply, however, these considerations to England, it must be confessed that, substantially, it is not to any such magnetism of personality that she owes her weight and vogue among mankind. And this is true whether we have regard to our monarchy as the embodiment of our national personality, or to the nation itself.

It must be held, indeed, that the most recent occupants of the throne have played their part in softening the antipathies, and even in procuring for us the goodwill, of continental powers. Outside Europe, too, our self-governing dominions, who can look over the head of Parliaments, but not over the head of kings, have felt the spell.

Again, many of the oriental or native races respect our monarchy as an institution common and congenial both to east and west. Thus the line of Egbert affiliates antagonistic ages and sundered worlds.

But, though this is the case at present, we must remember that such sentiments are of comparatively recent date. It may fairly be said that from the close of the sixteenth to the close of the nineteenth century none of our monarchs, except Queen Elizabeth and Queen Victoria, had the spirit calculated thus to attract. For between the reigns of these queens neither the House of Stuart nor the House of Hanover produced princes either capable of such insight or otherwise than indifferent and even hostile to such sympathies.

If we revert, then, from these representatives of the nation to the nation itself, and ask whether our ascendency may be ascribed to the fascination of our national characteristics, such an inquiry can only be made to be put aside. As Lord Salisbury, commenting on the "root of bitterness against England" so implanted in foreign soil, has said, "This country has been cast out with reproach in almost every literature in Europe."

If, not contenting ourselves with so general a verdict, we look more closely at the European view of England as expressed in its literature, it seems that we have been generally adjudged unreliable, proud, selfish, and quarrelsome. As far back as the seventeenth century the first of these

characteristics was constantly charged against us. Thus Bossuet, in his sermon on Henrietta Maria, declared us to be more unstable than the sea which encircles us. De Witt, the Dutch statesman, remarked the same. In the succeeding eighteenth century Peter the Great described us as a power torn within itself and variable in its plans. Torcy, the French foreign minister, observed that of all the countries comprised in Europe there is none where the maxims of government vary more than in England; while, later in the century, Vergennes wrote that nothing is so fickle as the policy of the cabinet of St. James.

There was the same complaint in the nineteenth century. Bismarck held that it was impossible to make an alliance of assured permanence with us; and, on the other side of the Rhine, Ollivier, the minister of Napoleon III., has echoed the accusation.

As regards the three other qualities above mentioned, their attribution to us is too common to be emphasised. Michelet called us pride incarnate. Bismarck said that the policy of England has constantly been to sow dissension between the continental powers for her own interests. And from Froissart downwards any number of continental writers have remarked upon the quarrelsome proclivities of the English people. In fact, these charges reveal an old, deep-seated, and widespread sense of irritation against us as a power which will

not answer the bell for any one in Europe, and is a most troublous neighbour with whom to sit at meat.

If, overstepping the boundaries of Europe, we inquire whether our predominance over the Asiatic and native peoples is due to any special attraction of personality exercised by us over them, it must equally be answered, no. We present ourselves to oriental eyes in the threefold aspect of soldiers, business men, and civil administrators. The British officer, admirable in discipline and conduct, is exclusive. In habit and pastime he is insular. He obeys orders; he utterly ignores local politics; he maintains discipline. Our men of business are meritorious, upright, and efficient. Our civil officials are models of what such men should be. But to the oriental they are all more or less unpalatable. They range from the inconvenient to the intolerable. For they are all the off-shoots of the stem of Japhet.

Hence it is clear that the greatness of England cannot be ascribed either to the resources of her wealth, or to the impulse of her religion, or to the organisation of her armaments, or to that inborn attraction which shines in some characters.

The true cause has been otherwise. There are two forces, always verging on the tyrannous, and seeking to oppress us all, the one exercised by man over his fellows, and the other exercised by nature over man. To resist the one, England led the way in organising modern freedom; and next, to resist

the other, she led the way in organising modern industry. She claimed for the individual such security against his kindred, man, and such power over his parent, Nature, as he had never yet known.

CHAPTER III

THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGLAND

MEANWHILE, a light haze had gathered over the towers and turrets and temples of London, that a while ago had stood out so clear-cut in the afternoon. Next, thought itself, by sympathy or by reaction, became clouded too, as if a breath of scepticism had mounted up from the vapours yonder to confuse the worth of freedom and of industrialism, the past work of England.

In fact, was it true that this was indeed the achievement which had constituted our greatness? And, if so, was it not now insufficient to meet the future?

To look for a moment at history, assuredly England has not been the *prima donna* of freedom. For there have been three great stages in the history of liberty, and she has taken a leading part only at the last stage of the three.

The first of these epochs coincided with antiquity, and was initiated by Athens.

In antiquity the commonwealth was Church and State in one. Montesquieu said, inaccurately, that antiquity subordinated religion to the State. More correctly, religion was identified with the

State. There were no conflicts between the State and religion, for these were indivisible. But evidently this condition of affairs imposed the most serious restrictions on the individual, who had thus no foothold from which to oppose the will of his fellows. He had no religion to support him against State tyranny, for religion and the State were amalgamated, the State being the Church.

It was Athens, then, who set out to break this bond. Her thinkers were the first to argue that man is a citizen not of a city state but of the universe, and is bound ultimately by the laws of reason alone. They told the world, in the words of Epictetus, to look to the laws of the living godhead, not to the laws of dead men. These new ideas transferred freedom from the forum of the city to the forum of the conscience, and the Roman disciples of the Stoics dispersed their principles throughout the world.

Nevertheless, this first epoch of freedom ended, after all, in failure. The barriers, raised by metaphysics before authority, were not strong enough to resist the impact of absolutism. Reason could not found a Church, to make head against the Cæsars.

The second stage of liberty arose in the Middle Ages, in protest against the undue assumptions of the Church over the State. Whereas antiquity had identified Church and State, mediævalism separated them, but gave precedence to the Church. When Gregory VII. said that the papacy was the master

of emperors, when Innocent III. said that Christ had given to the Church the government of the whole world, when Boniface VIII. said that every human creature was necessarily subject to the Roman pontiff, each expressed authoritatively the inner hope, the ultimate aspiration, the soul of mediævalism.

This claim of the churchmen, however, was founded only in the temporary order of things, and to raise from the ground the broken sceptre of the Cæsars was in excess of their prescribed authority. For civil government is materialism *in excelsis*, and materialism is in no way the mission of the Church. Accordingly, this claim upon the allegiance of Europe called forth the resistance of the civil powers, and it was in the contest which followed that the second epoch of freedom began. For the civil authorities had to put forth every nerve, and strain every resource to win the favour of humanity against so tremendous an antagonist as the papacy. Thus were born those civil institutions, such as limited monarchy or representative parliaments, which, reputed modern, are originally mediæval. For if antiquity created the idea, the Middle Ages created the institutions, of freedom.

Nevertheless, as the Middle Ages went onward, it became increasingly apparent that the civil power was not equal to the papal. The latter, with its unique record of services accomplished, with its complete political organisation, with its universal language, with its legal system in full

force, with its standing army furnished by the monastic orders of which the world was the parish, was too strong. In default, then, of a civil empire fit to cope with the ecclesiastical, the civilians of Europe began to create bodies which might be competent some day to hold up their heads against this overwhelming ecclesiasticism. So a whole cluster of novel organisations began to appear on the horizon like a group of Ionian or Balearic islands descried far out to sea. Some were insignificant as yet, like Austria, or full of energy, like France; some were monarchical, such as Castile, or republican, such as Florence; some slavonic, such as Poland, or romance, such as Aragon, or teutonic such as Holland; some dependent on the decaying Empire, like the Forest Cantons, or only nominally dependent, like Bohemia; some dying, like the Arelate, or progressive like Brandenburg, or precarious like Hungary. What a bewildering scene! What a pilgrim's progress of nations setting out on the mission of humanity! or, perhaps, what a plundering and lawless caravan!

The third stage of freedom has been in modern times. The idea of mediævalism was to put the Church above the State: the idea of the succeeding epoch was to put the State above the Church. This modern idea, like the mediæval, has been fruitful of absolutism. Those who have opposed it, and have regulated the frontier between what is national and what is spiritual, have procured liberty.

For instance, the power which held the chief place in Europe at the opening of our own period, and long afterwards, was Spain. The internal policy of the Spanish monarchs, for which they were prepared to make the greatest sacrifices, was the control of religious opinion by the State. From the days of Ferdinand and Isabella onwards, they fought successfully to subordinate the Church and even ecclesiastical doctrine to themselves. It was for this that they established the Inquisition, that weapon used by the Spanish monarchy to regulate the religion of its subjects. It was for this too, that they drove out the dissenting Moriscoes with such slaughter that southern Spain has scarcely recovered it. They conquered Italy and put every indignity upon the Pope. Rather than not establish their religious views in the Flemish portion of their dominions, they forfeited the Netherlands. They abandoned their traditional friendship with England, and sent the Armada, when they realised that she barred the way. They sent their fire and their faggots across the ocean, the sworn tormentors of the world.

This characteristic feature at the opening of the modern period is equally observable in the history of France. There was one internal aim which the French government never abandoned from the time of Louis XI., at the close of the Middle Ages, to the reign of Louis XIV. and the eighteenth century; this was the mastery of

religious thought by the State. The government had often to compromise its purpose, and often to patch up temporary truces with its enemy. But it never lost sight of this, the culmination and crown of its domestic authority. It mattered not whether Catholicism or Calvinism held up its head against the monarchy; both should kneel at its feet. As regards Catholicism, the authority of the French government was very early established, and this control was so complete that the monarchy could utilise without fear the services of its long line of sacerdotal statesmen, Richelieu, Mazarin, Fleury, Dubois, Brienne. Calvinism, however, was so powerful and combative that the government could not master it, until, by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it was almost abolished by one of the severest blows ever dealt by a nation at worthy subjects.

These two instances illustrate what it is that has necessitated the third phase of the struggle for liberty. In antiquity there was the identification of Church with State, in the Middle Ages there was the ascendency of Church over State, in modern times there was the domination of State over Church, to be combated. It was the effort to reject this latter absolutism and its consequences, that first evoked the energies, the vigour, the greatness of the English people.

In the first place, the English people, simultaneously with the French and the Spanish, were themselves confronted at home with a prolonged

and serious effort upon the part of the State to secure dominion over freedom of thought. For this tendency of the modern State to dictate to its subjects what opinions they were to form on the most important issues was not confined to the Continent, but was rife in England no less than elsewhere. Indeed, it is not too much to say that for four centuries the English government attempted to enforce its views upon its subjects by the severest measures. It began with the laws for exterminating the Lollards. It practically ended with that penal code for the extirpation of Catholicism which, inaugurated under William III., assumed its worst features under Anne, that code which Burke justly stigmatised as an "unparalleled code of oppression."

At first, that is to say during the earlier part of the sixteenth century, it must be admitted that Englishmen seemed ready to acquiesce in the claim by the State to create their convictions for them. But this was not for long. Their independence was soon organised, and their resistance eventually came to a head in the great Civil War, the fundamental cause of which was that the people of these islands declined to have their beliefs dictated to them by governmental authority. In a word, the tyranny so successfully exercised on the Continent did not succeed in this country, whose inhabitants, whether Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, or Independent, though in turn

persecuted by the State, never failed to assert their liberty. And temporal followed inevitably upon religious freedom. For, obviously, in declining spiritual allegiance to the State, Englishmen had secured their civil liberties. If the State could not force them to think to its liking in one sphere, it had clearly no position from which to dictate to them in another. The fighters who had repelled the State's attack upon their religious, necessarily gained their civil, independence.

Thus was brought into being that liberty which has constituted one half of the greatness of England. Liberty is that spirit which, in politics, repudiates absolutism, respects the minority, and weighs the protest of a single conscience with care ; which, in jurisprudence, favours the common, limits the canon, and rejects the civil, law, suspecting those iron maxims to be the weapons of imperial wrong ; that spirit which, in the judgment seat, assumes innocency and gives the benefit of the doubt; which, in social life, sides with weakness against strength, with the outcast against the oppressor ; and which, in all conflicts of authority against reason, inclines to follow the inner guide.

Such, then, is that emancipation of the individual from the undue authority of his fellows which England sought to secure. This is the first of the two factors of her past greatness.

But we have to fear the aggression of Nature no less than of our own kind, and we tread ground menaced by social forces and by natural forces too.

In the war waged by modern industry against the latter, it was England again who showed the way.

Between the civil revolution, whereby England led the modern world to political liberty, and the industrial revolution whereby she initiated our emancipation, more completely than ever before, from the dominion of nature, there is an intimate, and even necessary, connection. For to live free was little, if life had no strength. Therefore, to grapple with nature, nay more, to renew and reconstitute it, now became her purpose. Every mechanical artifice, every novel form of power harnessed to man's service, every substance rendered chemically pure for manufacture, every race of plants or stock of animals bred up to be abnormally fertile or vigorous by human agency, is part of this new nature, this novel birth of time.

That this industrial revolution, which is still in process, began when it did in the eighteenth century, and began in England, is due to three converging causes, all referable to freedom. First, the definite failure of the State in the religious sphere had a notable reaction upon its civil policy. The mediæval Church had aimed at dominating the individual in all departments of life. The modern State, in succeeding to the authority of the Church, had been only too willing to prolong and perpetuate that ascendency, and, in this respect, the English government, in the earlier part of the eighteenth century was still mediæval in some respects. But now that the State was disclaiming

the idea of ruling men in one all-important matter, its authority in matters less momentous was undermined and broken. The second cause that originated this movement when and where it did, was that, as liberty was ever in difficulties on the Continent, and ever conquering here, there arrived on our shores, and settled in our midst, for a space of two centuries, the very choicest workmen of Europe. The more the history of almost every trade, apart from some of the great staple trades, is studied, the more it is clear that in all that ministers to the convenience, the efficiency, the luxury, the amenity of life, we owe an incalculable debt to the refugees from continental despotism. But, after all, the third and main reason of the industrial revolution was that every Englishman had become aware that he had attained the stature and the rights of manhood. This liberated a force among us which in its practical result had till then no parallel in the world. Men turned to conquering nature with a zeal which to-day can best be understood by those who have breathed the air of an Australia, a Canada, a South Africa, or an United States, those homes of the English people where the energy of our eighteenth century is reproduced before our eyes.

Thus was it that an inventive genius which owed scarcely anything to science or education, produced, by an otherwise inexplicable marvel, those wonders that have so largely reshaped human life—the power-loom, the steam engine,

the carding frame, the spinning frame, the furnace, the crucible, the open hearth, the steam hammer, the rolling mill, the hydraulic press, and the others of the long catalogue. Man became a cyclops. Our manufactures, our commerce, our shipping, our numbers, swelled to modern figures. We traded everywhere, we founded nations, we mastered nature. It was Prometheus unbound.

So, to one looking over the tortuous maze of London, the reason why we had risen thus far seemed clear. England had shaken man's authority and founded freedom. Free England had shaken nature's authority and founded industrialism. Hereby, in her morning and at her noonday, our revolutionary England had led the world. And now, as the afternoon widens before her, whither shall she lead it next?

CHAPTER IV

THE PRESENT ISSUE

As the eye ranged from the slope of Traitor's Hill through the golden haze of summer, London seemed a city of gold.

Was not this a true emblem of our future? Had not the time come for the people to enjoy those riches which they had wrested from Nature during a century and a half of industrial revolution? Such an outcome might present itself as a natural sequence from our past. For England, in deciding to be free, chose next to be industrial. But the aim and object of industrialism is prosperity. Hence the future of England might primarily lie in the general fruition of that wealth which we had won.

Are not things tending that way from a remote history? Under the Tudors, England was governed according to the will of her monarchs. In the succeeding seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we were managed by our landed gentry and aristocracy, the lovers of freedom. In the nineteenth century our directors were the middle classes, the trustees of industrialism. But now the twentieth century is to belong to the masses,

the people. These think, perhaps, that after their long campaign of labour it is time to pile arms, to pitch tents, to divide the spoil, and enter Capua. At any rate, hopes of a prosperity reasonably diffused will dictate our future. For the hopes of the people are the future of England.

Will these hopes be gratified? Will our industrial revolution which, beginning in the eighteenth century, is still in process, yield such fruit? This is the first issue ahead, and it is of primary, of radical, importance. For, in these days and in those to come, there are, and will be, many who, if they cannot obtain from their nation that substance which it purports to give them, are ready to question, or quash, its title-deeds.

In simpler terms, is our existing industrial organisation so defective that, as suggested by many, we shall be obliged to change it fundamentally? Or is it so sound, and so well suited to the facts of life, and so well calculated on the whole to satisfy the nation that, with due amendments, we shall adhere to it in the future? That is a plain issue, and it needs, now more than ever before, a plain reply.

I endeavoured to arrive at that answer, not by reliance on any personal predilection, or on any party view, or on any old economics, or on any conscious self-interest, but by attending to the ultimate direction which the central common sense of the English people, in spite of natural oscillations of judgment, will take.

To look back, for a moment, to the first eighty years, or thereabouts, of the industrial movement in question, it must be said that it failed, on the whole, to attain its proper end. The sober historian of nineteenth-century England, Spencer Walpole, has pointed out that in the early part of that period the labouring classes "were perpetually becoming more and more impoverished," "the most frightful distress was almost universally prevalent." And, as time went on, things got worse. By 1830 their condition was "growing more and more intolerable." But even this was "as nothing compared with the protracted wretchedness which commenced in 1837 and continued in 1842." And he concluded by saying: "I desire to express my deliberate opinion that the wave of misery in Britain reached its summit in the course of 1842."

Since that date, for seventy years our statesmen have laboured with zeal to remedy such a condition of affairs. They have pursued a sixfold domestic policy, not always consistent with itself, perhaps, but creditable, at any rate, to their goodwill and resource.

First, there has been the establishment of Free Trade, in the hope that cheap food for the masses and cheap raw materials for the manufacturers would curb the evils of the commonwealth. Secondly, there was the policy of economy in public expenditure, which culminated with Mr. Gladstone's proposal in 1874 to abolish the income tax. I remember being told by Mr. Gladstone, some two

years before his death, that he, the last of the Peelites, regarded economy as a main principle in his domestic policy, and as a weapon which he had borrowed from the armoury of his master, Sir Robert Peel. For these statesmen considered that money fructified better in the pockets of the people than in the greenhouse of the Treasury.

Thirdly, there has been the enactment of a multitude of laws in restraint of capital, on the view that, in our industrial revolution, as in other revolutions, undue ascendency is secured by men intent upon what Bacon called "the Sabbathless pursuit of fortune." To that end the State, formerly aloof as Buddha, has emerged as the busy tutelary god of labour.

Fourthly, we have embarked on socialism, chiefly of a municipal kind. As long ago as 1889 the Fabian essayists pointed out the wide extent to which socialism of this sort was already in operation here. And during the quarter of a century since those days, our advance in that direction has been decided.

The fifth line of remedy has been an extensive alteration of our institutions, with the object, it is hoped, of enabling the voice of the people to be heard more clearly, more emphatically, and more immediately. And sixthly, we have launched out, since the retirement of Mr. Gladstone, upon that running tide of public expenditure, so bewildering in its speed of current and volume, and so familiar to us all.

Such, during seventy years, has been the gist of our domestic and social policy. Never, assuredly, has a great nation been more ill at ease than was England in 1842. Never, assuredly, has a great nation made such strenuous efforts to cure her inward evils, as has England from then till now.

And the result of all this reformation? Not unimportant, obviously. Though no one can approve all these policies, for some are inconsistent with others of them, and though it may be felt by many of us that certain of them have been mischievous, yet since 1842, by whatever measure we test social progress, whether by average earnings, or by consumption of food, or by the death-rate, or by judicial statistics, or by deposits in savings banks, there has been the improvement of which we are aware.

Nevertheless, at the very moment when, at the opening of the twentieth century, we might have hoped to raise our voice in paean, cruel blows of disappointment descended in hail upon our bewildered and humbled crest.

In 1903, especially, these strokes came thick. The position of our main industries was pronounced to be very critical, while we heard from another standpoint the sensational statement that about 30 per cent of our population is "on the verge of hunger."

Are we, then, to think—and this is the crux and core of everything—that our industrial system is rotten and must go?

My conclusion is that, though the spread and vogue of such an idea among the people may be considerable, our industrial system, apart from certain curable weaknesses, is sound. With the adoption of certain amendments, it is capable of satisfying the people of this country, and of thus resuming or retaining their allegiance. It may even be asserted that our system, thus rectified, will be one of the highest excellence, and that it is thus capable and assured of a long and goodly future.

But let us first inspect the forces that seem to be bearing us the other way.

As long ago as 1884, Herbert Spencer, in *The Coming Slavery*, foretold that socialism would win the day here. He said, "The changes made, the changes in progress, and the changes urged will carry us towards State usurpation of all industries, the private forms of which, disadvantaged more and more in competition with the State, will more and more die away."

If, however, we follow the history of the working classes subsequent to that date, we shall find that, at any rate during the last decade of the nineteenth century, State socialism did not achieve more than very limited success. Although an Independent Labour Party was instituted with the object of winning over the trade unions to socialism, the latter movement did not gain ground. As the authors of the *History of Trade Unionism* have pointed out, during that decade the interest of

English working-men in labour politics "gradually diminished," and there was "comparative peace in the industrial world."

But, with the new century, things began to alter. As a prominent trade unionist has recently stated, though perhaps too absolutely, "It was not until after the year 1900 that anything of a party nature was to be found in any trade union rules . . . it was into this united family that the socialists threw the apple of discord when they formed the Labour Party." In other words, trade unionism proper began to alter its course.

In order to mark this change precisely, a word or two is needed. Trade unionism seeks to utilise private ownership, in order to obtain good wages, short hours, and favourable conditions for the men; socialism would withdraw capital from individuals. The socialists would regulate the whole State; the trade unionists would only look after their own people. Socialism is universal collectivism; trade unionism is corporate individualism. For instance, a great trade union declares, "The object of this Society shall be to improve the condition and protect the interests of its members." But when, at the Hull Conference of 1908, the Labour Party had already become socialist, it resolved that, "The Labour Party should have, as a definite object, the socialisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, to be controlled by a Democratic State in the interest of the entire community." These two purposes are opposites.

Nevertheless, in the kaleidoscopic world of labour politics, this new view had scarcely established itself ere another movement, long familiar on the continent, began to undermine socialism itself.

A leading advocate of this departure was Mr. Tom Mann, who, in his Industrial Syndicalist organ, started in 1910, has definitely presented this project, a conception of the future totally distinct from trade unionism and socialism alike. We are told in that paper that "the struggle must go on until the workers of the world, organised as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system." Obviously, this diverges acutely from socialism, for it is rule by "a class." The whole scheme is to be "revolutionary in character—revolutionary in aim —revolutionary in methods." For, we are informed, a working-class movement that is not of this nature is useless to the working class. "Industrial syndicalism aims at perfect organisation, so as to enable the workers to manage the industrial system themselves, once they have seized it."

Thus the three main schemes which competed for the favour of our working classes were trade unionism, socialism, and syndicalism. Under the first, the employers are still to conduct industry; under the second, the State, and under the third, the workers themselves, are to discharge that function.

And then, in the swift progress of current

events, syndicalism itself commenced to go under, and its "perfect organisation" to disappear. It began, in its turn, to be ousted by something akin to anarchy.

The latter word is accurate. There is no other suitable to describe the events of the summer of 1911, when the chief port in the world was held up for ten days; when our second port, Liverpool, was in a state of siege; when disorder spread from Southampton to Glasgow, and from Hull to Cardiff; when for two days the railway system was partially paralysed; when for four whole days the transport trade of North-Eastern England was shut down; when Irish railwaymen struck for no adequate reason; and when, in a word, famine began to present itself as a practical possibility.

Thus, in the brief space of a decade, trade unionism was jostled by socialism, and socialism by syndicalism, and syndicalism by anarchy. We reached the flash point of England.

What has been the cause of this quick revolution of events? To answer that question correctly is vital for those who wish to know the England of our own hour, and to look ahead. For the national future itself is at stake.

The development of English industry in our day has had a double effect upon the condition of our working classes. It has exposed them, as it were, to the simultaneous play of two opposite influences, the former leading many of them upward to a better fortune, and the latter dragging

others of them downward to a worse. And this is why economists and statisticians can so easily confuse us with the pessimism or optimism of their antagonistic figures as to our social state.

For instance, the series of our fiscal blue-books, published since 1903, exhibits to us workmen more highly paid, working shorter hours, and better housed than the corresponding workmen elsewhere in Europe, and enjoying, as regards prices, a greater command over the necessaries and comforts of life. On the other hand, the reports of the Royal Poor Law Commission of 1909 reveal to us a vast mass of casual, under-employed, unskilled, low grade labour, in depths, some of it, of profound misfortune. These contra-indicants are alike genuine. As the author of *Life and Labour in London* remarked years ago, "The cleavage between the higher and lower grades of manual labour has become more marked industrially." He who does not realise that fact firmly is apt to lose himself on this stricken battlefield of thought.

According to modern astronomy, the sky, as far as we can observe it, is filled by two currents of worlds, of like chemical constitution and probably of like origin, moving in opposite directions through space. Our social system has two analogous currents within it.

It is superfluous to analyse the causes of this growth of inferior labour. Partly, it has always existed, and the swamp has stood undrained from

old days. Partly, our expanding foreign commerce has multiplied these men at our ports. Partly, there is a constant variation or contraction of industries under the stress of taxation, or of invention, or the fierceness of domestic or external rivalry, whereby men are thrown out. Partly, legislation has sometimes unwittingly favoured in the past the classes of organised labour at the expense of this unorganised class.

During the two last decades this portion of the population increased in number, and its wages, so far as the records show, did not rise, at any rate as they did in other more organised trades. But prices rose, and made its condition yearly more difficult, more serious, and sometimes cruel.

It was from these multitudes of men, thus circumstanced, that there have been issuing those forces which have caused trade unionism to give way to socialism, socialism to syndicalism, and the latter to disorder and anarchy before our eyes. To comprehend how this has happened, let us get, as General Gordon recommended, into the skin of the labourers of this class.

The casual labourer had no regard for the older trade unions, for they were the aristocracy of labour, the men on the upward way. And this was why the socialists so easily dominated the trade union movement. For though the socialists were few, the trade unionists knew that the former had the big cohorts of unskilled labour at their back, that same unskilled labour which the trade

unionists had passed by, and had left to the economic elements.

Nevertheless, the low grade labourer, when he came to listen to the socialists, had no particular love for them either. If the industries of the country were nationalised, they would only be managed by a big bureaucracy in Whitehall, who were nothing but aristocrats to the docker and his fellows. So casual labour turned to Tom Mann and those who were with him.

And then, in the rapid haste of events, Tom Mann himself, with his idea of "perfect organisation," was left behind by the labourer. The latter had no idea as yet of any such thing as organisation; so, when his opportunity arose, he struck hastily, irregularly, and hard, with consequences that were startling for everybody. He left behind all his advisers, trade unionists, socialists, and syndicalists together, and went out "on his own."

The first immediate result of this rising of low grade labour was that many other allied grades in the country, and many grades immediately above it, contemplated striking too, or did strike.

So far, then, an endeavour has been made to explain the course of events up till now. What of the future?

It is evident that, to the minds of those who seek to control the labour world, all that we have hitherto witnessed, from the downfall of trade unionism up to the rise of occasional anarchy, is but a foretaste of what is to come in the future.

We must attend, therefore, in surveying the tendencies of the time, to what such extremists may contemplate.

These appear to desire to pass from the conditions of the moment to much stronger measures. They regard the recent outbreaks with dissatisfaction, as being irregular, informal, and unauthorised, and they indicate another departure still. They would turn the forces of low grade labour to more definite account. The strike, whenever called for, should be so organised as not to drag itself out or prolong the agony: it is to be universal, summary, and final. Add to this that the indirect and intermittent control of the State by a small Parliamentary party is to be superseded by a party sufficiently strong to form a government, and that this labour organisation is to be rendered international, so that external considerations may not interrupt its domestic triumph. But a general strike is to be the real power in the State. Thus, having trodden the round of trade unionism, socialism, syndicalism, and disorder, we are finally to be starved into an autocracy wielded by a few.

Two separate issues are here involved under one head. First, shall we be content to be ruled in this way? He who estimates the future of England can decline even to consider such an outcome, for it would mean the abrogation of any future at all.

But the second issue, and this must be looked at carefully, is whether labour can improve matters

by substituting something better than our existing industrial system. He would be very blind to the future who, in the twentieth century, attempted to dismiss such an idea off-hand without impartial consideration. For clearly, if labour can, by abolishing our present industrial system, improve matters decidedly, then England will agree to such a proposition.

It has been indicated already that, putting sheer disorder and autocracy aside at once, there are three various solutions of our industrial position which have commended themselves to labour. These have been trade unionism, socialism, and syndicalism. Trade unionism, however, recognises capital and the existing order, and would work with them. It has been the breakdown of trade unionism before forces alien to itself that has made way for all this trouble, for trade unionism, purged of socialism and syndicalism, works well with the existing system. Accordingly, the only new constructive solutions of our problem that remain for labour to impose, once it is in power, are socialism and syndicalism, that is, the possession of all industry by the State, and, alternatively, by labour itself.

Therefore, in order to see whether any such schemes will prove acceptable in the future to the English people, we must compare them with our existing industrial system, to know whether the latter is doomed to die.

CHAPTER V

OUR INDUSTRIAL FUTURE

It seems, then, that since there are active movements among our working classes for the abrogation of the existing industrial system, it will be well to inspect that system in order to see, first, whether it will stand the test of time and the hostility of competing projects, and secondly, whether, in that event, it does not, at some points, need amendment in the future in order to make it more adequate and secure than it is to-day.

For such a task as this, we have at present certain advantages of observation. At the period when we started manufactures upon modern lines, all the industries, not of this country alone, but of the world, had been, up till then, hand industries. From about 1770 until about 1850, thanks to our new energies, and in spite of the terrible evils in our social system, we drew clearly ahead, having almost a monopoly in manufactures. During the thirty years after the latter date, the world was busy imitating us, using our capital to erect factories, and modelling their machinery and methods upon our own. It was, however, not till the early 'eighties that the public definitely learnt

from the Report of the Royal Commission on Technical Instruction that foreign nations had outstripped us in technical knowledge, and in the arts and sciences as applied to commerce. During the succeeding generation up till our own hour, we have been regaining this ground. Accordingly, for full thirty years, our industry has developed under conditions of stress and rivalry which are sure to continue in the future, and which therefore have already exposed to view the fundamental facts of our position.

There is an essential factor in the economic situation of England making decidedly for instability and weakness, and explanatory of most of our past and present distresses. Our area is very limited; our soil is, on the whole, poor and unable to supply even a third of our food; our climate is northern, inclement, and incapable of producing the raw materials of our industries, much less the luxuries of civilisation; finally, our mineral resources in regard to such essentials of commerce as copper, tin, lead, zinc, gold, silver, and so forth, are slight or non-existent. To exercise no initial control over the production of these requisites, and to have to import them from far over sea, is a radical flaw in our situation, compromising in a measure the solidity of our whole industrial structure.

There is, however, another essential factor in our position which, to some degree, counteracts this grave default of Nature. In the extent and rich-

ness of our coalfields we are the most favoured country in Europe; the quality is good, the strata are ample and regular, and calculated, in spite of Sir William Ramsay, to last at any rate 500 years; and the richest basins are so close to the sea as to economise materially the cost of shipment. This is the leading item in our modern economic life. Such a colossal asset, combined with our store of iron ore, furnishes us with three priceless advantages: in a rigorous climate we obtain cheap fuel; our manufactures secure cheap power; while, not least, we are enabled to buy food and raw materials cheap. This last service of the three is performed as follows.

Of our total output of coal, on an average a quarter or somewhat less is exported, thus providing cargo for vessels outward bound. Were this not available, the bulk of the ships bringing to our shores corn, cotton, wool, wood, and so forth, would necessarily clear without cargo and in ballast; no outward freight would be earned by the shipowners who, in that case, to make both ends meet, would have to charge a much heavier freight on imported articles, thus increasing their cost very seriously to the consumer. Hence, through coal we procure the warmth, the food, and the materials vital to our existence.

Thus, on the whole, what Nature has done is to give us, in return for grave disadvantages, the opportunity and the power to be an important manufacturing people. It remains to see whether

we duly avail ourselves of the gift so as to provide means for our population, and whether the edifice of our manufactures is framed as substantially to last into the future as the foundation is, on the whole, well laid.

The industrial framework built upon this basis of coal has been raised, and is maintained daily, by three converging and co-operating forces—the brains of our men of business, the skill of our artisans, and the energising power of our capital. Consider each briefly in isolation, and then survey the whole result.

The quality of our men of business can be most accurately measured by a reference to our foreign trade, because the organisation of that trade is clearly one of their special provinces, and outside the function of the artisan. England, of all countries, must sell abroad largely, in order to procure in return those supplies of food and raw materials necessary for our existence, and of which we are internally bereft.

At the opening of this century it was thought that this foreign trade, so absolutely vital for us, was in danger of weakening materially in the future. Foreign tariffs were rising to a prohibitory pitch, it was said. And certainly, the closing decade of the nineteenth century witnessed a serious heightening of tariff walls, so that these fears were grounded on solid considerations.

The truth was, however, that in spite of the unique height of foreign tariffs, our men of business

were to prove equal to the occasion. In 1900 our exports were £291,000,000, and they grew until they were £430,000,000 in 1910, an increase of 47 per cent in a single decade. Thus, in spite of tariffs of special severity, our men of business have shown themselves able to surmount them, and to solve what seemed an almost impossible problem.

But, tariffs apart, this is not all that they are doing to-day in this sphere.

A danger to foreign trade is that our exports might conceivably be limited to certain quarters, and might thus rest upon a frail and shifting foundation. Fortunately, however, this is not so, for our commerce is being built upon the prosperity of the whole world.

This can be proved by examining the direction of the £430,000,000 of our exports in 1910. These are now becoming so widely spread as to be sent to fifty countries, or thereabouts. Besides, only one country, India, receives more than 10 per cent of our total sales. Indeed, so well are they now apportioned that, with the exception of four countries that take between 9 and 5 per cent each, no one of the remaining countries takes more than 5 per cent. The outflow of our exports is thus becoming variously distributed and in that measure reliable. Such is one of the proofs to hand of the ability of our business men. It is the industrial activity of these individuals that makes the opportunities of England, and guarantees whatsoever prosperity we enjoy.

Next, as regards the competence of our artisans, London of itself answers, the greatest port and the greatest city in the world. Having no coal and no cheap iron, London, when material bulks large in manufacture, has a relatively weak economic hold. But all is compensated by her wonderful workmen. Thanks to them, she is the best finisher of manufactures, the best fitting shop and repairing shop ever known. Without a staple industry, or a dominant group of trades, exposed at every point to universal competition, she is still supereminent in variety, as she turns the rare luxuries of yesterday into the universal necessaries of tomorrow, and constantly raises the standard of living for all the peoples of the globe.

To look at our artisans from another point, the author of *Industrial Efficiency* concludes that, judging from a close comparison of work done in a representative business in the north with that done elsewhere, "it takes eleven men in America to do the work of ten in England." The American flags, and the German lags, behind the Englishman.

But, in order to realise more comprehensively the capacity of our artisans, we must consider the industrial strength of the nation as a whole.

It may be measured in the first place, and mainly, by the degree in which it can provide warmth to its citizens. This can best be verified by opening the weekly budgets of the people. These will show that we spend the overwhelming proportion of our outlay upon procuring warmth

in the fourfold shape of food, fuel, clothes, and houses.

These necessaries are supplied in combination by agriculture, mining, the textile and clothing trades, and the building trade, the collective importance of which, in the national economy, can thus be understood.

Industrial strength may be measured, secondly, by the degree in which it facilitates transport. Transport is provided by the railway, the shipping, and the engineering trades, the latter co-operating with the first two. To warm and to transport is the main function of human industry.

It must at once be evident how distinguished, and even how leading a part England plays in these seven chief departments of material life. In five or six of them our artisans will be generally admitted to lead the world.

On the third great factor in our industrial strength, our capital, there is no need to dwell. As already made clear, England lacks food-supply, raw materials, and metals. Her capital is therefore ever necessarily directed to developing and mining these products abroad, and to bringing them by rail and ship to our shores. Every one recognises the unique energy and boldness with which for nearly a century our capital has been worked on these lines.

So far, we have considered coal, the basis upon which our industrial structure is built, and next, the three forces—our business men, our artisans,

and our capital—which combine to rear it. But what is it, this industrial organisation, actually in itself?

London, again, guides us down all the multiplicity of her streets to an initial answer. For that city is the world centre of the small method of production: tiny industries flourish there in any number, and will continue to do so. They are bred by hope, the confidence of the small man that he can fight his own hand and can be sergeant instead of private in the grand army of life. And so we trace in London, as in all other of our cities, an infinity of retail shops, of personal businesses, of minnows living in the whirlpool as best they can, of small parties foraging against poverty, of vedettes feeling the way for the Napoleonic hosts of commerce, until we climb to the room of the solitary worker, who has no master but the morrow for which he has not provided, and no subordinate but the yesterday which he has won from death.

One main division of our industrial structure is, therefore, the small business. But if we apply to this department the ideas of socialism and syndicalism, these have no meaning and are of no use here, while even trade unionism can find poor footing in this broken ground.

To propose that these businesses with their ups and downs of fortune should be socialised and acquired by the State is obviously impracticable. To advocate that the workers themselves should

own them is to suggest what in a large measure is done already.

Turn we now from this great division of industry to that at the other end of the scale, joint stock enterprise. Between these two lie, no doubt, an indeterminate number of concerns partaking of the character of both the others, but these concerns can be ignored for the present purpose, more especially as the two mentioned together cover much of the field. The difference between the two divisions is that, whereas in the first the three elements, brains, labour, and capital are mostly amalgamated, in the second, brains, labour, and capital are highly differentiated. That is to say, our citizens supply the share capital from their savings, our men of affairs furnish the brain power and management, while our clerks or artisans do the clerical or manual work.

The socialist proposal would be that the State should transfer to itself the share capital, and that the men of business, as well as the clerks or artisans, should become civil servants. But, in truth, there are insuperable difficulties in the way. For, as it is, all these industries exist under the severest conditions of rivalry. If they are to pass into the hand of one owner, the State, that rivalry and competition will either cease, or the reverse; if the former, then the chief stimulus of our industrial energy will have been eliminated; if the latter, then all the intense forces of struggle and contention now dissipated among numberless industries,

but existing throughout the commonwealth, will be concentrated within the circuit of one central administration and will explode it.

The alternative proposal is that these industries are to be appropriated by the workers themselves, and that wages are to be abolished. But that would be incompatible with England's chief want—the application of an ever wider intelligence to industry. In these days the highest knowledge and the utmost foresight, and the most vigorous mental training, and the boldest initiative are needed increasingly among our commercial organisers in order to meet hostile attack. Our artisans, excellent and eminent as they are in their own line, are not as yet in the line of such qualities.

Putting aside, then, such schemes, let us establish the proposition that our industrial system, though of high excellence, needs some amendments to enable it to hold good in the coming time.

There are six specific adjustments required in that system, and I shall proceed to recite what I believe them to be.

The first of these has reference to the relative want of creative capacity in our industries.

If we look even at the strongest and best of them, this want can be observed.

For instance, the cotton trade, which furnishes one-third of our entire export of manufactured goods, is without any possibility of doubt the most highly organised and the most efficient of any that the world has ever seen. Just as in one of its

modern looms there are 2000 pieces, and will be more, so in all the branches of its human membership an incessant specialisation of ability, and an inconceivably minute adjustment to new problems is ever in process. The proof is not merely that in fifty years Lancashire has doubled her population and her machinery, besides adding vastly to the latter's efficiency and speed, but that, though she has more than a third of the spindles of the world, they are so well managed and produce such fine work as to consume, in spite of their superior speed, only a fifth of the world's cotton crop. We can do, in fact, a great deal more than others with a bale of cotton.

It might be thought, then, that we have here an Eldorado, a unique industry pouring wealth into our people's pockets. Nevertheless, such a supposition would be somewhat beside the mark.

This fact is worth establishing, and can be established by three different proofs. Firstly, the average return on the capital invested in the cotton industry is moderate, and presents a narrow margin between prosperity and adversity, the net profit not exceeding an average of 5 per cent. A slight change in conditions, and capital would evidently find it more remunerative to take flight elsewhere. A second proof is furnished by the recent census of production, which shows that the net annual output, that is the gross output less the cost of the materials brought into Lancashire, is £47,000,000. Since there are about 570,000 persons

engaged in this industry, the net output per individual is £82 a year. From this sum must be deducted rents, rates, taxes, depreciation, and so forth, before the profits, salaries, and wages are arrived at. Evidently this leaves a very modest fund of not much more than £50 a year per individual. Thirdly, it is stated in the Board of Trade return that the present average weekly wage of all cotton operatives in Lancashire is not more than about a pound a week, a figure which corresponds with the above. Of course, as this includes the receipts of both sexes of all ages, this must not be considered unduly low, and indeed the minimum for Lancashire people may be generally said to be a living wage.

The question, however, arises inevitably why the most splendid of businesses is so comparatively restricted in yield.

One real secret of Lancashire's relative economic weakness is that she sells a great proportion of her product to orientals who are extremely poor, and thus are unable to give much for their cotton goods. If we put up our prices, they cannot pay and do not buy. The other scarcely less cogent reason militating against Lancashire is that she has as yet practically no command over the raw material. In the last forty years this has fluctuated in price between threepence and tenpence a pound, thus inflicting serious evils on her trade. For instance, owing to a short crop in 1909, Lancashire had to

pay subsequently 30 per cent more for the raw cotton imported, notwithstanding a decline of 10 per cent in the quality received. An apt illustration this of the characteristic defect in our national position. That our profits in cotton are comparatively low is therefore due partly to our difficulties in buying the raw material, and in selling the finished product at an adequate price-level to the impoverished East. Add to this that over twenty foreign countries now manufacture cotton, thus preventing us from attempting, in any case, to raise our charges against the consumer. Even Lancashire, then, as a whole, can expect, on present lines, no more than a modest remuneration, earned at the cost of severe and ceaseless effort.

If we turn from the most salient of our organised, to the most important of our unorganised, industries, agriculture, there is the same story to be told.

Our agriculture would appear at first sight to have several advantages over our cotton trade. The latter has to draw its raw materials from distant continents, and thus depends permanently, or at least will do so for many years to come, on the foreign grower; whereas agriculture has its raw material, the soil, under its feet. Then again, whereas Lancashire sells the main proportion of its output abroad to consumers of the poorest class, or else must struggle over the walls of high tariffs, agriculture has no such

difficulties to encounter in any shape or form. For our farmers have at their doors an insatiable and boundless market, ever ready to absorb the best produce obtainable. Such are the palpable advantages of this occupation; and there are several others not much less considerable.

If our soil and climate are inferior in many respects, we enjoy, nevertheless, one unique excellence. Our stock is everywhere recognised as of the most serviceable and most valued strain. For instance, following on the heels of the fine-woolled Spanish merino, the English long-woolled sheep of the Leicester and Lincoln breeds have built up the most important flocks of the earth.

Nor do these factors by any means exhaust the catalogue of our agricultural advantages. Just as the Lancashire mill can do wonders with cotton, so the English farmer grows the best crops which the soil, such as it is, and his science, such as it is, can supply. As the operatives of Burnley and Oldham are unsurpassed in efficiency, so, in the Far West of Canada and in distant Tasmania alike, I have heard it acknowledged that the English agricultural labourer is the most vigorous, the most useful, and the most trustworthy of men.

Here again, as with cotton, it might be thought that we possess an industry of rare economic strength, able to supply wealth, at any rate in a modest degree, to the rural community. Yet the history of our agriculture during the last half-

century is rife with tragic disaster to all the parties interested, and teems with the histories of ruined men.

Those, however, through whose eyes we should do well to look at the agriculture of this country, are not so much the landlords, or even the farmers, both of whom may have other resources to assist them in a crisis, as the labourers. For these latter are not only, of course, so far more numerous, but upon them falls the heat and burden, and if their calling fail them they must be sucked into the slum and the alley, being seen no more of Merry England.

The money wages of the agricultural labourer of England average 14s. 6d. a week. His extra earnings, and the value of his allowances in kind, are calculated to average 3s. a week, so that altogether he earns 17s. 6d. a week, though the men who tend the animals obtain a trifle more. That is not very brilliant.

To look at the labourer not as he is, but as he tends to be, it will appear that one current of events is carrying him to a better, and another to a worse, fortune.

As regards the first, it seems that the causes which produced the rural exodus have somewhat spent their force. That exodus is generally supposed to have been due to the great fall of prices about 1880 caused by the opening up of the American wheatfields, and the cheapening of transport, which by forcing farmers to give up

arable, and adopt labour-saving machinery, rendered a vast number of labourers superfluous, and originated their migration into the towns. That is not quite accurate. The most modern research has shown that from 1860 to 1880, when times were good and farming boomed, the labourers were passing into the towns at a faster rate and in larger numbers than at any period since. The true cause of their departure was that their wages were at that date so low that, in the face of the high prices then ruling, they had little option but to seek the better remuneration of industry. From 1880 onwards, however, the impulse came rather from the side of the farmer who, confronted with a growing scarcity of labour as well as a fall in wheat, turned arable into grass and sought to replace labour by machinery. But, whatever the exact sequence of events, the fact remains that agriculture, theoretically the most stable of occupations, and the most obviously necessary in a country which does not attempt even remotely to produce enough food for itself, was for many years a rude and cruel stepmother.

But now this evil is lessening in some degree. The scarcity of labour has resulted in an upward tendency for wages; and as so much arable has been converted into pasture, more labourers obtain the somewhat higher wages got from tending the stock of the farm. Besides, by private goodwill and by public statute worthy efforts are being made to forbid the absolute divorce of the labourer

from the soil of his fathers, so that gardens, allotments, and small holdings form the threefold stage of progress presented to his wondering or incurious eyes. Credit, the ligature of business and the lever of energy, is to be extended to him, and co-operation seeks to reach a friendly hand.

As against this, we live in an age of rising prices, and since the commencement of this century, and still more since 1896, values of food have increased seriously, not a pleasant thing for those wage-earners who spend over half of their money in that way. Perhaps, on the whole, there are reasons for thinking that the labourer's condition creeps slowly upward as compared with days gone by.

England, then, on the whole, is not only furnished by nature for the commercial struggle, but her people have raised upon this foundation an organism of industry unsurpassed in the world, and destined, assuredly, in spite of the fierce storms of competition, for a long and famous life. That is one aspect of the industrial future as it is opening before our eyes. But the other aspect of this future is disappointingly different. In spite of the mercy of nature, of all our triumphant organisation, and of all these human energies at full stretch, the hard and stern fact remains that the result is not what we might expect. Even our best industries are not specially satisfactory, measured by the only true test, the wealth drawn therefrom by the mass of those engaged in them.

So far, therefore, it seems as if we must admit that our industrialism is likely to miss its central purpose, and that the pursuit by the people of reasonable wealth is more or less impracticable. For how can we achieve more than we achieve already, outdoing our own ascendency and outvying ourselves?

Nevertheless, it is certain that all this that looks impossible will be accomplished, that this barrier purporting to bar our progress is but a mist, that we are as yet on the mere verge and fringe of our industrial resources, and that the future will multiply infinitely our commercial strength. Science says so. For science views our boasted progress in production as the mere gropings of a standstill empiricism, and pours contempt on the archaism of our primitive inventions, on the crude wastefulness of our processes, and on the ignorance of any despair.

In order to estimate the progress that industry will achieve in the sphere of production during the coming time, it must be remembered that, if industry is the action of man upon matter, modern science has only within the last few years begun to account for what matter is. The advance has begun in full earnest. The new discoveries in physics have, in our own hour, stimulated science as much as the Renaissance stimulated literature, and it is evident that the knowledge of to-day is but fractional compared with what will accrue to-morrow. *Augebitur scientia.* Borne on the ad-

vancing crest of the wave of discovery, industry will hold right on.

If we are to understand something of the degree in which, as the century proceeds, science will have enlarged its knowledge of matter, we have only to glance backward to its views of matter at the close of the eighteenth century, and compare them with the views which it entertains now. A man of science, asked at the earlier date as to the constitution of things, would have answered with confidence that there were all sorts of ponderable matter scattered through space, but all retaining their mass unchanged through every metamorphosis and all exercising action at a distance. Among these masses would move the two electrical fluids, and the corpuscular emanations known as light. Further, he would have described matter as possessed of primary qualities, such as shape and mass, and of secondary qualities, such as warmth and colour. Such, at the close of the eighteenth century, was the tenure on truth of the scientific man.

If a similar expert were to-day confronted with a similar question he would ridicule and reject out of hand every one of the above propositions. Proceeding to his own views he would declare his belief that matter is electricity. He would resolve matter into elementary atoms, these again into sub-atoms or monads, which last he would show to be not electrified atoms, but electricity itself. Asked further to define electricity, he would submit that it is but a knot, a kink, a convolution of that

universal and primordial ether which itself constitutes the all.

Questioned more closely as to his view of the particular forces which count most in the scheme of the universe thus constituted, he would put aside at once chemical affinity and cohesion, or the gravitation which shapes stars and suns, or heat on which organic life depends. All these he would class as the paltry residual effects, the by-products, the *obiter dicta* of those electrical powers so inconceivably potent, so unimaginably prodigious, lying stored and balanced, or moving with the speed of light, within the molecules themselves. Thus there are no such things as units of matter; there are only units of electricity. Matter does not exist, or, if that be too strange a proposition, then matter, he would say, is no other than a collection of negative and positive units of electricity, and the properties which differentiate one kind of matter from another originate in the electrical forces exerted by the positive and negative units grouped together in things.

But, if this be so, then, to come back to earth, the affair of human industry is, for one thing, to utilise, however infinitesimally, these boundless electrical resources, and to harness them with precaution to its own service. It scarcely pretends to do so at present on any general scale, or on anything like scientific lines. For instance, the most obviously available form of the energy of matter is the heat of the sun. On the electro-magnetic

theory of light, now universally accepted, the energy streaming to the earth from the sun travels through the ether on electric waves, and the heat has proved capable of being measured on the basis of horse-power per acre. As the most eminent of our physicists has pointed out, our engineers have not yet succeeded in utilising this supply of power, but science has not the slightest doubt that they will ultimately manage to do so.

At present it is the electrical energy of the sun stored up in our coal that does our work for us. Even here, however, science condemns our existing methods, root and branch, as absurdly prodigal of human labour, and as incredibly inefficient.

By our present procedure we apply effectively, as the president of the Institution of Electrical Engineers has recently pointed out, much less than 10 per cent of the energy in the coal consumed. Assuredly, the total waste of more than 90 per cent of the value of our coal in the process of conversion is an evil of magnitude. Moreover, there is a further loss, involved in our present habits of using coal, only second in importance to the above, when we dissipate, as we now do, nearly the whole of the valuable by-products contained in the coal, consisting principally of fixed nitrogen. For our best hope of eventually supplying ourselves with food-stuffs lies partly in the application of electricity, and partly in the use of those fertilisers of which fixed nitrogen is the base.

It is pointed out authoritatively that, to begin with, and even with our present knowledge, we should be capable of retaining in the form of electricity 25 per cent of the energy in the coal. That is to say, where we now burn 150 million tons, we should use at most 60 million tons. Coal, converted at many centres into electricity, would be supplied in the form of current at, say, $\frac{1}{8}$d. per Board of Trade unit. With cheap current available, imagine the growth of electro-chemical processes now in their infancy, the application of this force to all our industries, to all our domestic arrangements, to all our transportation, and to all our agriculture, which latter would be further reinforced by fertilisation. These are speculations, it may be said. But the speculations of to-day are the statistics of to-morrow.

Yet the truest and widest ground for confidence in the coming expansion of our productive capabilities is to be found in man himself. He has progressed so slowly hitherto because evolution has put in the forefront of his nature the wrong faculties for exact research and discovery. His senses, forged in primeval epochs, and the crude fabric of geologic time, came to birth ages before science, thus being utterly out of date for her present purposes. Therefore, the practical man must follow ever more closely and more humbly and more hopefully at her heels; and when she tells him that she will lead him to vaster power than he has dreamed of, and to more knowledge

than the whole that he has now in store, though she be herself but a child on the mere margin of the infinite, and though the mathematics of her wisdom grow not in a converging, but in an ever diverging series, he must believe.

This, then, is the first of the six remedies in question. The second of them lies in quite a different direction. At present, if supply is not as efficient in creative power as it will be, industrial demand is also weak.

Demand, in the modern business world, tends to fluctuate rapidly in detail. The reason of this is that man's requirements are increasingly regulated not by his body but by his mind, not by his wants but by his imagination. The human stomach is speedily satisfied, the mind, never, being infinitely progressive and incalculably various in its desires. This constant shifting of requisition evidently breeds commercial instability.

But demand tends to fluctuate not only thus in detail, but, what is far more important, as a whole and bodily. Ever since the closing years of the eighteenth century, economists have noticed that our trade regularly oscillates in periodic cycles of good and bad times, these being usually reckoned at ten or eleven years. The tide of activity, then, pulses by a general ebb and flow, which dominates the whole economic life of the nation, and enables the history of its collective business to be mapped out into eras of progress and stagnation. It has been further ascertained recently that corresponding

cycles of a similar term occur in the case of other peoples, such as France or Germany.

This is an evil of weight, though we must not exaggerate its scope. These fluctuations are even arguably a good; they are the obverse aspect of improvement, the shadow side of progress. For, as trade contracts, the weakest factories and the most obsolete methods go under, and thus the next expansion starts from a higher level of efficiency. By this rude play trade advances, and through the crest of prosperity and the trough of depression commerce makes head.

Considered, however, from the platform of the individual artisan, these movements are serious enough. The worker cannot wait. He lives by selling his labour, and he must sell it now. Viewed through the eyes of the working classes these fluctuations mean that something like two hundred thousand skilled men occasionally find themselves, through no fault of their own, without work or wages, while, simultaneously, this evil spreads in widening circles through the grades of unskilled and general labourers. Insurance is well enough, but has to be paid for, and cannot pretend to cut at the root of the problem, any more than a life policy sets forth to avert death.

The principal suggestion hitherto made is to regularise the internal demand for labour. For instance, national and local authorities are estimated to spend 150 millions sterling annually on works and services. This immense outlay could be

scientifically adjusted so as to counteract the ebb of private industry. Such a change, it is said, would involve no expenditure save forethought, and would be a preventive instead of a palliative. Distress would not be relieved but obviated, and there would be no artificial installation of those useless works which are the targets for the universal anathemas of economists of every school and of every age.

Yet this and other similar suggestions obviously do not penetrate to the root and core of the disease. The fundamental evil is not so much that demand is intermittent, as that its whole power and intensity are on a relatively low scale. The strengthening of demand is the genuine cure. We are at the threshold of this fundamental reformation, but the future of England will see us entering fully upon it.

There are two main expedients by which this country will eventually cure the weakness of demand. Although, as already pointed out, for nearly a hundred years our capital has gone abroad to build up markets, yet, in fact, from 1890 up to 1903 at any rate, it must be said that, for several reasons, our efforts in this direction were comparatively mediocre and unsatisfactory. For instance, we were devoting a relatively small amount of capital to railway construction in the colonies, in India, and foreign countries, or to the development of the agricultural resources of those countries. Since then, however, we have entered upon those undertakings with greater activity. The best authority calculates that, at the present date, our

investments oversea are divided equally between the Empire and foreign countries. Of the total thus put abroad 60 per cent is in railways, while the remaining 40 per cent goes to produce food, minerals, and materials. By this means we multiply the very things necessary to our existence, and provide the means of conveying them here, on the one hand, while, on the other, we create communities able and willing to take our goods. Thus only does the weary Titan live. Thus only, in the increasing prosperity of others, England will seek and find her own.

A further method available for the strengthening of demand is imperial co-operation. The Empire, it is true, is not our best customer, in the sense that, in 1910, for instance, foreign countries took 65·8 per cent of our exports as compared with 34·2 per cent taken by our Empire. Besides, it is easy to see that our self-governing Dominions, peopled by the same energetic race as ourselves, aim at becoming some of our most redoubtable competitors.

Nevertheless, if we consider the origin and history and meaning of the Empire, we must suppose that one of the results of its existence must be, in the purely business sphere, to strengthen demand. After all, that is really why we created it. On the loss of the United States we felt it vital, in face of the general animus of Europe, to build another Empire in the place of the one which we had forfeited. Our precise motive was

not sheer desire for territory, a sentiment never entertained by any cabinet, and by scarcely any of our statesmen. Our real motive was the fear that, once a foreign rival occupied a given territory, our trade would be hampered, our traders handicapped, and the demand for our goods limited. This has been the inward impulse which has forced such immense annexations upon a series of unwilling governments. Primarily, we formed the Empire as an insurance of our business. The Empire, in this practical sense, is demand.

Hitherto, however, modern statesmen have experienced some disappointment in this regard. Though we have burdened ourselves with an enormous debt incurred in the general interests of the Empire; though the hardships and poverty of our people have been seriously aggravated by the financial weight of armaments undertaken partly on the Empire's behalf; though we have given its occupants a free market; though the aggregate of our capital invested in the Colonies and India is great; though we have lent the Colonies and India these sums at a rate of interest at least 1 per cent below that which they could have obtained from foreign countries; yet, practically, we cannot feel as yet that our Dominions have erred on the side of generosity towards us in business. In the memorable words of Mr. Chamberlain: "We think that it is time that our children should assist us. . . . The Colonies are rich and powerful. . . . The United Kingdom is a mere speck

in the Northern Sea. . . . There is a naval and military expenditure per head of the population of the United Kingdom of 29s. 3d. per annum; in Canada the same items involve an expenditure of only 2s. per head. No one will pretend that this is a fair distribution of the burdens of Empire."

But our Empire, after all, is to an overwhelming degree composed of the dark races. These have never known peace and comfort and prosperity until our coming, but are learning ever more keenly to appreciate and to require those advantages. To strengthen the concrete aspirations, to fortify the bodily desires, to elevate the standard of living of those nations entrusted to us, this is, in its material aspect, the imperial office. Hitherto we have been mainly intent upon conferring on them the boon of settled government. Their demand for the products of our civilisation will be the result and our reward.

Thus, then, it seems clear that, both as regards productive capacity and power to sell her output, England, in spite of inevitable reactions, will gather strength in the future. As it is, her industrial revolution is only midway, her conquest of Nature merely opened, the demand of the world for her products but begun.

Nevertheless, beyond these two stages of future progress, several others may be discerned.

It has been pointed out that an underlying cause of the troubles witnessed in the summer of 1911 was the condition of casual labour. No form

of labour is so apt to become demoralised, or is more dangerous when thus disorganised. England has only just awakened to this evil. Statesmen, by means of Labour Exchanges and so forth, men of business, by schemes for regularising work, are beginning to tackle decasualisation.

For instance, the outburst in its initial stage was worst at Liverpool. Here is what is already stated authoritatively with regard to the effect that the strike will have on the economic structure of the port. "A very real determination exists among all the enlightened and thoughtful ship-owners to put an end to the conditions of labour which produce the hooligan and the wastrel. As at other ports the dock labour is casual. A scheme is in preparation by which regular men shall be increased as far as possible, and the fringe of casuals which remains shall have their work dovetailed, in so far as conditions allow." It is added that if this is carried out, the scheme may change the curse of the strike into a blessing. And there are other schemes in preparation throughout the country, calculated to mitigate, at least, one of the most potent and most urgent evils that the country has to face, an evil so deep as even in the long run to menace it.

A fourth readjustment of our industrial system, to be brought about by mutual goodwill and better understanding, is necessary in view of the serious dislocation, recently so apparent, that has been widening between capital on the one hand, and

those classes of labour above the casual grades, on the other. Those classes have, of course, felt the rise of prices too. But beyond this they have had specific, but perfectly curable, causes for unrest, the remedy for which lies in oiling, not in scrapping, existing machinery.

The first of these causes has been the vigorous effort made in recent years by English capital to improve its industrial organisation, so as to be not merely abreast of the world but ahead of it.

For instance, as a member of the recent Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to investigate and reorganise the published accounts of our railways, I have realised the extent to which, since 1902, our railways have speeded up their methods of handling traffic, a process which has necessitated stricter supervision of the men and insistence on better working. Hence active discontent.

Another cause of unrest is the recent severe fluctuation in industry caused by the South African War, succeeded by the American, or rather the world-wide, crisis of 1907.

For example, shipping, after some few years of most acute depression, became unusually brisk and profitable in 1911. Now that prices were higher, the seamen and firemen expected more. It is true that during the last fifteen years their wages had risen by about 6 per cent, but this was not much by comparison with greater advances in other trades, and was also wiped out by higher prices. On the side of the owners was the

Shipping Federation, one of the most powerful organisations of employers, which, in its eagerness to make up for lost time, unwisely ignored the claims of the Sailors' and Firemen's Union. Hence the strike; whereby to the general surprise a weak union won advanced rates of wages in a month at all the chief ports of the kingdom.

Still another reason for recent discontent among these grades of labour is traceable to their own want of organisation, or to their choice of those who lead them wrong.

For instance, in the woollen and worsted industry of South Yorkshire the operatives have never displayed the ability of their Lancashire brethren of the cotton trade in organising themselves into trade unions. This is borne out by the low scale of wages which the former have obtained even in very good times. The Board of Trade return shows that both these industries are worked by women in a large majority; but whereas the Lancashire woman gets 18s. 8d. a week, her woollen and worsted sister receives only 13s. 10d. But a deeper root of mischief is that the workers take so little continuous interest in their trade unions that they fall under those who have other fish to fry, and whose interests often diverge widely from those of labour itself. The cure of these several evils is administrative, not revolutionary.

There is a fifth remedy, applicable to those who, in spite of the first four, incidentally fall out for miscellaneous reasons from the ranks of

industry. England, as already pointed out, since 1842, has tried many specifics for her internal state, yet still the success of the industrial revolution is very far admittedly, and in spite of four hundred optimistic prophets, Ramoth-Gilead has not been won.

In these circumstances, the nation is coming to the conclusion that, having embarked on the most complex of enterprises, the cure of a people, public policy has proceeded hitherto with a serious want of plan, with wide fluctuations of purpose, and without any very precise goal. For, tossed by many doctrines, we have favoured individualism at one moment, and socialism at the next, or both together; individualism, with its apparent hypothesis that the State should do less than it ought, and socialism, with its theory that it should do more than it can.

Accordingly, another policy for to-morrow is upon us, fills the air, and has the future with it. If individualism, it is said, can never remedy those evils which itself has allowed to grow, and if socialism, on the other, which we have pursued for a generation, has failed to save us, between these two culs-de-sac runs conceivably a middle way. In plain terms, the State is definitely to see to it that each of its subjects attains to a minimum, whether in wages, or in medicine, or in housing, or in insurance, or in education, or in leisure, or in employment, or in military training, or in food. Beyond that minimum, freedom for each on the

upward way. As individualism, it seems, ignores the individual, and socialism swamps him, we are to forget these shibboleths, and are to stow these nineteenth-century antiquities in the lumber-room. Thus in future we are to employ the energies of the State in creating what for want of a better term may be called the Minimum Man. Each swimmer in the maelstrom of life is to be buoyed up partly. The milk of human kindness is to be on tap at every door. There is to be a Plimsoll line of citizenship.

There is a sixth development which the future will witness. Looking abroad over the world, will strikes, disputes, risings, lock-outs and the guerilla warfare of labour and capital, be rife as ever in the immediate future before us? Yes, unfortunately. Why?

One sufficient reason among others is that throughout the world a change, purely economic and of great power, is in silent operation. It is the rise of prices.

Various economists have attributed this rise to various causes. Some point to the recent destruction of capital in the South African, Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars; some to the relative unwillingness of this country to invest abroad until recent years; some to the rise of wages and the increased cost of production; some to the heightened standards of comfort and of consumption; some to the alarms which have made credit shy of enterprise. But there is one cause deeper

than these. The fact is that since 1896, or thereabouts, there has been in process a definite alteration in the standard of value, and this is a main reason why prices push upward.

The reason of this change is definite. The output of gold, which is the standard of value, has increased rapidly in recent years up to an annual total of nearly 100 millions sterling to-day; and, altogether, the entire production of it in the first decade of this century has been over £750,000,000 sterling. Taking the holdings of gold in the banks and treasuries of twenty-eight of the most important commercial countries, it will be found that about half this great output has passed into their keeping, the rest circulating outside them, in currency or in the arts.

Many experts have argued that this vast accumulation of the precious metal can have no effect on prices, because in modern business any relationship between gold and commodities is wholly cut off by the intervention of credit. But to argue thus is to confound the medium of exchange, which nowadays is credit mainly, with the measure of value, gold. Putting this objection then aside, it is plain that an enormous addition to the material constituting the standard of value must depreciate that standard, or, in other words, must raise prices in the long run.

But, if so, then evidently to all those who have fixed incomes or wages this is of serious concern. It means that the purchasing power of their wages

is falling, and that they are receiving their dues in a depreciating currency. Of currency the artisan knows little or nothing, but assuredly he feels his loss, sees trade active and himself poor, and inevitably agitates for a readjustment. And this is happening in the Far East as well as in the Far West; in the tropics, as I have had experience, as well as in the United States, and, of course, in England.

This readjustment, like all such, is bound to be a long, tedious, and harassing process, chequered by many outbursts and many disasters. This is one cause that has accentuated the antagonisms of labour and capital to such an acute and alarming point.

In mitigation of these evils our most practical men are busy creating a structure of mutual understanding, of conciliation, of arbitration, and of constitutional practice wherein we shall one day excel the world. But to-day and in the early future we must all allow that we have to encounter so many backward fluctuations, and dire disappointments, and breaches of agreement, and utter failures that we must fall back upon some other hope and remedy.

We have all listened so long to eulogies of co-operation and profit-sharing as not to believe much in them, though, as a matter of fact, the sliding scale of wages in use in some important trades is itself profit-sharing in a certain sense. But the only final cure for the war of labour and

capital is that labour should own some actual share in its own industries. A Lancashire authority, writing in 1887, foretold the day when the operatives in the cotton industry would possess a great portion of their mills, and already the better paid of them have large sums so invested. Similarly with our land. Here, too, and elsewhere, the best hope is that the savings of the people should be directed to investment in their own businesses. We should hear little in those days of the nationalisation by the State of industries which will be partly owned or controlled by the people themselves. The State is the name for every one else under an alias. Rather than vest their industries in the State, our artisans will prefer to vest their industries in themselves as shareholders.

Then would be, then will be, liberated a commercial energy calculated to confound our rivals and to amaze the world. Then those who have hitherto wasted their strength in the civil wars of business will join ranks to score triumphs such as we have never known. The army of industry will march not as conscripts, but as volunteers. In that day the last word of the industrial revolution will have been uttered. Nature will have surrendered to her insurgent son.

Therefore, behind the deceiving sunshine of the afternoon which, streaming over London, should have bared the abysses of poverty, instead of flattering with false visions of wealth, there seemed good hope still. We are mere neophytes, after all,

in industry. There is a reasonable abundance in store for us, and the future will show the way to it. The gates of poverty will not prevail against us. We shall individualise, rather than generalise, possession, and, by widening what men have, shall widen men.

And then the mind turned from this theme of prosperity to wider hopes, and higher aims, and better destinies.

CHAPTER VI

OUR DOMESTIC FUTURE

As the afternoon made progress, the light haze that had tended to obscure the details of the landscape began to thin and lift. For miles every house and roof stood revealed in clearer outline, wherever an angle could meet the eye in that close forestry. As they advanced more definitely into view, they, the homes of the people, could not fail to carry their own special suggestion and to impart their own significance. They prompted the thought that England, having become free, and having utilised that freedom in industry, was in turn employing the resources thus created to build the home, breed the family, strengthen the race, guarantee the future. The care of the race, or, if the term may be used, racialism—that, after freedom and industrialism, is the next watchword of the coming time. Hitherto, our zeal for the goodness of the English stock, our study of the native breed, our thought for the child and the woman, have been backward and amiss. Alike in the country and the town we witness the bad result of past negligence and want of knowledge. This must be so no longer, or else our whole future

will be invalidated. So, beyond the day when industry will be far more fruitful than at present, there will be another day and a better, when the race will be far stronger too.

Thus, as the young man's first object is to be free to go his own way, and his next is to earn for himself, and then to provide his own home, so it is with nations, or at any rate with England. In the seventeenth century she attained to freedom; in the eighteenth and nineteenth she addressed herself to industrialism; in the twentieth she will consummate these two achievements by establishing the family on the basis of health and strength.

The writers who, from Plato to Locke, and thence onwards, have discoursed upon the family, have esteemed it as the central pivot in human affairs, yet perhaps these thinkers have alike failed to lay sufficient emphasis upon two important features in what may be termed its unwritten constitution or natural structure. The first of these is that, as the family consists normally of a man in his prime and of a woman and children, the balance of sheer power inclines in favour of the man. By consequence, throughout many epochs the temptation and the tendency has been for an autocracy to arise within the bosom of this tiny state. Of this the Romans furnish the classic example, where the *patria potestas*, the authority of the father, reached at one time to abnormal heights. It must be confessed that a similar ascendency, though, of course, in an entirely

mitigated form, prevailed at one time among ourselves, with whom, for instance, the married woman was deprived, until quite recently, of some of the most essential rights of property, while the child, far into the nineteenth century, was a person scarcely known to the law. For our fathers, in winning freedom at Naseby or Worcester, forgot to bring it home.

The other flaw inherent in the human family concerns the child and the woman rather than the man. The human mammal is peculiar and perhaps unique in the unusual length of its period of childhood or dependence. The reason for this may be the complexity and potential excellence of our capacities, which need an excessive time for development and co-ordination; at any rate, we commence our lives with a period of helplessness which is abnormally long. The parent, on the other hand, has, to some degree, lost the instinct for dealing adequately with childhood, acquiring instead, in the long ascent of humanity, the compensating gift of intelligence. For instinct knows, but can learn nothing; whereas intelligence knows nothing, yet can learn all. The loss of instinct is the price which man has had to give for mind, the premium which this mortal has had to pay for immortality.

In a word, nature has left a definite gap, a wide hiatus, between infantile needs and parental knowledge.

It is evident, then, that the family possesses, as it were, an unstable constitution. For it inclines

to be upset from within, and it tends to display some incompetence in its domestic economy.

It was upon this organism, the family, that our industrial revolution fell, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with destructive force. The chief sufferer was the weakest unit of the family, that is, the child. Those who may doubt this should read that series of blue-books on the children of England, which, beginning with the report of 1817 on chimney-sweeps, may be said to have reached its climax in the report of 1867 on the abuse of children in agricultural gangs. That sequence of official documents is perhaps our most sensational literature.

Probably, however, the report and evidence issued in 1842 and 1843 by the Commission appointed to inquire into the physical and moral condition of the children and young persons employed in the mines and manufactures of this country, is on the whole the most representative and the most instructive of these documents. It appeared that an immense number of children had been drafted into industry. As regards mines, the Commissioners found that eight and nine was the ordinary age at which employment commenced, though it was frequently six and seven. Underground, girls and boys, young men and young women, and married women, worked mingled together, commonly almost naked and in the grossest degradation. The work as regards the children was mostly for twelve hours a day, while

night-work for the infants was usually part of the ordinary routine. It was found that a peculiarly stunted and debased race was thus in process of production on a wide scale, utterly uneducated, and not only immoral but with no conception of Christianity or morals. In calico-printing, the report found, children of five or six were usually kept at work fourteen hours consecutively in all the districts. In the Wolverhampton region there was a "general and almost incredible abuse" of the children. At Birmingham vice prevailed almost universally from a very early period of life, accompanied by child drunkenness on a wide scale. At Sheffield, too, there was a prevalence of the same evil. In the lace business of Nottingham it was customary for children to begin at five or six, and to be called up to work at all hours of the night with disastrous results. All this was exceeded by what went on in the millinery establishments of the metropolis. In Lancashire the parents were in the habit of "sacrificing their children without hesitation" for what they could earn. The Commissioners concluded that, over great portions of the country, the natural parental instinct was wholly extinguished by the pressure of industrialism, "the order of nature being reversed." Thus the children in the industrial regions of this country were being widely manufactured into the degenerate, the idiot, and the criminal.

The specific nature of the forces thus let loose against the child, and therefore against the future,

by the industrial revolution, deserve notice for the reason that they are not yet in abeyance. They are fourfold now. Factory life of necessity separates the woman from the child, and with the improvement of machinery the demand for women's labour is becoming accentuated in many departments. Secondly, the change whereby about three-quarters of our people have removed to towns, operates to the prejudice of the health of children. So far, then, the tendency has been for great numbers of our children to need more care than formerly. Thirdly, in the increasing strain of the industrial struggle the woman knows that it is vital to maintain the strength of the bread-winner, even at the expense of the child, and every economic investigation reveals this tendency. Fourthly, a strong motive has been brought into play inducing the parents to despatch the children at the earliest possible age into economic employment, in order to add to the family budget. The deleterious effects of this common procedure are universally recognised. Thus, the family, the factory which makes the future, is still thrown out of gear by the industrial revolution.

Looking backwards, we may recognise that the five volumes of the Commission of 1842-43 initiated the first stage of a social transformation. This primary epoch may be said to have lasted until 1889, and during the years of its currency, I have counted no less than eighty public statutes dealing mercifully with children, so deeply was

the nation's conscience stirred with our domestic evils.

Nevertheless, all this legislation up to 1889 was to some degree experimental and preliminary, and failed to reach the evil deep down. It was the act of 1889 for the Protection of Children which definitely marked a new stage, and which, with its progeny of consequential statutes, will, if properly administered, be fruitful for coming generations.

Prior to that act a child had no legal right to proper treatment, to due care, to cleanliness, or to any of the conditions most essential to its life. The act accorded those rights. Hitherto there had been no such offence as ill-treatment or neglect. The act created those offences. Till then, however brutal or unendurable its treatment at home, the child must bow its head in submission. The act abolished that misuse and violation of authority. Before it passed, the English home could be the unassailable castle of an unnatural parent and the prison of a victimised child. The act swept away that heinous prescription. Till then, the law only provided homes for the destitute child: henceforth it provided prisons for the criminal parent. Hitherto the parent had owned the child as his property: for the future the child had the privileges of a citizen. Hitherto the child had received the necessaries of life as matters of parental grace: henceforth it could claim these rights lawfully.

Following closely upon the act of 1889 came

a series of important statutes dealing with the same subject. They culminated in the Children's Act of 1908 with its 133 clauses, and thus altogether, during the last seventy years since 1840, some 110 statutes have been carried to mitigate our reproach.

With the act of 1908 the second stage of this long process approached its apogee, and is giving way to the third. It is with this third stage that the future is more closely concerned.

This third stage, which promises to be a very long one, was perhaps definitely inaugurated in 1908, by the report of the Committee on the school attendances of children below the age of five. This body, composed of twenty-one of our gravest experts, in a parliamentary report of 350 pages boldly entered the precincts of the nursery with a temerity unknown till then. They patronised net-beds. They tabulated the respective merits of black-boards and gold-fish. They acquiesced in the existence of Noah's Ark. They passed the rocking-horse. They descended as deep as sand troughs. They even authorised the unequal combat to continue between the spade and the sand-pie, on the one hand, and the ocean, on the other. Is the nursery to be revolutionised? For perambulators were not specified, and will the go-cart go?

But the Committee touched upon matters weightier and wider even than these. They laid it down that the first three years of a child's life are the most critical of all, and they pointed out

logically that if the State acknowledges, as it does, the duty of training children after the age of three, there is even greater reason for extending that care to those below that age. They were convinced that the improved treatment of the children depends almost entirely upon the improved condition of their homes, and urged that, as the best place for all children under five is a good home, the State, in improving the condition of the children, should work in unison with the home. These principles mark a new departure. We are boldly to co-operate with the family, handling the raw material of our future, and adjusting it to the loom of the coming time.

It is sometimes said, and more often thought, that this is folly, that it is infinitely better for the weaklings to die rather than be coddled into a miserable existence, and that there are far too many as it is. But such a policy is unpractical. That thousands of infants should perish outright might be tolerable enough, were it not that the hundreds of thousands, who would muddle and worry through, would be so invalidated by the initial struggle as to grow up weaklings, and physical and mental degenerates. Therefore, a high infantile mortality rate inevitably connotes a far higher infantile deterioration rate. Hence, if the policy of neglect were adopted, the national physique would be endangered or doomed. Besides, modern science has indicated that not far from 90 per cent of our infants are born healthy, and

are thus given a fair start by nature, so that to maintain them in health is by no means a hopeless task. Lastly, the argument that there are already too many is founded on erroneous economics. The true position is that each sound unit, instead of detracting from, adds to, the sum of human happiness, wealth, and efficiency, and is urgently needed to strengthen the scanty numbers of the imperial race.

It may be answered in reply that, though all this may be so in the abstract, there is no concrete proof, and can be no proof, that the family is now incapable on any broad scale, that therefore the call for outside interference is unwarrantable, and that the long roll of statutes already passed in favour of the young should now suffice. Yet there are overwhelming facts to be put honestly upon the other side.

For instance, there was published in 1910 the result of an inquiry, organised by the Board of Education, into the physical condition of our children as a whole. This was an undertaking unique in our history, and contained for the first time irrefragable evidence of the true condition of affairs affecting the six million children in the public elementary schools of England and Wales. The state of the children was shown to indicate a lamentable submission on the part of the parents throughout the country to filth and sluttishness absolutely incompatible with decency or self-respect in the homes. That dirt and disease are

congeners seemed utterly unknown or completely neglected. In July 1911 it was officially stated in Parliament that the "vast majority" of parents are utterly "surprised" when the actual illness of their children is brought home to them. Or again, an official inquiry recently conducted into the persons blind from childhood has established that from 50 to 60 per cent of this evil is solely due to the utter ignorance and incapacity displayed in the home. Such statements might be multiplied without end. Taken together they confirm the view almost universally expressed by those best qualified to express an opinion, that the incompetence displayed in the nurseries and homes of this country is profound. This, then, is one of the reasons why, in the words of Mr. John Burns, "we are beginning to concentrate on the child."

These views can be verified if we consider the recent history of infantile mortality in this country, which is, perhaps, one of the most compendious tests of health. The law here has been that, while for the half century from 1860 up to 1908 the annual death-rate of all persons in England and Wales fell rapidly, that of infants under one year of age fell much more slowly. In fact, the latter rate in 1895 and 1899 stood actually at its highest level. The reason for this divergence between the two rates appears to have been that, while public energy in sanitation, and so forth, favourably affected the seniors, it was not able to exercise a correspondingly beneficial effect on the nursery,

owing to the invincible inability and prejudice displayed in that department of our social system. Now, however, that outside influences have begun, in 1909, to penetrate successfully into the homes we may expect an eventual response of the infantile death-rate, which, indeed, in 1909 fell from the 1901-8 average of 133 per thousand to the unprecedentedly low figure of 109, and again in 1910 to 106. The fivefold influence of teachers, health visitors, inspecting officers, care committees, and medical officers, of whom to-day there are nearly a thousand, has now at last been mobilised against parental inefficiency and in favour of the child. The work of rebuilding the national physique has at last been initiated, and must for many generations to come call forth our energies. If Comte said rightly that the first seven years of life are the most decisive, it is in the family that the national existence is primarily at stake.

After the nursery, the school. The school is the next stage of human life, and here too the family has shown itself quite unable to satisfy the call of the future.

As with so much else, it was at Athens that the theory of elementary education was first formulated. For Socrates, on his visit to the Athenian workshops, laid it down that though the artisan, in virtue of his technical skill, has an advantage over the thinker, what he needs is culture after all. That proposition, after twenty-

three centuries, was not accepted practically in England until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

Although we have been so backward in this department, it must be remembered that there have been, nevertheless, two remarkable periods of educational activity in our annals. The first had its flowering time in the thirteenth century, when the mediæval mind was more alert than before or later, and Oxford could rival Paris itself. The second came to a head from the time of Henry VIII. to that of our Civil War, during which epoch nearly eight hundred grammar schools were founded for the public benefit. And yet it happened that both these extraordinary efforts seemed in course of time to yield relatively poor fruit.

The reason of this strange weakness in the intellectual organisation of the most vigorous of peoples has called forth the speculations of thinkers, who, however, may not yet have touched the truth. Perhaps the real reason was our neglect of the education of women. Mediæval pedagogy looked to the male rather than to the female, for the end of its instruction was the Church, and the highest purpose of its chantry and cathedral schools, those cradles of elementary education, was to produce clerics. Similarly with the second movement initiated at the Renaissance. In all the deeds of gift and statutes of founders instituting those eight hundred grammar schools,

scarcely one can be found which allows girls to be educated. The object of the pious founders was almost wholly to teach boys Greek and Latin, together with religion.

But if the women of a nation are practically uneducated, the educational system of that people is insecure. If the man vetoes the education of the woman, the ignorance of the woman forbids the education of the child. If the child has not that home education which, as Plato said, is of all things most valuable, the vicious circle of ignorance is complete. Does that account partly for the past of our educational deficiencies?

At any rate, whatever the explanation, the history of our education up to the closing decades of the nineteenth century is not merely a record of stagnation but even of lamentable and painful decline. That statement is not speculative or hypothetical. It can be proved to the hilt by a perusal of the conclusions of the Commissions which sate in the 1860's, and reported respectively on our elementary and secondary education. Altogether, these documents stand to the pedagogic world as the report of 1843 stands to the industrial. They revealed a deplorable condition of ignorance, chaos, and decay.

As touching elementary education at that date, it was required for 4,300,000 children. Of these no less than 2,000,000 were not at school at all; while another 1,000,000 were at schools of utter inefficiency. The rest were distributed among

institutions of varying degrees of merit. And this in a country whose American offspring had instituted a sound system of general education since the time of Cromwell, and whose Scotch neighbours had organised the same since the days of William III.!

But if the elementary system was bad, the secondary system was really pathetic in its decrepitude; and the ponderous tomes of the Commission which inquired into the state of our grammar schools and other institutions of secondary teaching, constitute one of the most melancholy chapters in the history of the English mind. The body of Commissioners was moved to propound the thesis that girls should have full participation in any such system as could be set on foot.

It had therefore become evident that the State must henceforth abandon its immemorial policy of abstaining almost totally from interference with education. It had relied on the family, and the family had failed it. Parents had not seen fit to insist on the education of their children, so the State must reluctantly adopt the imperative mood, effecting forcible entry into the family precincts and possessing itself of the child. In the words of the minister who introduced the Education Act of 1870, "England must now make up for the smallness of her numbers by increasing the intellectual force of the individual."

During the period of nearly half a century since that time the efforts of statesmen have been

directed, of course, principally to establishing a satisfactory system of elementary education. To test the enlightenment of our day, it is possible to put in percentages the education of an average boy, say in a London school. It would seem from this calculation that his time is allotted as follows: 45 per cent to reading and writing English, and to arithmetic; 15 per cent to the threefold study of geography, history, and nature; 18 per cent to the artistic pursuits of drawing, handicraft, and singing; 12 per cent to physical exercises and recreation; 10 per cent to religion. It should be added that the work of a girl is somewhat differently distributed, as she has to give much time to domestic economy and housewifery. A mediæval schoolmaster who taught the seven sciences would have been little edified on hearing of this procedure, and might even have been aghast.

The instruction thus given to the 700,000 children of London, to take them as a sample, may be viewed in another light. They spend twenty-eight hours a week continuously during nine years under fairly satisfactory conditions of air, warmth, and light, engaged in wholesome and stimulating pursuits. Considering what their homes often are, this itself must be reckoned an immense benefit.

It would be an error to conclude from all this that the problems of our elementary education have even yet been solved by the administrative energies of half a century. The warring claims of

humanism and industry still jar. The Poor Law Commissioners of 1909 found among almost all their witnesses a strong feeling that the system is still unsuited to practical needs. Or again, that the distaste of the parents for education is still decided may be judged from the fact that, though they can claim gratuitous elementary education for their children up to the age of fifteen, the vast proportion withdraw their children from school on the earliest possible opportunity, at the age of fourteen, thus rupturing their scale of instruction at the most critical point. Or again, many listen to the advice of Tolstoi, the Rousseau of our time, like him a revolutionary and like him an educationalist, urging that children should not be burdened with books at all, that all boys and girls should be trained mainly to work with their hands at domestic duties, that all the school systems of modern states instil false statecraft and inspire wrong jingo ideals, and that disorder, or free order as he called it, should be encouraged to evoke individuality at all costs. Nevertheless, in spite of such moot issues or deficiencies, our elementary system may be pronounced to be taking shape on set lines, so that it can no longer be said to the English educationalist, in the matter of elementary instruction: "Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep."

The main educational issue of the coming time centres, then, not so much in elementary, as in that vague and vast field known as secondary, education.

It is in this region that the battle of England's commercial supremacy may be lost, and must be won.

Those who would try to define the secondary education of this country, will not succeed, or, if they do survive and reach the other shore, will emerge from their Odyssey as exhausted as the much-travelled and much-troubled Ulysses. The French, very logically, have their primary, secondary, and tertiary, education; we call the first and last by the terms Elementary and University, though still, with disregard of coherence, retaining the second name.

Writing in 1887 amid the torrent of Jubilee, Matthew Arnold sounded an emphatic warning. Our secondary education, he said, is a chaos. He pointed out that the bulk of the middle class of this country were worse educated than the corresponding class either in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, or the United States; the reason being, he explained, that our upper class do not want to be disturbed in their preponderance, or the middle class in their vulgarity. Let us have, he cried, good elementary schools taking our youth to thirteen, and good secondary schools taking them to sixteen, together with good technical and special schools parallel with the secondary schools proper. As yet, nothing really substantial or adequate had been achieved; we had indeed broken up the old type of secondary instruction, but had not yet founded a new one of any soundness or worth.

It must be confessed that, up till 1902, which dated a new epoch in this connection, little clear response came to the objurgations of our English Jeremiah. This branch of instruction continued to grow haphazard, unpruned, and at its own sweet will.

Yet secondary education is vital to our ultimate prosperity, since it undertakes to guide youth at its most uncertain hour, when it enters, or ere it enters, the real business of industrial life.

The cause of our tardy action has been that in this country the function of secondary instruction is complicated by special embarrassments. The precise nature of the difficulty may be stated to be that while, on the one hand, compulsion by the State ceases abruptly at the elementary age, on the other, nearly two-thirds of the boys leaving the elementary school select a form of occupation where there is little initial call for skill, no provision for training, and small prospect of a permanent position when the boy becomes a man, so that they feel no reason to pursue their education further than the primary stage. The individual needs to be shepherded towards aptitude and efficiency, and this, next to our care for the physique of the race, is the other main problem which for many decades far into the future, if we are to judge from the analogous history of our primary education, must exercise us most.

A reference to the example of Germany may serve to clear our views as to the office of secondary

education. The 9,000,000 school children of Germany are compelled to attend up to the age of fourteen, and after that age must, as a rule, attach themselves to an evening continuation school for three years longer. Here actual compulsion ends, but indirectly it is made difficult for them to dispense with secondary education. For a pupil, by obtaining a satisfactory certificate from a secondary school, can by this means secure entry into certain University courses, and thereby into some important professions, and can also in this way procure exemption from one year's military service. Hence, elementary and secondary education are closely affiliated in the fatherland. These secondary schools are either classical (Gymnasien), or modern (Realschulen), the former usually preparing scholars for the University, and the latter for the Technical High Schools. Secondary schools altogether educate nearly 400,000 scholars under about 20,000 teachers, and furnish instruction of the most advanced type.

On leaving the secondary school the German youth passes either into one of the Universities, of which the purport is pure culture, or into one of those Technical High Schools, of which the recent growth has been so conspicuous and formidable. It is in these latter that the qualities of Teutonic thoroughness are best displayed, and most unerringly applied to the triumphs of industry. These High Schools are nothing less than the headquarters of modern science, where a staff, comprising the most

renowned scientists, plan, from the retorts and microscopes of their laboratories, campaigns against nature and the conquest of the commercial world.

Nevertheless, though Germany may be said to have outdistanced us at several points in this department, we need not definitely adopt sackcloth, or pour ashes too indiscriminately upon our head. Since 1902 we have begun to wrestle with our own problem, and there is no doubt that we are making considerable way. The main necessity of the time is not merely to organise secondary education as a thing apart, but to link it to primary education by some device which will induce our youth to remain within the circuit of instruction, instead of abruptly quitting it. To the achievement of this end something has been already contributed. One of the more hopeful innovations of our time has been the remodelling of our secondary schools, together with the provision by local authorities of organised scholarships. Schemes, enabling promising pupils from public elementary schools to proceed to the next stage of instruction, are backed by the regulations of the Board of Education, making it a condition of increased grants offered to secondary schools that a proportion of free places, ordinarily one-quarter, should be reserved in each school for pupils from elementary schools. Thus the bulk of the State-aided secondary schools are now under effective control, and are open, as regards a certain number of places, without payment of fee, to children from the public

elementary schools. There are now few populous areas in which there is not some suitable secondary school accessible to all classes, and there is a tendency of public opinion to regard a complete national system of secondary schools as, at all events, a desirable ideal.

And yet, in spite of these cheering considerations, our secondary education is in germ only, and is utterly incomplete as yet. At the present date we have only 161,000 scholars in secondary schools, and even these, in most cases, according to the statement of the Minister of Education in July 1911, "come in too late and go out too early." Besides, the nature of the teaching in these schools has been hitherto, and is still, unsatisfactory, for, in the words of the same authority, "there are far too few of the teachers in secondary schools who have had anything in the nature of training."

In a perfect system the next stage for our youth would be to proceed regularly from secondary to what may be termed tertiary, or University, instruction. But of course, in our present stage, such an idea is out of court, and in August 1911 the minister responsible has drawn due attention to "the apathy of the public at large" to this branch of education. Indeed, it is beyond the present hopes of practical men that the generality of our youth should even proceed so far as to attend secondary schools proper. Let us be more modest and more sober in our immediate aspirations. At present, our best efforts are directed to

organising schools of a humbler quality than the secondary schools, where boys and girls, immediately after leaving the elementary school, may be trained practically in their future businesses, or to instituting evening schools, which may present some useful education after industrial life is already begun, or art schools, where the young may be taught to apply art to mechanical processes, or, again, technical institutions proper.

Here, again, even the most pronounced optimist must realise our painful deficiencies. The minister explains that in technology, as compared with the Continent, "we have most leeway to make up." And indeed, if, to the full-time students in our eleven modern Universities, be added the undergraduates and post-graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, it will be found that England and Wales possess 16,600 students only, against the army of 63,000 students possessed by Germany in similar institutions.

Thus, is it too much to say that our system is still inchoate after the efforts of fifty years? Let us believe that in another fifty years a definite organisation will have finally won its way amid the press of educational controversies. Growth is slow; prejudice and counter-interests are oppressive; the calls of life are insistent; and this powerful race has some innate and profound distrust of knowledge for its own sake, agreeing with Epictetus that education is a surgery to which we go not for pleasure, but for pain. Will not the

future take a wider view, and form a more generous conception? For the true object of education is that each body should have its own hygiene, and each mind its own Renaissance, and each soul its own Reformation.

Racialism, then, or the culture of the race, and the care of the individual—this, before all! Such, above all things else, will be the domestic business of us in the twentieth century. As we judge the seventeenth century by its work for freedom, and as we test the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the value of their industrialism, so, domestically, the England of the twentieth century will largely stand, or fall, in the estimation of the future by its success, or failure, in dealing with the health and physique, bodily and mental, of the English race.

It may be said in reply that other internal issues much more vital and much more moving fill the air and will engage the energies of men. The battle of liberty, it may be argued, is never won, and the social forces wage a warfare for predominance which can never cease. True,—yet, in sum, the classic time of freedom is in the past not the future, and, were it needful to revive the battles of liberty in the face of new oppression, the refurbished armour of those old days would suffice.

Or again, it may be thought that the reorganisation of our industrial system should be the main goal of our future efforts, and that it is here that we shall witness the most momentous trans-

formation. True, again, partially—for evidently, even after the labour of generations, it is as yet half-way. Yet here, too, the main line of progress is well foreshadowed.

But the really vital and momentous thought, only now beginning to dawn upon the public mind, is that in all the catalogue of her achievements England has neglected her own breed of men. Walk through the streets of Gath or of Ascalon, where three-quarters of our populace are now gathered together, and see if that be not true. The cause of their condition is the physical breakdown of the family over large areas before the pressure of industrialism.

Five proofs of that truth are available, and cannot be too much laid to heart. Parents, under the stress of the industrial struggle, have not been able to resist the temptation of sacrificing the health and strength of their children for the sake of the money which the latter can earn. Next, the State, which deliberately, and of set policy, had left to the family the task of educating its offspring, found that such a task and duty had been hopelessly neglected by the mass of our families, and that education must, in consequence, be made obligatory upon them, if this country were not to be distanced by its rivals, and if its freedom were not to be a broken reed. The third proof has been found in the figures of infantile mortality, furnishing evidence of parental indifference or incompetence to a serious extent. And then, too, the recent investigation

into the cleanliness and habits of the children, as they appear at school fresh from their homes, has revealed an astonishing mass of ignorance, and a marked neglect of the most elementary precautions against disease upon the part of the parents.

The fifth proof is not less cogent than these. If we look at the class of the casual labourers of this country, calculated at somewhat under two millions in number, these often fail to get a full week's work, and their average earnings for the year are so low that, even with careful management, they are frequently unable to procure for themselves and their families the necessaries of healthy life. It is these men who, with their families, fill the hospitals and infirmaries, and burden the community in so many ways, while the hundreds of thousands of their children share the demoralisation of their parents. It is largely the offspring of these casual labourers who grow up so under-nourished, and poorly clothed, and degenerate in physique, and who lack not merely food and clothes but even a minimum of home care. Thus the children recruit the ranks of casual labour, follow the parental example, decline to work regularly or learn a trade, and breed families prone to an early degeneracy.

It is difficult then, after weighing all these reasons soberly, to deny that this widespread weakness of the family, the oldest, and most powerful, and best of human institutions, is the gravest evil, the most urgent domestic problem, which we have still to face and overcome.

Therefore, a touch of gloom, a wave of shadow, seems to overcloud the future here. What bad ingredients in the glory of England! What errors we may perpetrate, what delays we shall undergo, ere we feel our way to the desired end of recuperated family life and revivified personality!

But a further thought suggests itself. This racial evil has been on the increase for several generations, having grown with the growth, and strengthened with the strength, of the industrial revolution. What, then, is the fundamental reason why, for so long a time, our administrators sate inert in face of the progress of this malady? In the name of what principle did they abstain from grappling with it? That question cannot be put aside lightly. For, if the same cause be now operative and applicable, it might be calculated to tie our hands too.

The true answer goes down to the crucial subject of the relationship of religion and the State, and the proper functions of each.

Statesmen are those, doubtless, who, by business methods and practical expedients, seek to realise materially the ends and ideals of the governed. But that which ultimately provides the ends and ideals of any people, and thus regulates from outside the scope of statesmanship, without interfering in its methods and internal economy, is religion. Therefore, the State is, as it were, the adjutant, the bailiff of religion, the general

manager of mysticism. It receives its highest ideals from across the religious borderland.

It so happened that, in the Middle Ages, religion was pushed forward by the aspirations of Italian statesmanship and by the mental energy of the Scholastics far beyond this, its constitutional boundary and term. In plain words, religion strove to lift even administrative and executive government out of the hands of secular practitioners, thus exceeding its office. St. Augustine, in early days, had indeed countenanced the conception of a Church purely spiritual, in contact with a worldly state. His great mind, however, had recognised the difficulty, or, more strictly, his consummate wisdom had assigned to each its place. But what was given to the founder of mediæval theology was not accorded to his successors; his greatness was taken: his weakness left. These latter, in their speculative imprudence, ran violently down the slope avoided by the Fathers, and thus the Church bade fair to be dragged to the lower level of mere statesmanship by the juristic dialectic of the Roman canonists.

The result of all this was the Reformation. Just as, doctrinally, the Reformation strove to replace the mediatorial priesthood of the clergy by the spiritual priesthood of all believers; so, politically, it consisted in the emphatic, and even violent, assertion by the State of its power over the Church. Hence the absolutism with which modern times opened, when statesmen, turning the tables

on ecclesiasticism, attempted to penetrate far into its precincts.

This counter-attack by the State had proved a failure, in England at least, by the eighteenth century. For the English people declined, with their usual stubbornness, to be carried too far in either direction, and would no more consent to a strict political, than to a strict ecclesiastical, control, evicting the Stuarts on the one hand as they had repudiated Rome on the other.

With the eighteenth century, therefore, a novel situation arose. Church and State alike had gone under in turn. Each had definitely failed to assert its ascendency in a sphere not properly its own. The mediæval edifice which, mingling truth with beauty, had been the common shrine of sixty generations, was a dismantled wreck. Correspondingly, the State, now aloof from religion which it had tried in vain to dominate, had nowhere henceforth to apply for its higher inspiration, and there was nothing to make the dry bones live.

This was the cause why our State in the eighteenth, and through much of the nineteenth, century proved itself so unfitted to meet those needs of England now under review. For when, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, our materialistic and industrial expansion began, and active measures became then, if ever, necessary to solve the domestic issues opening up, we merely floated along. From whatever angle the states-

manship of that period, so far as it had to do with the health or happiness of the people, be considered, an emphatic condemnation must be pronounced. As a legislator of that time said, legislation really proceeded on the principle that life had grown cheap. Parliament's constructive social legislation was practically confined to multiplying capital offences, which, at the Revolution of 1688, were about fifty in number, and, at the opening of the nineteenth century, had risen to about two hundred. The penal code, presently to be transformed by Sir Robert Peel, was the standard of our legislative bankruptcy.

Then arose a school of thinkers who made it their business to find principles for our social negligence, and to propound theories to correspond with our administrative futility. In default of religion, which had definitely abjured leadership, they substituted a formal political agnosticism. They pushed confidently across the shoals of human nature laid bare by the religious ebb. They brought to birth the economic man! On that view, our species is chiefly animated by the pursuit of profit, and from that hypothesis they extracted the laws of politics. Man became the premiss of a deductive syllogism. There was an iron logic, a faultless sequence, an invulnerability in their conclusions, as they rolled them down from the height of this inexorable postulate. It was the gospel of the manufacturer-take-the-hindmost. Such, originating in the divorce of the State and religion,

was the Arctic habit of mind, the polar view of citizenship, which led us so deep into the dangers entangling us to-day.

Nevertheless, this was an artificial and unstable condition of affairs, as appeared every year more obviously with the progress of the nineteenth century. The State and religion began presently to live on better terms with one another, working co-operatively, the one to formulate ideals and the other to fulfil them.

There can be no doubt as to the general influence which this change must tend to exercise upon the commonwealth; for, in the words of Edmund Burke, "Christ appeared in sympathy with the lowest of the people, and thereby made it a firm and ruling principle that their welfare was the object of all government." However, in the perversity of human affairs, there is some danger attending us even here.

That danger is sentimentalism. The risk of sentimentalism is that, whereas, in the past, we have suffered from the conception of the economic, we may, in the future, suffer from the reality of the uneconomic, man. So we shall regret it, if we shed too abruptly our utilitarian skin.

But, on the other hand, and on the whole, we may welcome this new integration, for the fruit of better lives that it will yield us, and for the cure which it will apply to the weaknesses of the race. And besides, there is another danger which it can avert. Since democracy ever opens itself to more

numbers, its authority tends in a like ratio to slide into autocracy. Therefore, the old balances and checks, the counter-weights and counter-checks, of the constitution of our fathers stand in danger of the judgment, so that, however much we prize them, we must not pin all our political faith to these. Only where policy rests on an eternal code, can freedom find sanctuary, whence to say *usque huc venies* to despotism itself.

CHAPTER VII

OUR INTERNATIONAL FUTURE

So far, then, it had seemed that the maintenance of liberty, the extension of industrialism, and the initiation of racialism, or the care of the race, would constitute our domestic future. It was normal and healthy that a nation should realise its destiny in this order, just as an individual aspires first to independence, then to earning wealth, and next to the foundation of a family.

Yet this conclusion had scarcely been reached ere its inadequacy stood confessed. For clearly, a nation cannot cry halt when it has rendered its citizens the freest, the most prosperous, and the most healthy in the world. Its very success in so arduous a work must inevitably awake new ambitions, wider desires, and loftier interests not yet accounted for. The people must aspire to rise on the stepping-stones of these acquired advantages, and to assert themselves in the world. And the sight of London, stretching interminably under the afternoon sun, strengthened that conviction. For she draws so much of her power and life from intercourse with many peoples, and looks oversea. Internationalism, then, or our due

relationship with the nations yonder, is the next issue to confront us. What will democracy do here?

Our immediate problem is, of course, with Europe.

During the nineteenth century, from the close of the Napoleonic struggle, two opposite European policies contended for mastery with us. The one found its most authoritative exposition in Sir Robert Peel's last speech, in 1850. He argued with weight that we should keep clear of Europe altogether, and that we had no call to exercise even "moral influence" in that quarter, even in the name of "constitutional liberty." Far better attend to our own business, which is urgent enough, and give a wide berth to continental complications.

The other view was best advocated by Mr. Gladstone, in what Mr. Balfour has called his "unequalled" speech of 1877, when the orator exerted himself to recommend the opposite policy of interposition. "Sir, there were other days when England was the hope of freedom"; when, in fact, all those who struggled to be free could look to us for succour. In his appeal to bring those days back again, the master harped on a very tuneful string.

But though either of these policies may have been possible in the nineteenth century, neither of them will command the allegiance of the twentieth.

Taking the view of Sir Robert Peel first, we all agree in theory that, burdened as we are with our extra-European interests, it would be highly convenient if we could act as though Europe were not. But, unfortunately, as time goes on, it is becoming increasingly apparent that we cannot escape by any possibility from the direct influence of, and intimate contact with, the continental powers.

For instance, our dealings with the world outside Europe have multiplied enormously since 1850, and, strangely enough, it is these which have brought us into closer contact with Europe. That was the inwardness of Bismarck's meaning when he said that he could defend the German colonies "against France, at the gates of Metz; or against England, in Egypt." Or again, it is well known that the Boers, during the years prior to the last South African War, were guided in the main outline of their policy by the knowledge that some sympathies in Europe were on their side. Thus nowadays, our critics in Europe, without lifting a finger or moving a gun, cross the sea without ships, stand impalpably in the battle, and mulct us in treasure and in blood.

Or again, it is Europe which enters vitally into our domestic finance, and actually determines to a very considerable extent our internal economy. For not only is the immense bulk of our national debt due to our past wars in Europe, but to-day the barometer of our army and navy estimates

accords mainly with the atmospheric depressions advancing, or receding, across the Channel. To-day, as Sir Edward Grey said recently, our expenditure must be dependent upon the expenditure of other powers. It is thus necessary to conclude that our avoidance of Europe is more and more impossible, that we are indissolubly associated, and that we cannot put the continent by. For it is largely in that precipitous watershed that the torrent of our national expenditure has origin; the chief lions in our path can be traced to that lair.

This consideration pushes us a stage into the subject. In the twentieth century, to wash our hands of Europe is to decline to have anything to do with our most crucial interests and our most vital necessities.

If, then, the policy indicated by Sir Robert Peel is becoming, on the whole, unacceptable; so, also, on the other hand, is the policy of active moral action so finely enforced by Mr. Gladstone. The ground of this view can be stated in a single sentence. Now that constitutional government obtains everywhere, the good things of freedom are presumably already within the reach of all. But, more than this, we have not the power. For instance, all Englishmen probably disapprove of Germany's treatment of the Poles in East Prussia. Here freedom might well summon us to interfere. No need to waste words in proving laboriously that the day is gone by for any such sentimental journey into the fatherland.

Hence, if both the continental policies which commended themselves to nineteenth-century statesmen are obsolete, whither shall we steer in Europe, since steer we must?

The two policies above mentioned, though apparently divergent, were fundamentally rooted alike in the same hypothesis. That hypothesis was one of pessimism as regards the European world. For the advocates of the first policy assumed that Europe was such a whirlpool that it was best to avoid it altogether; while the advocates of the second equally assumed the continent to be so incapable of managing its own affairs properly that England was bound to intervene occasionally for freedom's sake.

Our present point of view must be somewhat different. We start from the assumption that, in our day, we cannot avoid constant association with Europe. Accordingly, the precise issue now before us is whether we shall restrict that association as far as possible, or whether we shall extend and regularise it, on a settled plan.

At the European ball, shall we dance every turn, or shall we merely be agreeable to the dowagers? That depends on Europe.

If any Briton, now or at any time, were to ask for a forecast of European affairs, he would hear, no doubt, that things are at their gravest, that they were never more threatening, and that war, if not actually declared, would break out somewhere and soon. Yet our dismayed islander might take

some heart of grace, if he remembered that, for the last fifteen centuries since the entry of our barbarous ancestors into the Roman Empire, not a decade has passed in which Europe has not been either at war or in active preparation for it. For the continental nations have never lived otherwise than in crises, excursions, and alarms.

The causes of this preternatural vehemence, implanted in the peoples of the western stock, lie inscrutably far beyond knowledge. No analysis can account for that bacillus of mutual hatred with which our tribal parents, issuing from the German forests and the Asiatic steppes, inoculated the West. In the South-Eastern Europe of our own time, that brasier of so many races, these primitive passions may be witnessed still, burning with the crude and unalloyed fire of antiquity. See the Bulgarian, all muscle, next to the Greek, all nerve; the Servian, haunted by memories of an heroic past and of a lost imperialism, cheek by jowl with the robber race of Albania. For these peoples to quarrel, any pretext has been enough. Meanwhile, the advanced peoples of Europe, while contemning these archaisms and taking longer views of mutual destruction, have hastened to fill the intervals of their wars with the increase of their armaments.

So much for the past. But it is the future that concerns us. Democracy has been busy conquering Europe since the French Revolution, and now that it has definitely become dominant, will it tend

towards international peace or war? On this issue, so vital for ourselves, we have two diametrically opposite schools of thought to guide us. These must be interrogated and cross-examined, for, according as we answer this question, our future course in Europe depends.

One side prophesies that the people will be all for peace. If so, goodwill among the nations will be the embrocation patented by democracy. These thinkers look forward confidently to the coming advent of that time, so long wished for and never yet realised, when nations shall finally lay aside the sword. The other side asserts precisely the opposite. It declares that demos will prove the very imp of international mischief, demos who, blatant with unruly passions and windy ignorance, will seek wars and ensue them. Thus the former agree with Mazzini that democracy is progress under the best and wisest; the latter endorse the verdict of Talleyrand that it is an aristocracy of roughs.

The latter opinion has, in our epoch, found its most convinced and impressive champions in Moltke on the continent, and in Lord Salisbury here. Moltke, speaking in the Reichstag upon the Army Bill of 1890, said, "princes and governments do not really bring about wars in our day. The era of cabinet wars is over. We have now only peoples' wars. The truth is that the factors which militate against peace are to be found in the people themselves." The German Imperial

Chancellor, in March 1911, speaking in the Reichstag, repeated and emphasised these views. He said that the time had passed away when European wars could be made by governments, and that nowadays wars only arose from antagonisms rooted in popular sentiment.

Lord Salisbury, throughout his career, held the same opinion, and constantly insisted upon it. As early as 1864 he wrote that "moderation has never been characteristic of democracy. In the old hemisphere, or the new, a thirst for empire and a readiness for aggression have always marked it." And to this idea he constantly recurred with all the increased authority of ripening experience, pointing out in 1888, that the real peril to peace came "from the bursts of uninformed feeling among the masses of the people"; in 1897, that it was the "unofficial people" who made war nowadays; and in 1900, that the governments are pacific, but are "always liable to be overthrown by the violent and vehement operations of mere ignorance." This devout lover of peace profoundly distrusted the international proclivities of the people, and set himself throughout his career to pluck the finest feathers from the wing of high-flying sentimentalism. He was the plumassier of democracy.

These two schools of thought, then, stand diametrically opposed. One side opines democracy to be a tree fruitful in olive-branches. To the other, it is a stem which is certain to put forth,

one day or another, the red bloom of war. Let us see which is right, and then act accordingly.

The first argument, and not the least powerful, adduced in favour of a peaceful future to be provided by democracy, is derivable from the United States. What the leading democracy in the world thinks of war to-day, surely the democracies of Europe will think to-morrow. Mr. Bryce, in his classic work, *The American Commonwealth*, states that "no country is at bottom more pervaded by a hatred of war." The Americans, he repeats, "have no lust of conquest—have no earth-hunger." From such a pronouncement it must be difficult to appeal.

Nevertheless, if we look a little more closely at the United States, any such argument drawn from that instance must appear of doubtful import. For, against the view just cited, must be set that which Burke, followed by others up to our own time, entertained of the Americans. He considered them to possess all the characteristics of an ambitious race. "Fierce" was the epithet which he thought most applicable to them: "we cannot falsify the pedigree of this fierce people," and he noticed in them all the marks of "the haughtiness of domination." And surely, the people who, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, could not even settle the question of domestic slavery without a terrible civil war, can hardly be held up safely as a model of peaceful democracy.

Besides, if they are a nation who feel "no lust of conquest" and no "earth-hunger," how is it

that, during a century, they have absorbed an immense portion of the earth's surface; have ousted from their neighbourhood three great nations, Russia from Alaska, France from Louisiana, Spain from all the South and West; have proclaimed by the Monroe doctrine that they will not allow any European power to "extend its system in any portion of this hemisphere"; have, recently, embarked on a most vigorous and expansive foreign policy in regard to Venezuela, Hawaii, Cuba, Spain, and the Philippines; have reorganised their army; and finally, are busy adopting measures of armament calculated to render them the second naval power in the world? According to Mr. Roosevelt, they are "a nation already of giant strength, which is but a foretaste of the power that is to come."

The next argument favouring a peaceful future in Europe is that so ably presented by Jeremy Bentham and his followers. To them monarchy is essentially warlike, and therefore democracy, a species of inverted monarchy, is essentially peaceful. Hobbes in former days had defined democracy as political power divided into small fragments, and Bentham said of it similarly that it is a polity where everybody counts for one, and nobody for more than one. The latter and his school inferred from this that, whereas monarchy is amenable to "sinister" influences, democracy avoids that pitfall, and remains in the broad and open way of peace.

Applying that to ourselves, we remember that democracy was definitely installed upon its throne here by the statutes of 1867 and 1885. Yet when the South African War broke out in 1899, those who held the Benthamite view in question were almost unanimous in recording their opinion that our democracy, at this its crucial test, had been duped by the "Kaffir circus," that Park Lane had outwitted Parliament, and that Beit and Co. had pulled the strings, with England for their marionette. Thus they bastinadoed us. But, in saying all this, they cut away the best anticipations for democracy. For, if one side recognises it to be inveterately warlike, and the other admits it to be utterly gullible, the world stands a poor chance. Small hope if the serpent, capital, can so easily corrupt the morals of the dove, democracy.

But, thirdly, abstract arguments about democracy apart, it is said that war must be particularly abominable to the working classes who rule us now. For war, we are told, breeds the sultanised satrap and the plumed proconsul; and empire, according to James Mill, is "a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes." Glory is stated to be a dividend for everybody but the artisan, and the "lower races," whom we are to "foster," a euphemism for slave-labour. The new diplomacy is stigmatised as finance "in the know"; public opinion as Fleet Street; naval and military scares as merely the big armament firms on the prowl for orders. The masses, we are informed,

cannot away with "rectifications" of frontier, and "hinterlands," and "concessions of territory," and "trusteeships for civilisation," and "manifest destinies," and all the jargon about "efficiency." It is anathema to them even to "think imperially."

Such is a fair statement of the main reason given why wars shall presently be put on the shelf, and why our democracy and those of Europe may prepare to lie down in amity. This argument, like the rest, is worth an examination.

Democracy, in its modern phase, was inaugurated in Europe as long ago as 1789, and, therefore, its essential lineaments may be fairly discerned by now. It is evident that at first, in 1789 and 1790, the new France was thoroughly animated by hopes of universal peace. Mirabeau, towards the close of the latter year, solemnly asseverated "our unalterable desire for peace and the renunciation of all conquests," naming this country as "our elder brother in liberty." Unfortunately, in its high despotic temper, the Revolution, in the brief space of two years, had generated that warlike spirit which it required a quarter of a century of war to quench.

With the close of 1815, however, and amid the general exhaustion of Christendom, it might have been hoped that order and peace would have resumed sway. But the generation succeeding to 1815 was best characterised by Prince Metternich, when, writing in 1859, he uttered the lament that "the revolution to-day counts seventy years of

life—it has passed from a flagrant to a chronic state." And, indeed, this was the age of permanent revolutionary unrest. From 1815 to 1830 alone, political cyclones swept over Europe, and shook established authority in Spain, in Portugal, in Italy, and in Greece. These were followed by the French Revolution of 1830, and by others in Belgium and Poland. Seven revolutions in little more than fifteen years! After 1830 the movement culminated in 1848 with a series of explosions which burst throughout Europe.

It might be thought, then, and it was thought by the men of 1850, that, war having played every trick upon democracy, peace was now at last definitely in sight. Britons began to descant on the parliament of man, on war drums beating no longer, and on the federation of the world. Our universal exhibition was organised to usher in the brotherhood of peoples, and good men gushed over the inauguration of universal peace.

From that moment, however, wars raged in almost all quarters of the globe. In Europe alone, Italy fought Austria; Austria fought Germany; Germany fought France; France fought Russia; Russia fought England; Germany fought Denmark; Russia fought Turkey; and so on with the catalogue. Triumphant democracy!

But surely, with the close of the latter war, and with the successful conclusion of the Berlin Conference, the nations could at last consent to cease from aggression and the rape of territories

not their own. Here, in 1880, we consigned Lord Beaconsfield to his political grave, turned our backs on "scientific frontiers" and oriental adventure, and deemed ourselves ripe to be friends with all the world. Yet from that very date we, and our fellow European nations, embarked on the most rapid and vast career of acquisition and conquest that the world had witnessed since the days of Islam.

For instance, speaking in 1896, Lord Rosebery could say: "During the last twelve years you have been laying your hands with almost frantic eagerness on every tract of territory adjacent to your own, or desirable from any other point of view. In twelve years you have added to the empire, whether in the shape of actual annexation or of dominion, or of what is called a sphere of influence, 2,600,000 square miles of territory . . . twenty-two areas as large as the United Kingdom itself." And since then we have rapidly gone forward with immense annexations on the same lines. So too with France. The extension of her empire into Senegal and Sahara by 1880 was promptly followed by the annexation of Tunis. She scrambled for Africa in 1884, at the same time consolidating her Asiatic empire in Tongking and Laos. Since 1880 France has acquired 3,500,000 square miles, with a native population of about 40,000,000. So with the other nations.

Nevertheless, even these stupendous conquests

have not been able for a moment to satiate the warlike instincts of the European world. Not content with subduing the extra-European races, we arm ruinously against each other. "Never," said Lord Derby as early as 1876, "since the world began, have such masses of men been drilled and disciplined for purposes of war"; and, of course, the armaments of 1876 were mere toys to what they are to-day. For, yearly, new expedients of conscription cram the barrack-yards of the Continent, and young navies dispute the roadway of the high seas. All done on the highest principles, and in order to promote the sacred cause of peace!

So far, then, as the arguments of those who believe in the future peacefulness of European democracy have been examined, they do not appear to be as solid as might be wished.

Nevertheless, it would be inadvisable to draw a hasty conclusion. On an issue so complex and so all-important for ourselves, no argumentative precaution is superfluous. We must heave the lead every inch of the way over the red coral and the volcanic floor. Therefore, let us weigh with equal care the arguments of those who, with Moltke and Lord Salisbury, hold democracy to be essentially inimical to peace. These reasons may prove to be weak in their turn. If so, we shall have to adjust our views accordingly, and strike a balance between rival uncertainties.

Lord Salisbury himself, in 1898, furnished a

signal argument in favour of his belief in a warlike future. He analysed the nations into those living and those dying, and pointed out that some are decaying as fast as others progress. The weak States, he said, are becoming weaker in the too intense rivalry of our epoch, while the strong States are becoming stronger. Therefore, he concluded it to be certain that "the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the seeds and causes of conflict among civilised nations will speedily appear."

And yet, if the recent history of Europe be considered even in the example most favourable to Lord Salisbury's view, some modification may be appended to his proposition, a modification serving to bring a principle of the European organism, not yet touched upon, into light.

Turkey is the classic case in point of a "decaying" nation, of a "sick man." And truly, the decrepitude of the invalid on the Bosphorus invited and caused a great European outbreak, not to mention minor disturbances, twice during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The first, the Crimean War, was due to Russia's conviction that the Turk was on his death-bed. A second conflagration began in 1875, when Herzegovina thought herself strong enough to defy the Crescent, and the flame spread right along the Balkans, burning the outlying homesteads of the sick man. We witnessed another stage of that process when, in the autumn of 1908, Bulgaria suddenly pro-

claimed her sovereignty, and Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; and when, in 1911, Italy attacked Tripoli.

Thus, the angina pectoris of Turkey has, indeed, caused wars in Europe, and this, so far, justifies the assertion that the inevitable decay of States will provoke strife in the future. Nevertheless, an important additional fact must here be brought into notice. Who have been the beneficiaries of this process of partition? Has it been wholly the "stronger" States who have "encroached," and been the legatees of the patient on the Golden Horn? Certainly, to some degree. But it is remarkable that it has been the "weaker" States who have done well, no less, in face of these overwhelming protagonists. Roumania, and Servia, and Bulgaria have carved out their independence; Montenegro has consolidated her position; Greece, when overwhelmed in 1897 by Turkey, was rescued by Europe. Viewed broadly, then, the property of the Sultan has devolved as much to sustain the weak as to enlarge the strong, so that even in Europe, and even in the south-eastern part of it, force has not ruled absolutely, and weakness can live and flourish. How is it that the rays, shorn from the horns of the waning Crescent, have made an aureole for such humble brows? Who, if not democracy, has cried halt to the "Drang nach Osten" of Austria and Russia? Perhaps the Roumanian blood, at the foot of the Grivitsa redoubt, was the seed of power and

of freedom. Perhaps Joseph de Maistre was right in saying that if you bury Slavonic aspirations under a fortress, they will blow it up.

We may find another illustration of the same point if we look at the opposite end of Europe, where, wedged in between the three great powers of France, England, and Germany, lie the two small States of the Netherlands. In 1814, Europe decided to form them into one State strong enough, it was calculated, to resist France. But, in 1830, Belgium revolted in order to form a separate sovereignty. And in complete defiance, though eventually with the acquiescence, of Europe, she succeeded in establishing herself without war.

If, not content with these instances, we generalise our view of the continental polity, we must be struck with the large number of small States which manage to exist in face of the great—Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Greece. It may be said, no doubt, that these only maintain their life because it is to the interest of the big powers to let them be. But to this it may be answered that, viewed as mere engines of greed and aggression, the latter would find it much more profitable to partition them, as Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioned Poland in old days. In fact, to carry the argument the other way, it might even be maintained that it is autocracy, and not democracy, which has so keen an appetite for weakness. At the Treaty of Westphalia the

numberless Germanic sovereigns were cut down to about 350, and again, by the date of the Treaty of Vienna, to a mere handful of 40, whence the Prussian autocracy reduced them to their position to-day. So far, then, from democracy being coincident with the rule of force, it may be not impossible that it will prove favourable to the rule of right and equity. Indeed, at the Hague Conference of 1907, the world witnessed with surprise Europe's welcome to the small States of South and Central America as equal members of the European fraternity. The perch and the pike somehow live together.

The next argument employed against democracy is that it foments nationality, and that the latter is an association of individuals who feel their interests to be distinct from, and opposed to, those of their neighbours. Thus nations, it is concluded, are necessarily hostile to each other, since, otherwise, they would not exist at all. More than this, democracy augments that native animus, if, according to Maine, "the prejudices of the people are far stronger and more dangerous than those of the privileged classes." De Tocqueville had the same thought in mind when he wrote that nations, like men, prefer their passions to their interests.

Nevertheless, this proposition, if rigidly tested, can hardly be accepted as accurate. When Burke and Fox pressed that thesis upon Pitt in 1787 he stigmatised it as "weak and childish"; and Beaconsfield, in his day, told the House of Commons

that those who thought so, might as well argue that 5 per cent was the natural rate of interest.

The truth is that neither in ancient, nor in modern, times have the European nations entertained fixed animosities against each other, and this we can see best in our own case. Between us and Russia the fiercest hatred has been alight during the nineteenth century. Yet during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we were regarded as her natural and ancient friend. It was only as the eighteenth century ended that our feeling changed towards suspicion of Russia, from the date when Catherine II. organised the league of the Armed Neutrality against us, a feeling much strengthened when, in 1800, the Czar turned against England, and, above all, when, in 1807, after Friedland, he abruptly abandoned our alliance at a most critical hour.

But this suspicion changed to genuine dislike during the years succeeding 1820, as we witnessed the rapid approach of Russia towards India and Constantinople, marked by the Treaties of Turco-Manchai and Unkiar Skelessi. This emotion has lasted almost up to the present date, when, for reasons known to all of us, the tide of public sentiment which, since 1780 and the days of Catherine II., had been running strongly against Russia, has reverted to its more ancient direction of friendship and goodwill.

Or take again our feelings towards Spain. To an Elizabethan Englishman our animosity with

Spain appeared axiomatic, final, and ordained as by a law of nature. Yet during the Middle Ages we were on very friendly terms with the Spaniards, even up to the early years of the reign of Henry VIII. The alienation between us began somewhat suddenly in 1528. It lasted up till 1656, at any rate, for in that year Cromwell still could say to the House of Commons that "the Spaniard is your enemy, naturally and providentially." This antagonism, however, tended to decline in 1660, and, in the next year, Pepys noted in his *Diary* that now "we do naturally all love the Spanish." For certain reasons, however, the sense of antipathy revived in the eighteenth century, though the course of the nineteenth, since Trafalgar, has seen us resume our mediæval disposition of amity towards Spain, happily sealed in our time by a royal marriage.

In a word, history altogether belies the view that nations are fundamentally hostile. Nor can democracy be charged with any such impulse, if our improved relationship with Spain and Russia, since the introduction of democratic ideas into both those countries, be borne in mind.

Another argument employed to establish the warlike disposition of democracy is drawn from economics. European democracy may, in its economic aspect, be defined as, in the first place, an attempt upon the part of the masses to procure a fair equality of fortune with the privileged or propertied classes. For instance, Taine said that the real French Revolution consisted in this that,

whereas the French peasant in 1789 could only keep a tiny portion of his net savings for himself after discharging his feudal dues, in 1800 that condition was precisely reversed. But as the appetite is thus whetted, this struggle for redistribution, it may be argued, merges into one for wresting more opportunities of wealth from neighbouring powers, thus providing the root of innumerable rivalries among the nations. As Bismarck said, "the war of the future will be the economic war, the struggle for existence on the largest scale. May my successor always bear this in mind, and always take care that Germany will be prepared when this battle has to be fought."

An apposite instance of how such a conflict might arise may be drawn from Bismarck's own country. Economically, Germany labours under a disadvantage. Her fields of coal and iron, and therefore her main industrial centres, lie far from the sea. But this defect is remedied by the fact that, Saxony apart, those centres lie on, or near, the Rhine and its tributaries, so that thus the major part of her exports are carried abroad by an easy and cheap transit. As against this, however, the lower course of that river is possessed by Holland, who thus takes toll of her neighbour, and German writers are not slow to point out the advantage to the fatherland of possessing the estuary of the Rhine. In the words of Treitschke, "the very part of the Rhine which is materially most valuable to us has fallen into the hands of

foreigners. It is an indispensable duty of German policy to regain the mouths of that river." Here would be fine fuel for European war.

Russia, too, may furnish no less suitable an illustration of how war may spring from an economic source. The history of Russia is that certain tribesmen living around the sources of the Dnieper have, within the space of a thousand years, expanded into a nation ruling from the Baltic to the Pacific, and from Persia to the Polar Sea. That stupendous exodus had a cause partly economic, and partly political. The tribesmen fled before a niggard nature, and before fiercer man. For nature drove them with the whip of hunger, and their rulers with the knout. Yet in the main the cause was economic, and their wars, arising out of their necessities, have formed some of the bloodiest chapters in the history of humankind. Why, because at the last hour of ten centuries they have procured a Duma and a democracy, should their expansive energies and their aggressions vanish from the page of history? It is too soon to forget Mouravieff Amurski, and the diplomacy of Ignatieff, and the pledges of Gortchakoff. Remember Frederick the Great's prophecy, that all Europe will one day tremble before Russia; or Metternich's saying, that she is forever insatiable; or Palmerston's, that she is the universal aggressor; or Napoleon's, that Europe will be Republican or Cossack. She was the only nightmare of Bismarck.

This argument, when formulated, may be held to be that, since there has been an immense increase in the European population during recent times, and since democracy attempts to establish a higher standard of comfort for all the members of that teeming host, this twofold process must inevitably and mechanically result in a sharp accentuation of the struggle for existence among the modern democracies, and therefore in war.

But, on a strict examination, this proposition, like the others, will appear doubtful.

During our own age the European world has been busy providing for itself many safety valves and overflow pipes against the dangerous social forces just described. If we look at Russia there has been, no doubt, an enormous expansion recently in her population, accompanied by marked unrest and distress. But this is being met in three ways. The Russian agriculturists have been marching by millions into the regions, hitherto pastoral, which extend north of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Caspian, and still farther east. Also, farther north they have been penetrating into Central Asia on a scale of immigration unknown till now. Secondly, within Russia itself a strong conviction is spreading that as yet the soil has only been scratched, that intensive culture must supersede the primitive methods of the nomad, and that the salvation of the peasantry must be sought, not in new territories but in the soil underfoot. Thirdly, industrialism, with all

its pains and penalties, but with its many gifts, is rendering first aid to Russia's stricken economic life; presently, it will touch the dead corpse of her prosperity, which will spring to its feet. And in all these movements her young democracy has a profound interest. Here, then, are causes definitely counteracting the argument for economic war.

So too with Germany. Germany has been in past years depleted of her surplus economic element, which otherwise would have tended long ago to break bounds in Europe. Of the 90,000,000 Germans in the world, there are 60,000,000, or thereabouts, in the fatherland; but of the balance no less than about 13,000,000 are oversea. What the prairie and the steppe are to the Russian peasant, the Americas, north and south, are to the German refugee. On behalf of those who remain within her boundary it may be urged that, though they have waged several wars in the nineteenth century against Austria, and Denmark, and France, their sword has been drawn in the cause of national unity, that for forty years, and more, they have abstained from that arbitrament, and that temptations of wealth and comfort entice the fingers of the mailed fist from the hilt of the sword.

Another, and the final, argument pointing to the militant nature of democracy is that it foments race hatred, and therefore war. The two main manifestations of this spirit are known as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.

Pan-Slavism had really little root in the world

until Russia, the chief Slav power, had beaten Napoleon. After that date its professors could hold up their heads, and maintain that Germany has reached her day, England her mid-day, France her afternoon, Italy her evening, Spain her night; but the Slavs stand on the threshold of the morning. This Slavonic idea reached a practical point when, in 1877, Russia drew her sword on behalf of the oppressed Slavonic nationalities of the Balkans.

Another example of the Slavonic faith is represented in the words of Skobeleff; "our enemy is the German. The battle is unavoidable between German and Slav." It is certainly remarkable that the organised antagonism between Russians and Germans is of a most recent date. For centuries the tendency ran in the opposite direction; the Baltic provinces were little more than a German hinterland; and the Czars, from the time of Peter the Great, exerted themselves to open "a window on the west." But, as the nineteenth century proceeded, all that was changed under the stimulus of the Slavonic consciousness. Chiefly since Alexander III. became Czar in 1881, the russification of the Baltic provinces has been enforced with ruthless brutality against the Germans, and has aroused the most intense indignation and wrath in the fatherland. It may be argued, then, that Pan-Slavism, fomented by democracy, is preparing a tremendous conflict. Yet, in truth, democracy is not culpable, and can be shown to be actually the great obstacle to the Pan-Slav.

The Pan-Slavonic idea will not work in Europe because the Slavs are beginning to prefer democracy to Pan-Slavism. The Russians have already painfully realised that truth in the Balkans, where the young Slav peoples have preferred to establish their little states on a democratic basis rather than to coalesce with Russia. That democracy is rapidly laying its axe against Slavonic unity can be judged from the case of Austria. Austrian democracy is actually striving, with some prospect of success, to reconcile the Slavonic with the Teutonic and the Magyar races, and thus to foster peace and harmony among these intense antagonisms.

In Austria, democracy works also to amalgamate the Slavs into one people, but not on Pan-Slavonic lines. The recent policy of the Emperor, in urging his peoples to adopt universal suffrage, had no other object than to cure racial hatred by democracy. Thus Austria, by means of democracy, bids fair to refute the sarcasm of Gortchakoff that she is not a nation, or even a State, but only a government. For her, the question of the unity of her southern Slavs with each other, and of their consolidation in the Dual Monarchy, is a main question, and a main hope for to-morrow.

In a word, European democracy, so far from fomenting Pan-Slavism, on the one hand, gathers the Slavs into separate nations; and, on the other, attempts to harmonise their intestine quarrels, and even to reconcile them with their Teutonic fellow-citizens under the Hapsburg ægis.

But, of course, Pan-Germanism is the main instance of a racial movement tending to strife. Pan-Germanism was born at the same time as Pan-Slavism, but in the humiliation of defeat at the hands of Napoleon, not in the pride of victory. Its first-fruits was the battle of Leipzig, and its first classic was Arndt's song, "Was ist des deutschen Vaterland?" The poet answered his own question by saying that the German's fatherland exists "where'er is heard the German tongue," a revolutionary saying on the basis of which a whole literature has arisen to-day.

The main practical result of Pan-Germanism has been the determined attempt of Germany to stamp out the Poles of her eastern province. In his great speech of 1886, Bismarck opened the question, declaring that since 1814 Prussia had treated the Poles kindly, but "I do not care a straw for the pledges of those days." Germanism was being extinguished in Prussian Poland no less than in Hungary and Bohemia. "Let the Poles go to Paris or Monte Carlo." "We must stand on feet not of clay, but of iron." Thus the persecution began. Over twenty years later, in 1907, Prince Bülow reviewed the whole policy in Poland, and disclosed a rather melancholy state of affairs from a German point of view. In spite of all the government's efforts, more land was passing into Polish hands than *vice versa*. Expropriation must be resorted to, for, indeed, there was no possibility of preserving German nationality in

the Polish provinces unless far more stringent measures were adopted, even than those of Bismarck. Thus in the very fatherland itself, Pan-Germanism has its difficulties with national sentiment.

Yet these difficulties are literally as nothing compared with the external obstacles to Pan-Germanism raised by democracy. Of the 30,000,000 Germans who choose to reside outside Germany, how many wish to place themselves under the sceptre of the Kaiser? Not 1,000,000, not 500,000 at most. The Pan-German agitation has been most active among the 11,000,000 of Austro-Hungarian Germans, but has yielded the poorest result. The Germans scattered through Hungary and through Bohemia are gradually throwing in their lot with the Magyars or the Czechs. In Austria itself, when Pan-Germanism raises its head, the whole force of the Catholic Church, whose policy is opposed to union with Protestants, is raised to quell it, and amid an entirely Catholic population of Germans that Church wields immense force. When Pan-Germans, in their disgust and in order to cover their retreat, raised the cry of "Los von Rom," the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Este replied in the famous words: "Away from Rome is away from Austria." The observation was unanswerable.

Still less do the men of the Germanic stock in Switzerland, or Holland, or Belgium, or the United States, yearn for the Pan-German ideal. For no

people has proved so ready to bring the fuel of race into the oven of democracy.

The arguments of those who believe in the future peacefulness of democracy, when examined earlier, were found to be insufficient. And now the arguments of those who believe in the tendency of democracy to breed war, have been examined also, and it must be said that they too are not quite convincing. So we are in presence of two sets of opposite arguments, alike weak and therefore alike inconclusive. At first sight, that might be thought to be a valueless outcome. But, on the contrary, it bears with it a positive result for ourselves. For if, as appears, continental democracy is something other than a mere vendetta; if the tug-of-war between the barbarous and the civilised instincts of the West is even arguably level to-day; if the fiercest races in the world are not so unanimously thirsty for blood as they have been ere now; and if, for the first time since Roman days, some peace in Christendom has become, at all events, conceivable; if history and homicide are now possibly distinguishable terms—that is a new fact of much, and even immense, moment.

From it a practical consequence follows. For if, as already shown, our interests are increasingly concerned and involved in Europe; if, further, our pessimism of the nineteenth century in regard to the continent may give way to a hope, however modest, that the tangled skein of continental policy

is not a mere noose to hang any intruder; if, therefore, we may enter where our interests call us so imperatively, without sheer foolhardiness or wanton folly—then forward, in the name of prudence itself, and in abandonment of the splendid isolation of old days. We must be Europeans. The future designs it. How?

CHAPTER VIII

OUR INTERNATIONAL FUTURE (*continued*)

INTERNATIONALLY, then, it seems, that our interests, even down to the root of domestic finance, are becoming more and more exposed to the play of European influences. It appears, too, that, in Europe itself, the virulence of the war fever tends to be more manageable than formerly, to the extent that it is assuming an intermittent rather than a chronic form. These two propositions in combination indicate that, in the future, we shall find it expedient, and not wildly hazardous, to take a more active part than formerly in the continental blind-man's buff. But what part? Look again across the Narrow Seas.

The guiding idea of Bismarck, from 1870 up to his fall in 1890, may be described as one of insurance against war. His first expedient was to organise a league, or understanding, between the three emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia. "I have thrown a bridge across to Vienna," he said, "without breaking down that older one to St. Petersburg." But presently, owing to her diverging views on the Eastern question, Russia parted company; so that the Chancellor was left

with Austria, with whom he established a definite alliance, enlarged later into the Triple Alliance, by the adhesion of Italy. He had, indeed, lost Russia for the time, but he determined "not to cut the wire to St. Petersburg," and to regain her favour as far as possible; so he effected a reinsurance by negotiating an agreement with Russia too. In due course, however, Russia once again drew away, and formed later the Dual Alliance with France.

Before entering upon times more recent, it is well to mark an important feature in the transactions thus briefly mentioned. Observe that Bismarck did not attempt merely to construct a triple league against France; he planned also to cast his lasso round the neck of Russia, so as to form an European combination of overwhelming strength. True, he did not succeed finally; yet for several years after 1872, and also for several years after 1884, he attained the goal of his far-reaching policy.

To proceed, not long after the fall of the Prince, the whirligig of diplomacy brought back his ideal in another shape. In 1895, the world was somewhat startled to discover that Germany and Russia, together with France herself, were in close and zealous confabulation. The "Break-up of China" was thought to be imminent, and the savour of an unparalleled carcass seemed wafted down the east wind into Christendom. No time that for western braves to be scalping each other. Accordingly,

from 1895 to 1898, these three powers at Kuang-chou-wan, at Kiao-Chao, and at Port Arthur, cut and carved unmercifully at the body politic of the Son of Heaven.

Remark, again, how lightly intestine quarrels sit upon our neighbours when big game is reported abroad.

Generally speaking, however, the event that commanded the attention of Europe during the generation after 1870 was the consolidation of all that was powerful and progressive into the two opposing alliances. The constant tendency of these same powers to effect a merger, passed as a subsidiary affair.

This grand evolution of the European world placed England at once in a highly embarrassing situation. With the Dual Alliance of France and Russia we could not side by any means. For the world-wide aggressions of Russia in the Far East and in south-eastern Europe disturbed us profoundly; not less were we vexed by the ubiquitous efforts of France in search of a colonial empire. This animus reached its pitch in 1898, with Russia over China, and with France over the valley of the Nile.

If, then, we were not disposed to side with the Dual Alliance, it seemed less impracticable to march in unison with the central powers. And for this Lord Salisbury appeared by no means indisposed. If he could not go so far as to say, as Sir Robert Peel said in 1841 to Bunsen, "I am

a good German," yet he looked to the Triple Alliance with a distinctly friendly eye. In earlier days he had eulogised the Austrian "sentinel" of the Balkans; he had hailed the Austro-German alliance as glad tidings of great joy; and, as late as November 1899, he could declare that Germany was the State "with which we have for many years entertained relations of sympathy and friendship beyond all others."

Yet this policy, too, was closed to us by a very cogent reason. To side with the Triple Alliance definitely would be to give overwhelming preponderance to that association of the powers. But since immemorial days, since the days even of the mediæval Papacy, the policy of England had been to set her face against any would-be master of Christendom. She had ever, on occasion, struck the proudest lilies with her rod. Whoso throughout the ages had stretched his hand against the ark of European freedom, she had thwarted him in the bold design.

Therefore our policy, during the generation after 1870, was to adopt isolation, since there seemed room for nothing else.

Yet somehow the current of human affairs, or the tide of necessity, or that situation in life which is the dictator of duty, began insensibly to shift us from our solitary moorings. For though, in the forefront of European affairs, the mutual antagonism of the Triple and the Dual Alliances appeared to promise us security, in the background there was

ever that danger of a combination of all the powers, directed this time against the haughty and selfish privateer who, recking nought of others and recked of by none, was skirting the farthest capes for plunder, and stealing marches in every tropic, so as to rear a sky-scraping empire against the "ancient lights" of Europe itself.

Already, as so often happens, warnings rich with futurity were offered in the market-place and found no public. In Vienna, at the close of 1897, a voice was raised, not extremely important perhaps, yet significant certainly. Count Goluchowski, the Foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, whose policy was the united action of Austria and Russia in the Balkans, declared that the time was ripe when a combination of European powers was needed to preserve the Continent against "trans-oceanic influences." But it is England who in Southern Asia, in Australia, in Africa, and in America, has founded these parvenu powers that ruffle the complacency, and upset the balance, of the Old World.

More weighty was Mr. Chamberlain's speech of May 1898. Of that utterance it may be said without exaggeration, not indeed that it opened a new chapter in our international destiny, but that it indicated for the first time clearly that such a chapter must be opened soon.

The minister pointed out that, ever since the Crimean War, England had adopted a policy of isolation, so that she had had no allies, and, it was to

be feared, no friends. This had been well enough hitherto. But now "a new situation has arisen in the world"; the world was combining into great organisations, so that "we are liable at any moment to be confronted by a combination of great powers." He concluded that the time had definitely come for us to abandon our aloofness, and "we must not reject the idea of an alliance with the power whose interests are closest to our own." For the nonce, inaction and protests and queries; yet those words were pregnant with things to come.

As the years passed after 1898, the signs of the times accumulated about our head. In the first place, during this period, from 1892 to 1901 at any rate, the German Emperor steadily pursued a highly sagacious policy of conciliation with France. An ample and even embarrassing jet of international courtesies and diplomatic compliments was showered from Berlin upon Paris, "our chivalrous enemy, always so useful to the cause of civilisation," and upon "French soldiers, who fight with the courage of despair." Perhaps the climax was reached in 1900, when French and German troops co-operated in China.

Next, there was the outbreak of the South African War, on which occasion, in the words of Lord Rosebery, who expressed the opinion of our leading statesmen, our public realised "the hatred and ill-will" with which we were regarded "almost unanimously by the peoples of Europe."

Thus, by the teaching of a long catalogue of events, two facts of importance had been clearly brought home to us at the opening of the twentieth century. The first was that, in spite of the apparent or nominal division of Europe into two mutually antagonistic leagues, the nations composing these leagues constantly display many tendencies towards unity. And this fact often haunts us. Speaking in March 1911 with reference to the Triple and Dual Alliances, our Foreign minister said, "Gradually, in the last five years at any rate, things which might have brought these groups into opposition to each other, have been disappearing." The second fact was that the European peoples generally appeared to be animated from time to time by a common policy of resentment against us, an antagonism which our policy of isolation obviously could not cure and probably fostered. This was a dangerous and even an intolerable situation. A fresh international epoch must begin for England.

It was February 1902 which marked definitely the inauguration of this new era. From that date another destiny, filling generations of the future, opens before the eyes of the English people.

In February 1902 Lord Lansdowne announced in the House of Lords that the time had at last come for "a new departure." We must finally put away and abjure for ever "any old formula or old-fashioned superstition as to the desirability of pursuing a policy of isolation for

this country." He warned us against "a coalition of other powers." He pointed out that the world is becoming dangerous to those who have no allies, and that we must have them. So we had allied ourselves with Japan! In criticism hereof, it was pointed out, with force, that this was the first time that we had taken any similar action, that the treaty deprived us to some extent of the freedom of individual initiative, and that we had embarked upon a future which no one could at that moment foresee.

Since all alliances are melted down one day or another, this one will some day vanish naturally with the rest. But its consequences seem likely to be permanent.

The Japanese treaty provided, in its original shape, that if two powers, or, in its later shapes of 1905 and 1911, that if one power, attacked Japan, we were to go to war on her behalf. This involved an important obligation, but was not the main thing. In the view of Europe, England in taking this step had definitely turned the tables on the West; had preferred alliance with an oriental power only yesterday barbarous; had openly proclaimed her own non-European sympathies, or, at least, had avowed the preponderance of her Asiatic interests; had cast away any pretence of co-operation with Christendom; and had, by that act, justified all that the chancelleries had suspected of her treachery. For all eyes saw that England had thus definitely forbidden Europe to overwhelm Japan, to divide

up China, and generally to consign into untimely graves the various valetudinarians of the Far East. This was a flashlight upon the foreign destiny of England.

But there was something else of moment which this instrument accomplished. Its enactment cut away, once and for the future, the logical basis upon which our policy had stood hitherto. Obviously, if to England isolation was henceforth "an old-fashioned superstition," she would not stop at an alliance with a remote island in the depth of a distant sea.

In view of European feeling, there was no time for us to lose, and no time was lost. With the spring of 1903 the new international epoch of comprehensive and forward action dawned clearly for the English people. But the results are not yet.

This new departure is, for the most part, the active participation of England in Europe for a definite end. That end is, primarily, nothing more grandiose or occult than security, in view of the changing aspect of continental affairs. Our security, however, is to be safeguarded henceforth on a five-fold line. First, a definite side is to be taken in the balance of Europe; secondly, foreign nations, whether in our scale of the balance or not, are to be conciliated by a novel method of comprehensive settlement, embracing all outstanding questions likely to cause hostility; thirdly, a military and naval reorganisation is to be executed with a view to the possibility of

European action; fourthly, the Concert of Europe, and fifthly, international arbitration, are to be regularly supported and, if possible, established.

It will be patent at once that, though a step or two, more or less tentative, have been taken already in each of these directions, in no one of them is there even a prospect of finality for many decades to come.

Nevertheless, in order to gauge the future, it is desirable to inspect those several expedients summarily, and then to look beyond them still.

As regards the first, our choice of a side in the balance of Europe, that is a matter of particular difficulty. Lord Salisbury, as has been seen, towards the end of his career emphasised our special attachment to Germany. It was in accordance with this view that Mr. Chamberlain, in the early days of the Boer War, definitely proposed our alliance with the fatherland. He said that it is now "evident to everybody that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German empire." But against this policy there still is our old-rooted feeling that in Europe we must suspect a rising star. Besides, Germany, with her aspirations towards sea power, would not have it. The sea intervenes, the sea of which England must be victim or queen.

But if we were to incline towards France and Russia, we must also put into force our second expedient of a comprehensive settlement with each of them, and in due course with Germany herself.

With France we had accumulated, throughout some decades of animosity, any number of irritating questions, in Newfoundland, in Zanzibar, in Madagascar, in Siam, in Morocco, in Algiers, in Tunis, on the Congo, on the Niger, in Egypt, and the Soudan. Therefore, negotiations, beginning in the spring of 1903, were announced in 1904 as having produced "a comprehensive scheme" for the settlement of these issues, constituting hitherto "a standing menace to an international friendship."

The next step in this sphere was to agree with Russia, so as to terminate what Lord Curzon called "this long feud, which has been the source of so much anxiety, which has produced such incessant intrigues, and has involved such great expenditure to Russia, to India, and ourselves." Accordingly, in 1907, we made a treaty with Russia in regard to oriental matters, which the same authority described as the most important concluded by us for the last fifty years, and "pregnant with inexpressible influence upon the future." Lord Lansdowne reinforced this by saying that "the time has come when agreements of this kind are really inevitable." He added that this convention "marked the beginning of a new era in our relations with Russia," and that he trusted Russia to observe it with absolute loyalty.

Thirdly, if we are to take a line in European affairs, we shall obviously need forces competent, to some degree at least, to meet European necessities. Hitherto, the unavowed but underlying

principle, regulating our naval and military dispositions, had been that those forces would not be wanted to contend against highly trained troops or first-class modern navies assembled in European waters. Our ships, now concentrated, were scattered over the globe, while our army was organised confessedly for not much more than frontier fighting and "little wars." Or rather, there had hitherto been a complete lack of any agreement at all upon broad principles. Through the dim haze of military chaos might be discerned, indeed, three lines—the first, a professional force; the second, a semi-professional force, the militia; and the third, a purely voluntary organisation. But, as the War minister himself said in 1907, "our first line is full of gaps; our second line is decadent; and the third is totally disorganised." Up till now, in regard to overseas action, the mountain of our military reorganisation has brought forth what some esteem a mouse, an "expeditionary force," fitted presumably to manœuvre by the side of some big rat of a European ally. But, as Lord Haldane himself has often stated, "we are only at the beginning of the work."

The fourth line of defence is action in support of the Concert of Europe. This is a legacy from the later years of Lord Salisbury. He himself, he said, preferred to call it the Federation of Europe. On several occasions he defined its main purpose as the prevention of European war. He realised that it was as yet of only intermittent

value, but he pointed out that the Concert has a great future, and is "the embryo of the only possible structure of Europe which can save civilisation from the desolating effects of a disastrous war."

The fifth method which we have advocated is international arbitration. The age of the Renaissance exalted the irresponsibility of international action, but since that date a strong and increasing cry has gone up from Europe to bring that irresponsibility under the law. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did, indeed, establish permanent embassies as an instrument of peace, while the eighteenth founded the rudiments of a law of neutrality; but it was reserved for the nineteenth to establish international arbitration as a permanent factor in the world. This system, to be precise, dates from 1794, when England and the United States concluded an arbitration treaty to deal with questions arising under the Peace Treaty of 1783. Thus international arbitration is of Anglo-Saxon origin, was inaugurated by our race, and we, most of all, have practised it. La Fontaine, the learned historian of that subject, estimates that from 1794 to 1900 there were actually 177 instances of this arbitrament, of which he assigns no less than 70 cases as shared in by Great Britain, 56 by the United States, and 26 by France, with other nations relatively nowhere. Under Anglo-Saxon auspices the arbitration of sovereigns has been superseded by that of jurists, and the institu-

tion has ceased to be diplomatic in order to become judicial. Thus it is we who have written the name of international arbitration on the roll-call of freedom.

Nor has our energetic advocacy ceased with the century. Mr. Balfour, speaking in 1905, pointed out that England during recent years had "struggled to develop to the utmost the whole principle of arbitration," and had recently brought an increasing number of cases to judgment with success. But it is 1903 that really marks an epoch. For, in that year, following on the Anglo-French Agreement, a new departure was taken. An Anglo-French treaty was negotiated, agreeing to refer to the Permanent Court of Arbitration recently established at the Hague all differences and disputes between the two countries, "not affecting the vital interests, the independence, or the honour, of the two contracting States." M. Renault, who has summarised the proceedings of the second Hague Conference, has estimated that, from 1903 up to the middle of 1908 alone, no less than sixty other treaties have been modelled upon that precedent. It remains for us to widen the scope of this procedure, so that the Anglo-Saxon race may still guide the world in a department of political action so markedly its own.

So far, therefore, it has become apparent that in the future we shall play an increasingly energetic part in Europe, acting in these specific ways. It remains to inquire whether these

methods will have a powerful influence towards promoting our ultimate purpose of a peaceful and free Christendom. Undoubtedly. But further, will they be adequate by themselves actually to guarantee and secure such a consummation? No.

A very little thought will demonstrate that neither our entry into the balance of Europe, nor our settlements with individual powers, nor our reorganisation of our navy and an expeditionary force, nor our support of the Concert of Europe, nor our cultivation of international arbitraments, are more than highly laudable and very important palliatives against the seizures and paroxysms to which Europe has been subject for fifteen centuries. Enough surely to remember that, though all these expedients of ours are in operation at this moment, our western barbarism, though modified, is still itself. War, in the Miltonic phrase, is still "in procinct." As the Prime Minister, recently speaking of armaments, has said: "We have tried to get other nations to hold their hand. But they will not; they are not in the mood for it." Therefore, we must look farther into the future, asking ourselves whether the resources of England are indeed exhausted with this catalogue, and whether we cannot shoulder some other more effective accoutrement drawn from the armoury of the coming time. To understand how this is possible, we must extend our vision beyond the boundaries of Europe itself.

During the vast span of the last five

centuries, Europe has spared time from her internal combustions to discover and conquer the outer world, the four continents of Africa, Asia, America, and Australia. Henry the Navigator of Portugal began the work in the fifteenth century by exploring West Africa, and Henry Stanley completed it in our own day by discovering the Congo region close by.

These four continents had one feature only in common: political debility was universal. For they were all tenanted either by helpless savages, as in the cases of America, Australia, and a good part of Africa, or else, as in the case of Asia, by monarchies either discredited or of fortuitous strength. For though Asia could boast fine resources, teeming numbers, and glittering governments, in the East glory and havoc are sworn allies. Or, in the stately phrase of Gibbon, all Asiatic dynasties are "one unceasing round of valour, greatness, discord, degeneracy, and decay."

It was inevitable in these circumstances, that the European nations, with their insatiable appetites, should fall with zest upon such dazzling loot. Great was the *animus furandi.* Accordingly, for five centuries a scramble for the outer world ensued, begun by anointed culprits, and completed by unanointed democracy. For we have witnessed the wholesale deglutition of Africa, and the digestion of huge portions of Asia into the European maw. To-day some minor nations yet remain to be cut up into sirloins and briskets

by our butchers, who scruple not to dot their proposed partitions even on living hides.

To this famous crusade all the leading nations of Christendom, except Austria-Hungary and, until to-day, Italy, have despatched a respectable contingent of conquistadors. For example, Spaniards, Portuguese, French, and English have absorbed America north and south; while Russia, France, England, Holland, and Germany have raided a good part of Asia and the Far East; and so on with the other continents.

All this has exercised very naturally an immense stimulus upon the passions of Europe. Not only have formal wars arisen between the western nations over the division of their quarry, but also, what is less noticed, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century unofficial conflicts between them raged constantly in the outer world. Besides, almost from the first, at the back of the motive of sheer plunder, a subtler consideration and a more far-sighted dream took shape. For, obviously, any nation that could become master in the outer world would presently become master in Europe, and probably *vice versa*. Therefore, in the lists of war, now made infinitely more spacious, the charging knights gathered a double momentum. The internal conflict of Christendom became reincarnate on a vastly dilated scale.

As for England, she felt this great change more than any other power. Unambitious in Europe, and only anxious to have no more Cæsars, she

perceived that it was no longer the liberties of Europe, but the liberties of the world that were at stake. For, if the existence of England depended upon freedom in Europe, freedom in Europe in its turn now hinged upon the freedom of the world.

Therefore, behind her practical and business-like motive, already mentioned, of organising an empire in order to protect the commerce essential to her life, the profounder thought has increasingly possessed her that she must expend her last penny and her last drop of blood in maintaining not merely the balance of Europe, but the balance of the globe.

Thus the ultimate destiny of England, in this sphere of politics, begins to stand revealed. By mere action in Europe, by the sole agency of all that fivefold list of excellent expedients, she will evidently not settle the European question. But she will come, and is coming, to realise that at her own instigation, and by her own contrivance, the New World, in the sense of the world outside Europe, must, in default of all other plans, be trained to be the policeman and warden of the Old.

Let us gather precisely how this bids fair to be.

If we could put ourselves into the position of the statesmen, say, of the central powers in Europe, we should find that England's action and influence in the outer world increasingly hampers their warlike proclivities in a specific way. To her, incomparably above all other nations, is due the continuous rise of a number of communities

outside Europe, all capable of providing homes for European emigrants flying from the burdens of militarism, and the constant anxieties of war. These are the United States, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa. Besides these communities, there are the South American States, of which it is perhaps not too much to say that, whereas the original colonists merely pitched camps and called them republics, now, with the ceaseless and immense influx of British capital and British energy, they have been rendered suitable homes for the Germanic and Latin stocks.

Therefore, European statesmen see a new world rising rapidly yonder, alienated from themselves, in touch with us, destined to be the rival of Europe, and growing the faster as they indulge in their time-honoured Kriegspiel. Meanwhile, their best and bravest, their invaluable citizens, will take wing across the ocean to better continents, while the weakling and the pauper will stay behind. Thus an ever-ascending scale of impositions will fall upon peoples ever less disposed to bear them. "The burden of armaments," said our Foreign minister in March 1911, "will be dissipated by internal revolution, by the revolt of masses of men against taxation." So one day, when some galloping imperial Rupert has finished charging, he will wheel right about, only to find his camp in the hands of his own socialists. Such thoughts give pause.

There is a second course adopted by England,

equally calculated in the long run to check the internal passions of Christendom. The outer world, as already pointed out, was incapable, in its original state, of meeting the onslaught of Europe, thus providing an active incitement to wars waged between the western powers for so rich a prize. But England is gradually finding her mission in building up these politically decadent peoples into more stable communities, capable of resisting the attack, and thus of abating a definite cause of European strife. For instance, Southern Asia, and the seas that wash it, were once the scene of continuous battles between ourselves, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French; and, but for our presence, Russians and Germans would probably be fighting there now. In this instance alone, no inconsiderable portion of the human species has been removed by ourselves from the arena and the lions. But this is not all, by any means. This country has actively used her influence not merely to fortify the weak, who live under her own ægis in all parts of the world, but also to defend, by her diplomacy and even by her soldiers, many peoples not under her sway at all. For example, her Japanese Alliance of 1902 was signed in order not only to protect Japan from European aggression, but also to save the Chinese Empire from partition by the powers. In Europe itself she has constantly, though not always happily, ministered to the Turk, and has even fought for him. Even as early as 1816, Nesselrode, on behalf

of Russia, could complain of "the incessant attempts of the cabinet of St. James's to interfere in the relations of Russia with Turkey and Persia," to support, that is, those governments against inroads from the Czar.

So it comes about that, very largely owing to the wealth, the diplomacy, and the arms of England, we are witnesses in our own day of a resurrection of the world outside Europe. South America no longer lies open to the first comer, whether purveying a Monroe doctrine or not. Asia is refusing to be made the mere running track of Christendom. Everywhere the European pathfinder is warned away, finding his trespass barred and prosecution threatened, not so much by a European neighbour as by a local magnate. Europe halts, or has to proceed with infinitely more cautious steps.

The third measure which this country is taking outside Europe, calculated to arrest continental animosities, is cultivation of friendship with the United States, who are now evidently preparing to take a hand in external affairs. This has been one of the main legacies of the last few years of the nineteenth century, for, since 1896 and the Venezuela crisis, when the two countries seemed not far from war, Lord Salisbury steadily laboured for better relations. We have done everything possible, so far. For instance, it had been one of the cardinal axioms of British policy that no first-class power should control the Sound, the

Bosphorus, Gibraltar, Suez, or Darien. Yet we have practically abandoned the latter position in favour of the Americans. Again, even Canning, who tried to establish an Anglo-American alliance, laid it down in 1822 that no one must seize Cuba. Yet, when the United States took that island in 1898, we sided with them. This policy is now being pursued systematically, so that Sir Edward Grey has said that the pursuit of friendship with the United States is a main feature of our diplomacy, while an American ambassador has declared that friendship between the two countries is more solidly established now than for a hundred years.

In the very darkest hour of our history, within a week of the date when the provisional articles of the Treaty of Paris had been signed in 1782, our House of Commons passed one of the best resolutions in its long history. Now that our offspring, in alliance with our bitterest enemies, had successfully revolted against us, we put it on record that "we most ardently wish that religion, language, interests, and affection may yet prove the bond of permanent union between the two countries." After so long an interval, we are now taking active steps to realise an aspiration which, if consummated, will provide another method of guaranteeing the peace of the world.

A fourth resource available for England lies in the fact that so many of the powers of Europe have themselves acquired important colonies. As

time goes on, these will be seen more and more to be hostages given to peace. These colonies are in the main peopled by alien races, who may be supposed to be not unwilling to seize any opportunity afforded them by the absorption of their possessors in domestic affrays. Besides, if Bismarck could defend himself by moving against England in Egypt, so conversely may England, with her superior influence abroad, do the same against any continental power desirous of breaking bounds at home.

The fifth and last resource of England in the outer world is the one most pregnant with power for the future. Under the stress of the European danger, and of the vast weight imposed upon us by the growth of European armaments, we have been obliged, as we all know, to draw back upon ourselves, and to urge the Dominions to relieve us to some degree of the burden of their defence. The military ideal now aimed at is that, in addition to the expeditionary force to act at a distance in case of necessity, there should be "a far-flung line of local defence," as Lord Haldane has termed it, maintained by each nation within the empire, organised as far as possible upon one pattern, and regulated by one school of thought in the shape of a General Staff. Similar principles are to apply to the naval reorganisation. That this ideal, however imperfectly executed at present, exists at all, is due in the main to the apprehensions excited throughout the world by the lengthening

range of European armaments, and by the determination to resist the encroachment of western ambitions.

It seems, then, that the destiny of England is changing before our eyes. A while ago we appeared to aspire to be the Mrs. Caudle, or, at any rate, the Madame de Staël, of Europe. Our candidature was for the respectable post of finishing governess to Christendom. But, after 1870, as our pupils grew big and restive at our lecturing, we gave notice and retired. With the twentieth century we have come back in a rather different rôle, having read in the gospel according to Bismarck that "we shall not avoid the dangers that lie in the bosom of the future by amiability."

We did not emerge from the isolation of the past because Europe, in the generation following 1870, organised itself into two opposing combinations of immense strength. On the contrary, the formation of such antagonistic bodies would of itself only furnish us with another reason for remaining aloof, in composed contemplation of the balance of power. The real reason, therefore, for our advance into the current of European life was the painful knowledge, gradually borne in upon us, that there was, from our point of view, an essential unreality in these antagonisms of the Triple and Dual Alliances, which might easily terminate at any moment to our prejudice, and that, accordingly, it was impossible, without incurring the gravest

danger of a common hostility directed against us, to stand apart any more.

Therefore, we are seeking our own safety, and that of the world, both inside and outside Europe. First, in supporting the Concert of Europe, we have tried to lay the foundations of a true federation of Christendom. Failing that genuine concord, still so far from the minds of men, we have done our best to foster the growth of judicial arbitration, so that the coherent and comprehensible voice of the law may prevail in the babel of disagreeing diplomacies. In default of arbitration in its turn, we have begun to establish, by general agreements, our separate peace and concord with the individual powers. In further default of such a process, and as we approached reluctantly the realm of sheer force, we have indicated our side and our sympathies as between the alliances dividing Christendom. Fifthly, since this, too, would not be enough, in that danger zone where argument dies away and only might flourishes, we have initiated the reorganisation of our armaments, remembering that, of all the gods and goddesses, only one never lays aside her spear and shield and helmet. It is the goddess of wisdom.

And next, as though all else may fail us in Europe, force and argument and morality alike, we have striven, and shall strive, to mobilise the outer world in succour. We are providing oversea conduits and safety-valves for the superheated

passions of the Occident; large spaces, too, where the ichor of western animosities may evaporate under a torrid sun.

We have conciliated the United States, hoping to arouse the interest of the New World in the common good of Christendom, so coincident ultimately with its own. We have laboured also abundantly to bring home to our distant Dominions of the Newest World that, even if affection or regard for our welfare do not prompt them to dip their feet in the vortex of militarism, it is yet vital for them to know that, on our slaughter, siege will be laid to them, and that our collapse will postulate their catastrophe.

The paradox and scandal of the world is that for fifteen centuries, since the adoption by the continent of Christianity, European history has been a tale of blood. To resolve that paradox, to abate that scandal, to substitute concert for conflict, to bring the glories or the devilries of war to their lowest dimension, and to teach mankind to grow great in common, is the international future of England. She provides a remedy. If Europe will not accept, and will cling to force as its beatitude, western civilisation will perish, for mankind will tear up its title-deeds, as surely as they tore up those of feudalism. Then, echoing the words of Napoleon, "cette vieille Europe m'ennuie," England will turn away for ever to those young nations of hers that are becoming ancient, and to those old nations of the East that are becoming young.

But before she does so, not playing the part of the wounded benefactor, she offers still to open the era of the great amnesty, and to close the old history of wrong. She asks that nationhood, hitherto the signal of animosity, shall become the symbol of association, and that it shall lean upon humanity, and not betray.

CHAPTER IX

OUR ORIENTAL FUTURE

MEANWHILE, a storm which had been threatening Traitor's Hill had not come on. In the very moment when it had appeared about to break over London, its ranks opened, its battalions yielded, its artillery limbered up, and, as they wheeled to go, the descending sun completed their catastrophe. For it shot remorselessly clean through their regiments and annihilated their van, until all cloud-land was broken, lost with here and there a protest of thunder in the distant East.

Thought followed the omen, and went that way too. It seemed plain that if our first duty is to fortify our citizens in freedom, prosperity, and health, and if, in Christendom, we must strive for long-lost concord, all this must be crowned by another duty yet. The weightiest obligation of England lies eastward. Out there, we shall finally win, or lose, our title to lead the world.

At first sight that proposition may not appear entirely accurate. For England, behind her Asiatic empire of 320,000,000, is building up, in her inexhaustible way, another empire in its shadow. Hence, if our Asiatic Aladdin's palace were to

vanish to-night, another immense dominion in North Africa organised, in our own day, by Lugard, Goldie, Cromer, and Kitchener, would be there to take its place. So that Asia, it may be said, cannot be so much to us.

Besides, the day will come when this secondary, this nether, dominion will deflect, or even for a time dominate, the policy of the world. For, in the tract more than three thousand miles long, stretching right across Africa, and bounded on the north by the Sahara deserts and south by the equator, live endless fighting races. At the close of the nineteenth century two processes, which had both been in operation for centuries, were completed in their regard. On the one hand, they were annexed by Europe wholesale; and, on the other, the long-standing Mohammedan invasions from Arabia were mostly accomplished. The European had come, with his precise machinery and his less precise ideas; and the Arab had come also, with a prayer-mat and a koran, bearing across the hot desert the hotter formulæ of Islam. These melt some of the chains round the limbs of the benighted African. For, to apply the words of Gibbon, "the subject or the slave, the captive or the criminal, arises in a moment the free and equal companion of the victorious Moslem." Thus, the most energetic peoples in west and east are combining to inspire three thousand miles of Fuzzy-wuzzy warriors with novel hopes and powers. A formidable prospect, when we remember that it only

needed some few millions of Arabs to carry their faith and their rulership as far as Borneo one way and Morocco the other, to threaten Vienna and Paris, and nearly to make good the boast of Bajazet that he would stall his arab at the altar of St. Peter's itself.

However, our duty in those regions at present is negative, for the most part. In that quarter of the world, which for the time is as quiet as gunpowder, our business is to guard against two main dangers. The first of these is that in Islam the religious steam rises with inconceivable rapidity and force, when some one accuses every one else of impiety, and of having made crooked the straight path of the Prophet. Swords are drawn, and under the shadow of the swords is Paradise. Such, for example, at the opening of the nineteenth century, was the career of that Othman who founded the Foulah Empire and made Sokoto his capital; such too, at its close, were the histories of the Mahdi and the Khalifa in our Soudan. All this excites the fear and the faith of the idolatrous Fuzzy-wuzzy, so that Islam in Africa is far more than "a ring cast into the desert," as the Arab historian, Mohammed el Tounsy, calls it. Rather, it is an ocean into which tumbles an ever-breaking shore of primitive beliefs.

The second danger against which we have to guard, in that quarter of the globe, arises from the natural anxiety of the European powers to avail themselves of such an inexhaustible storehouse of

soldiery. To arm and drill these men would be a tempting policy, not altogether lost sight of by those who are exhibiting such interest in Morocco and other parts of those territories.

Yet when all is said, and all allowance is made for the importance of our African dominion, Asia must be the touchstone of our greatness still. For us, Asia dominates Africa, or, more accurately, is linked with it. If, for instance, we can be friends with our 70,000,000 of Mohammedan Asiatics, these can whisper in our favour from Eastern Bengal to Lucknow, from Lucknow across the Indus, until their goodwill journeys to Cairo and the heart of Africa. For though the staff of the Prophet is bent, it is not broken. As he wished it in his last sermon, there is a brotherhood in Islam.

Of the tremendous and even terrible importance to us of Asia, we seem to try not to think. Some eighty years ago, Macaulay said that three pitched battles in India were less accounted of here than a broken head in Coldbath Fields. Later, Dalhousie wrote that scarcely anything could rouse even a transient interest in Indian affairs. And, to-day, Lord Curzon confesses that "the indictment still remains true." So we attempt to forget that India is one-fifth of the human species, and that we are sponsors for the external safety, internal order, contentment, and prosperity of it all.

Indeed, our future there is even compromised by the slight acquaintance of Englishmen with

oriental affairs. This proposition, however disputable it may appear, is founded on the report and evidence of the Committee on the organisation of oriental studies, published towards the close of 1909. The Committee has revealed a regrettable state of affairs. "The knowledge of the Indian languages," says the report, "and the knowledge of native thought which such knowledge implies, is less than it was twenty-five years ago." In this country, with trifling exceptions, "no instruction of any kind is provided" in the history and social customs of Eastern countries, though these have been changing fast. Even "the great majority of missionaries go to Eastern and African countries without any previous training in a vernacular." While our India Office applies only £300 a year to such purposes, Berlin assigns a headquarters staff of forty-two teachers, and devotes a princely budget of £10,000 annually to the same objects. Paris has its École des Langues Orientales Vivantes. In England, almost alone of European countries, "no oriental school exists." Yet the persons speaking such languages, and practising such customs, number 800,000,000 of the human race.

The report of that Committee should signalise, assuredly, a new activity in our Asiatic relationship. It explains so much. All this talk about the "inscrutable" East, which we do not scrutinise! And then the unexplained progress of Germany in the Orient! And then that inevitable quotation from Matthew Arnold about the East, which listens

to the legions thundering past, and turns to thought again, as though we could march past in Asia and go off parade comfortably, without noticing what the oriental Archimedes is meditating in the dust!

To look, however, as best we may, through the untoward mist that thickens yonder, it would seem that, taking the past with the future, there will be altogether four main stages in our Asiatic destiny. We stand to-day midway in the third of these, but with the fourth stage already on the horizon.

Originally, we went to Asia for no loftier motive than to do business. But, though the motive was not particularly lofty, we have no reason whatever to apologise for it. Obviously, trade is for the mutual advantage of buyer and seller alike, and if the European gained, so did the Indian. This trading epoch was the primary stage in our Asiatic career.

The second stage began when we found that, for a twofold cause, we could not trade satisfactorily. Hindustan, during the eighteenth century, in consequence of the break-up of the Moghul Empire, of the Mahratta risings, and of the Pathan invasions, was little short of an inferno. Trade was becoming impossible. Besides this, an European nation, France, had come into India, and definitely aimed at possessing it, with the inevitable result that our commerce would go by the board, if she succeeded in her design. Therefore, extending our original position as traders, we adopted the political

rôle, almost, as it were, perforce, and established our governmental ascendency.

Good work for India was accomplished at this second stage also. For eight hundred years India's capacity for political development had been limited to tyrannies, and these were now in the dust. She was constitutionally mere treasure-trove. We destroyed no organised governmental institutions, for there were none standing, except the Rajput States and Travancore, which we preserved from imminent submersion in the flood of anarchy. Politically, India is a novice. As has been justly said, "at the end of the eighteenth century, very few indeed of the reigning families in India could boast more than twenty-five years of independent and definite political existence." It was we who made Indian politics.

Besides securing internal order and erecting a government, we have provided India with the novelty of order on her land frontier, nowadays nearly 6000 miles long, and peopled by hundreds of tribes, mostly inured to hereditary rapine, and full of the ferment of religious war. In our own day we have, in the far east, settled Upper Burma from the Gulf of Martaban to the Hukon valley, and from Yunan to the Lushai Hills; in the far west, we have given peace to Beluchistan, from the Arabian Sea to the Registan desert, and from the Persian border to the Suleimans and the Gomal Pass.

Then, too, beyond that frontier, the muffled

figures of European powers have been challenged by us. For France has been advancing again on India from the east; while west and north, across wide deserts, and lofty mountains, and debateable boundaries, there have been the nightly bivouac and the daily march of many legions. And now the Teuton is on the look-out too.

The third stage is that in which we live to-day. It is quite incomplete, and has a long and arduous road ahead. For, having become rulers, we set ourselves next to develop the country, and restore, or create, its prosperity, thus pursuing, on the one hand, our original business object, and, on the other, fulfilling the obligations of our new governmental position.

This third stage began a little before the Mutiny, say in 1850. Before that date, material civilisation, which vitally depends on facility of communication, practically did not exist. Therefore, 1850 was roughly the initial date of India's entry into modern life, under our auspices.

More precisely, what the policy of public works then inaugurated has done, is to guard the Indian peoples against famine. Apart from the comparatively few towns, India is a mass of villages. Before our coming, these villagers, in the absence of communication and markets, could not sell their surplus crop on a good harvest; alternatively, on a bad harvest, they could not obtain food, and were at the mercy of the season. But, having established our canals, railways, and roads, our

administrators, according to the report of the Commission of 1901, "for the first time reduced to a system the administration of famine relief," a policy amply tested and justified in recent years.

This third stage has had another aspect. The native has had to be protected not only against nature, but also against his fellow-men, by the enactment of law. To Asiatics law should be swift and cheap, and their ideal is an Aurungzebe, the emperor who would dispense justice in person to the raggedest of his subjects. But, as a fact, that system worked horribly ill. Besides, the will of the just man cannot decide if shirtings are up to sample, or if the documents in court establish agency, so that discretionary justice is incompatible with the most moderate commercial activity. Business demanded written law, and there were no written laws in India, or indeed in Asia, except the religious ones. These laws of Hinduism and Mohammedanism are, at the best, vague and contradictory, and in some of the branches of jurisprudence contain no rules at all.

Therefore, it was imperative to create law and compose a deuteronomy for India. Since 1860, when the penal code was enacted, we have formulated those codes which, in the words of Sir Henry Maine, "stand against all competition." The penal code itself is, according to Sir James Stephen, "by far the best system of criminal law in the world," and its fellow, the code of criminal procedure, which regulates the daily machinery

of peace and order in that vast empire, is not less efficient. As regards the civil law, we have perhaps been scarcely so successful, mainly because a large part of the substantive civil law, covered by Mohammedan law which is impossible to codify, and by Hindu law of which there is no single body, cannot be touched by our legislators.

Of this same third phase there is still another aspect, and the last. Before our coming, public finance did not exist, or, so far as it did, was mere oppression and iniquity. To be candid, our own record was only moderate up to the Mutiny, and that rising, which entailed a large debt, added confusion to chaos. Public finance, on modern lines, dates in India from 1860.

During the fifty years since that date, our people have done wonders in finance. Hardly any important country nowadays, east or west, is well managed financially, except India. But India can easily be shown to be admirably administered in this department. For instance, she has reduced her non-productive debt so fast during this century that at the same rate of extinction it will be nil in eighteen years' time. Or again, to compare to-day with 1860, the land revenue is everywhere lighter; customs duties have been greatly reduced; the salt tax, the only obligatory imposition falling on the general mass of the people, has been cut down enormously. To have set up a modern government on such economic lines is without parallel.

And this has been effected by a covenanted

civil service barely numbering 1000 men. A mere nothing in numbers; a handful of salt in the Indian Sea.

Therefore, in this third stage of our Indian career we have apparently been successful. Lord Curzon tells us, as indeed we know, that "wealth is increasing in India. There is no test you can apply which does not demonstrate it. Trade is growing. Evidences of prosperity and progress are multiplying on every side." The blue-books furnish the same story. Thus, if in India we began as traders, and continued as rulers, we are becoming, up to date, the successful agents of prosperity. On this showing, all may seem to be for the best.

But, then, if so, what need is there of any fourth phase? Why should India require more than all that she has already obtained at our hands—order and safety, and public works, and law, and sound finance—signal benefits these? And truly, these gifts are indeed important. But that India will rest content with them, or that the Asiatic future of England is to be limited to such services, no one will be so blind as to suppose.

In order, however, to understand why a fourth phase will be necessary, and the nature of it, we must look a little more closely than hitherto at the third, in the midst of which we stand.

To begin with, it may be questioned, on a closer survey of what we have done for India, whether our administration, even in its strongest points, that is, in the points of order and safety, of public

works, of law, and of sound finance, has been above criticism. Indeed, it may even be argued that, unfortunately, important blunders have been committed by our administration in all these respects, and need remedy in the future.

For instance, during years not distant the Indian government has displayed regrettable hesitation in respect of outrage and anarchy, hatched in the Deccan and Bengal, and even in London. Mr. Chirol, in his *Indian Unrest*, has explained "the extraordinary tolerance too long extended at home and in India to this criminal propaganda. For two whole years it was carried on with relative impunity under the very eye of the government of India in Calcutta." As Lord Minto himself said in February 1911, there has been "a far-reaching conspiracy against our existence in India." Our first duty was to have put it down and to have maintained order at an earlier date than we actually did.

It is worthy of note that, when our government had begun to realise the serious nature of this movement, the Viceroy laid the whole position before the princes and chiefs of the Native States, who govern about one-third of the total area of India and enjoy the allegiance of 71,000,000 of subjects. These potentates unanimously condemned the methods and motives of their misguided compatriots. Their replies were a rebuke to our supineness, and a reminder, too, that the East is governed by princes and by statesmen, and not

by the hare-brained chatter of a seditious press. This consultation was something novel. It was a sudden omen of the future, and pregnant with things to come.

Again, though our codes are undoubtedly excellent, yet the slow course of Indian justice has become proverbial. If the Asiatic, justifiably enough after all, likes justice to be swift and cheap, we have not succeeded in supplying that article. As M. Chailley has recently observed, "outside of the Presidency towns, the procedure of the courts seems to be very complicated, slow, and costly, and unsuited for about one-third of India." Besides, English civil law is one of the most cumbrous systems in the world, and its application to India is not an unmixed success. To some extent we have thus compromised the value of a magnificent gift, and our judicial conceptions and procedure in the civil field have helped litigation to grow into a speculation, a mania, and a curse.

Or again, though our public works have saved the agricultural community from actual starvation, yet on the other hand, in the words of Sir John Strachey, the warm advocate of our policy here, "the indebtedness of the agriculturists is greater now than it was before the establishment of our government"; while in 1899 Lord Curzon stated that "the canker of agricultural indebtedness is eating into the vitals of India."

Admirable, too, as Indian finance has been on the whole, yet in its relation to the Bengal land

settlement, for instance, it has been seriously at fault. The exhaustive inquiry, made in 1901 into the whole subject of the land revenue administration throughout India, refers with stricture to those measures, the result of which has been "to place the tenant so unreservedly at the mercy of the landlord," besides sacrificing revenue.

Nevertheless, these errors are either being remedied at the present time, or are for the most part reparable, and certainly cannot weigh for a moment in the scale against the corresponding achievements. Therefore, we must look a little deeper into our action at this third stage, in order to understand why it is still so imperfect, and must even eventually be supplemented from elsewhere.

Mr. Chamberlain has said that, as a young man, he ridiculed the saying of Lord Beaconsfield that health is the foundation of policy, but that in his maturity he regretted his levity, having learned that it was true. To apply that proposition to our rule in Asia, we may say that neither to have order, or public works, or justice, or finance, or all together, is so good as to be well. National health is the first postulate of prosperity, and it is prosperity that, at this third stage, we are setting out to supply.

Among the many virtues of the Asiatic, sanitation is not to be reckoned. When, for instance, we came to Rangoon, it is on record that this city of 100,000 inhabitants did not possess a single public lamp, or a drop of wholesome water, or one drain

that was not open in the streets, or any system whatsoever of sewage. In Calcutta it was the same, till comparatively recent times. To nine-tenths of its inhabitants clean water was unknown, and they drank the filthy sludge of the river, which was at once the cesspool and the common grave-yard of the city. The capital of India was officially declared to be unfit to live in. So squalid is what those who do not know it, term "the gorgeous East."

It must be said at once that, in this department too, we are doing something. As regards Burma, the accounts of the Burmese municipalities, and of the municipalities in Bengal, show that even here, if we go down into detail, a beginning has been made, though it should be borne in mind that progress is limited by the consideration that no taxation is more unpopular in India than taxation for local purposes. In our medical colleges, too, we are now training Indians to serve with aptitude and success in our hospitals and dispensaries. Besides, a corresponding organisation has been set on foot for training women, to doctor, in the hospitals and dispensaries which we have established for them, the hitherto neglected members of their sex.

Yet, to look broadly at the matter, the battle for health has hitherto gone against us. The triple alliance of the rat and the flea and the mosquito has beaten the government of India. The modern Juggernaut is the bacillus unrestrictedly trampling down its millions.

Let us attend to what Professor Ronald Ross, who went out to India to discover the true cause of malaria, thinks of its civilisation from a medical point of view. "Racked by poverty, swept by epidemics, housed in hovels, ruled by superstitions, they presented the spectacle of an ancient civilisation fallen for centuries into decay. One saw there both physical and mental degeneration. Since the time of the early mathematicians, science had died; and since that of the great temples, art had become ornament. Here was the living picture of the fate which destroyed Greece, Rome, and Spain; and I saw in it the work of nescience—the opposite of science."

And the representative of the Indian government, speaking in the House of Commons, in July, 1911, practically confirms all this. "The present standard of living," he says, "is deplorably low. Ignorance of sanitary or medical principles is practically universal." The death-rate of children is appalling. The general death-rate is also immensely high. "Plague has now been present in India for fifteen years, and the total of nearly 7,500,000 deaths from it has been recorded."

Thus an aspect of our Asiatic future rises before us. The Indian peoples, as we found them, were almost extinct politically, and we have provided them with a polity. Further, they lacked prosperity, and we claimed to furnish it. At first sight, it seemed that we had succeeded, with our public works, and our law and order, and our

finance. But, on a closer view, it is plain that, if health is the root of prosperity, we have failed in the vital matter of all.

Might it not be possible that, since the health of the Empire is one of the most important, most urgent, and most neglected of imperial duties, an Imperial Medical Staff should be organised, wherein the various energies and experience of the doctor, the parasitologist, the entomologist, the hygienist, the engineer, the civil servant, and the statesman, should be mobilised and concentrated for the good of one quarter of the human race? Sanitation, now on a peace, should be put on a war, footing. We have recently been provided with an Imperial Military Staff for more efficient defence against our enemies. Why not an Imperial Medical Staff for the more efficient preservation of our peoples?

But if prosperity is founded primarily on the health of the body, it is founded next on the health of the mind. Unfortunately, the culture of the latter has for ages been slackening in southern Asia. So we have tried to educate India. But, to be brief, our policy in that respect has been largely a farrago of failures, a system seemingly elaborated to be nearly as bad as possible.

For instance, 90 per cent, or more, of the Indian peoples depend on agriculture. That is the pursuit which eclipses all others in their eyes. They matriculate in mother earth. Our educational system has avoided that subject.

Among the remaining 10 per cent, we are endeavouring to foster commercial prosperity, not without some result already. Indeed, at the present moment, there are some 2500 factories in India, run by mechanical power and employing nearly a million persons. Or again, though four-fifths of the exports of India consist of raw materials and food-stuffs, this proportion is being modified, and the recent rise in the export of manufactures is more than twice as great as the rise in the export of raw materials. Although it might be thought that we should have made it our first duty to provide the best commercial education, this has not been the case. Thus, in the words of an Indian economist, "the supreme need of to-day is managers of firms, pioneers, and entrepreneurs. The highest intellect of the nation should be educated for industries; our new ventures are run by amateur managers, and for this reason many of our new joint-stock companies have failed."

Or again, it may be recalled that, at the start of things, Lord William Bentinck, the Viceroy, decided that we should devote ourselves to teaching "English literature and science." Of this programme indubitably the scientific half would have been valuable, as the Indian mind is unscientific. Yet from the first, science was dropped out of our curriculum.

Later, in 1854, the Indian government issued what is usually called their educational "charter."

It provided very wisely for the development of elementary education, with the object of "conveying to the great mass of the people, who are utterly incapable of obtaining any education worthy of the name by their own unaided efforts, useful and practical knowledge, suited to every station in life." A most admirable recommendation. It was, however, abandoned. Indeed, in July 1911 it was officially stated in the House of Commons that 80 per cent of the children of India are still "outside education." As the boys alone, of school-going age, number 16,000,000 at the present date, the widespread nature of native ignorance may be gathered.

Relinquishing, then, the systematic instruction of the masses in anything, we confined our education mainly to literary subjects, to be taught through the medium of the English tongue. For that purpose it may be supposed that we should have needed masters who understood our language and ways of thought. Yet out of 127 "colleges" to-day, there are 30 with no Europeans at all on the staff, 16 with one, 21 with two, and so forth. In the secondary schools it is even worse. Altogether, in the early years of this century, the total number of Europeans under government engaged in educational work has numbered barely 250, whilst that of natives engaged in similar work in colleges and secondary schools has been over 27,000. The Director-General of Education himself recently denounced the whole status of the latter teachers

as "scandalous in Bengal and Eastern Bengal, and unsatisfactory in every province."

In a word, our educational policy in India has been that rare thing—a policy of which nobody can approve. Nay more, it has been so misguided on the whole, up to 1904 at any rate, that on its reform the justification of our rule must depend. For we only hold India on the tenure of continuous amelioration.

So far, then, it has seemed that, as regards the third phase of our policy, we are still no more than half-way in it. But, to go a step further, is it not, conceivably, impossible that we should succeed here? All question of our own official policy apart, do not the very facts of Indian life forbid prosperity to be anything but a languid exotic?

For example, the Hindu population of 220,000,000 is divided against itself more profoundly than any other in recorded time. Out of that total, no less than 53,000,000 at the present date are reckoned so unclean by the others that their very touch or presence is pollution, and they are doomed to a shameful ostracism. An Englishman may be entitled to agree with what an Indian prince, the Gaekwar of Baroda, says of this system that, "claiming to rise by minutely graduated steps from the pariah to the Brahman, it is a whole tissue of injustice, splitting men equal by nature into divisions high and low"; and he adds that, therefore, reckoning the Mohammedans into his

calculation, "one-sixth of the people are in a chronically depressed and ignorant condition."

But even this opposition of Hindus and pariahs is unimportant compared with the caste system, which divides the Hindus *inter se* to an incredible extent. The castes, again, are infinitely parcelled out, the Brahminical alone containing over 1800 subdivisions. The principle of caste being that its members exclusively eat together and exclusively intermarry, the result is that India consists of a population indescribably heterogeneous. As Sir Bampfylde Fuller has explained: "For at least twelve centuries intermarriage between castes has been absolutely prohibited; the population of a district or a town is a collection of different nationalities—almost different species—of mankind. It is hardly too much to say that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are differentiated into two thousand species." India, in fact, is a continent of stereotyped chaos. The first preoccupation of each Hindu is to maintain his caste, his separateness, his ceremonial purity, sanctioned, as it is, under the ægis of the Brahmans, by rules, laws, prejudices, and traditions. From one point of view, in caste is a man's salvation and happiness; from another, it is the utter negation of equality, the very bar of progress, and the heaviest chain which humanity has ever worn.

And then, piled high upon the top of all the endless detritus of caste, comes the pyre upon which Hindus and Mohammedans burn Indian unity

to ashes. This is an animus, radical, utter, and final, ever vitalised by inextinguishable memories, and fed daily by the clash of warring beliefs. The wisest and most liberal Mohammedan of the nineteenth century, Syad Ahmad Khan, has said that on the day on which England left India there would be war, and that, if the Mohammedans were hard pressed, "then our Musalman brothers, the Pathans, would come out as a swarm of locusts from their mountain valleys—like a swarm of locusts would they come." A gruesome prospect for Bengali journalists, and able editors! A prospect more than ever certain to-day, when Hinduism and Islam are both busy with revivalism, with delimitations of doctrinal frontiers, and the fortification of theological stockades.

Yet all these are merely some of the difficulties which check the movement of a decomposed society towards integration and cohesion. For example, there is the status of women in Hinduism. We may credit the eulogies so often devoted to the domestic influence and character of the women of India. In India, Sister Nivedita with pardonable exaggeration tells us, "the sanctity and sweetness of family life have been raised to the rank of a great culture," and she adds that there is "a half-magical element in this attitude of Hindus towards women." But all this must not conceal from us the tremendous practical disadvantages under which the women labour, disadvantages so burdensome as to react with severity upon the race. We

are told officially that, at the present date, there are no less than 9,000,000 girl-wives between the ages of one and fifteen, of whom 2,500,000 are under eleven years of age. Also, there are 4,000,000 girl-widows who may not re-marry. Where an Englishman cannot tread without indiscretion, a distinguished Indian has recently come forward to denounce "this baneful custom" of child-marriage in all its aspects, and to declare, besides, that "enforced widowhood has hung like a heavy millstone round the neck of India." In fact, the female, as an infant, is less cared for, as a girl, is less educated, even than the male; as a betrothed, is engaged to marry in ignorance; as married, is in a backwater of life; and as a widow, is little more than an outcast. All this must work in two opposite ways. In the breasts of a minority infinitesimally small, it must excite a determination to escape from such dire bondage, and to embrace the outstretched hands of western civilisation and freedom. But upon the huge overwhelming mass it must work conversely, weakening the fibre of the mind and the sinews of the will, so that they welcome their trammels, and stand at cross purposes with their own enlightenment. And they excite their men against us. They recapture the native reformer, making western culture and science look cold and comfortless, and even impious, to their husbands returning hot with reform from some congress of the Arya Samaj. As one of the most eminent of modern native reformers has said, "the women are not with us."

And yet all this is not a tithe of all that, in the endless Indian world, is calculated to resist our progress. To so many of those peoples the past, in which we have no part, is so much more than the present or the future. The Islamite, remembering the centuries of his ascendency since Mahmud of Ghazni, and the Hindu, thinking of centuries in the older night of time, wish them back. It is aristocracy to live in the past, and they are all aristocrats. They revere ancestry more deeply than we can understand. Still more, they worship power, which to them is of God. Hence if, on the one hand, they obey a Maharana of Udaipur, the reputed descendant of Vishnu, or a Maharaja of Travancore, sprung, they say, from the old emperors of Malabar; on the other, they can yield allegiance no less, when a body-servant founds the dynasty of Scindia, or the brigand, Sivaji, becomes a monarch, or when a corporal seizes the crown of Mysore. So they are irked by the hum of "progress," and prefer their native hills and valleys to the bare blank plain of equality, even with safe-conduct from Padgett, M.P.

Nevertheless, when all this has been said as to the difficulties in the way of our policy of prosperity, we know little if we do not take a deeper sounding yet. In Asia we operate in the presence of some of the greatest creeds that have sought to reconcile humanity to its lot. There is Hinduism, the faith meditative, and Islam, the faith militant. Farther off, rise the peaks of Buddhism, those Himalayas

of the sky spiritual, wrapt in the snows of eternal thought.

Under the cold disapproving eyes of all these votaries, it is a stiff task for us to wean men to calico and cutlery, and the whole programme of the flesh. For the Mohammedan, in spite of his Aligarh college, cannot easily forget the dictum of Omar that all that agrees with the Koran is superfluous, and all that differs from it is error. The Hindus, though divided so much, yet agree in viewing all things as a curtain ever tremulous with breaths from the unseen. For them, in the phrase of the *Adonais*, life does no more than to stain the white radiance of eternity. Last of all, the Buddhists remember how the Master said that they should be free from the passions which, like a net, encompass men; and how he wrought out the great Renunciation; and how he straitly charged them to overcome this world's "thirst," by aid of the four Meditations, and the five moral Powers, and the seven kinds of Wisdom, and the noble eightfold Path; and how, dying, he enjoined them to go in that way for ever, of which the gate is purity, and its goal is love.

Yet, even so, in this interminable exhaustless East, into the mazes of which we have somehow stumbled, we have to turn another corner still. After all, the Moslem, in spite of his fatalism, can cry out when he is hurt like other people. The Hindu himself is growing as fond of money as the denizens of Park Lane or Capel Court, can

agitate, as well as the best of us, for the good things of this life, and is utterly material in his baser rites. For in Asia the religious torch burns dark at its foot.

But that consideration opens up at once a grave issue for ourselves. If in the East, as elsewhere, the old contests between the spirit and the flesh have their hard-fought battlefield, and if materialism gains ground visibly, are we justified in thus marching, horse and foot, in rescue of the latter? To make life worth living, and to raise the standard of comfort, sounds well. Yet the East may say that to stimulate unruly affections, and to put an edge to appetites, is practically our mission, and a disputable one. It is not an unquestionable thing to substitute the multiplicity of desires for the multiplicity of deities. Is England to be the *agent provocateur* of disbelief? For the rising flood of our western rationalism saps the foundations of the tabernacles where the tribes go up. We lay our unwitting axe in the primeval woodland of the divinities. We make our clearings in the matted jungle of the gods.

All this is dubious work, even from a practical point of view. For, as Comte wrote in his *Cours de Philosophie*, "a decisive experience has proved the necessary instability of all purely material régimes, founded only on men's interests, independently of their affections and convictions." That thesis is being verified in India: Sir John Strachey, who knew that country administratively

as well as any man, has stated that: "I never heard of a great measure of improvement that was popular in India, even among the classes that have received the largest share of education"; and he adds that the masses of the people "dislike everything new, they dislike almost everything that we look upon as progress." And the main cause of all this is that even to-day, as Sir Alfred Lyall has told us, "it is in the religious life that Asiatic communities still find the reason of their existence and the repose of it."

Thus it is that England, surveying her own work in India, in that third phase of her policy which would make men prosperous, has to apply to herself the words of Napoleon, "I am the Revolution." We shall discover, too, that the more eagerly we push that revolutionary programme of utilitarianism, and the more hastily India puts on the West, to the detriment of her old order, the more she will resent our disruption of the "reason of her existence and the repose of it."

Meditating on these deep issues, a thinker may have a dream. Resisting all present appearances, he may remember that the truer Hinduism never fails. The Greeks came, and made nothing of the Brahmans. Against that bulwark all-subduing Islam itself was checked. Buddha, who founded the most widely spread religion, was a Hindu, yet, because Buddhism was not orthodox, it was finally evicted from Hindustan, and had to conquer its world elsewhere. England herself,

with her steam-roller of democratic right, in reality avails little, for, if she is levelling out caste on the surface, it is only tightening down below. Though India may be giving ground nominally before the materialistic jehad, yet perhaps her retreat will only be on the first line of her entrenchments. She will fall back on the inner keep of her mysticism, upon the central fortalice of her esoteric faith. In the last resort of battle she will turn the stream of her despondency upon Europe, and will open upon our optimism the dykes of her immemorial despair.

Beyond this, the thinker may ponder on a still more audacious hypothesis. If we will kill their faith, they may try to kill our faith too. They will have no Metz. They will sally out for a religious sortie in force. They will argue that this one life on which, in our view, all our future status hinges, is, to them, more scientifically, but a link in the long chain. We desire consciousness; they would be rid of it. We presuppose, they deny, the soul. We anchor ourselves on a Personal Godhead; to them such personality of the divine is the most repugnant of heresies. As for immortal life, they draw back with horror from its torture or its bliss. Such is the arch of meditation through which they would have us gaze on the vista of reality. Such is the height, terraced by wisdom or by folly, which they would have us tread. Such is the forbidden opium of metaphysics which they will export West.

Thus at last would be realised the old prophecy

of Schopenhauer that "Indian philosophy, streaming back to Europe, will produce a fundamental change in our knowledge and thought." Then would come true the words of the Swami Vivekananda: "The land above all of introspection and spirituality is India. Hence have started the founders of religion, and here again must start the wave which will spiritualise the material civilisation of the world. Political greatness or military power is never the mission of the Hindus. But there has been the other mission given to us: to accumulate, as it were, into a dynamo all the spiritual energy of the race, and to pour forth that concentrated energy on the world. India's gift to the world is the light spiritual."

But these are dreams, the light infantry of speculation, only skirmishers from the ivory gate. The flank of England is too solidly posted to be readily turned by such assailants as these.

We have to look at facts. Facts tell us that, for generations still to come, our third phase in India, our policy of prosperity, will not reach its fulfilment, or be crowned with final success. Facts tell us, too, that, even if our aim were to be consummated to-morrow, it would not satisfy India at all. Therefore, a fourth phase of policy must be initiated, and indeed is beginning to-day.

In that fourth phase the Indian question will be not of prosperity, but of freedom. On our solution of that question will depend the ultimate future of England.

CHAPTER X

OUR ORIENTAL FUTURE (*continued*)

On Traitor's Hill the heat of the earlier afternoon was gone. The evening began, the tardy evening of our climate, so unlike that of the tropics, where the day begins suddenly, and the night is sudden too.

In the serene air of that stately prospect every fold and feature in the infinite articulation of London stood out perfectly, so that the volplane of sight sped with ease to the dome of St. Paul's and the towers of Westminster, those divided emblems of division in Church and State. But of the Thames that links them, and in its eastward flow gives to London its only unity, not a trace was to be seen. It was like the hidden path of our future.

For, to lift the purdah of that future, every thought, as it came, added to the conviction and to the certainty that for ourselves the determining trend of destiny lies east. At home, indeed, our problem is the condition of labour; in Europe, our function is to be the refrigerator of the passions of Christendom. But out there we have to face and remedy the old darkening hatred between

Occident and Orient, the most dangerous and profound of animosities, and to give life more abundantly to one-fifth of man's species, and to build what the subtle curving tides of Asia shall never sweep away.

We must see, then, plainly what is to be the fourth and last phase of our Asiatic career.

With us Europeans, as already pointed out, between the claims of religion and of the body, nationality has staked out its domain. But it may be said respecting by far the major portion of humanity, and certainly of the Asiatics, that for them this conception of nationality, as the sphere where the impulses of the body, the reasoning of the mind, and the aspirations of the soul can be co-ordinated for the good of humanity, is new. No one more than the oriental has made life bow to religion : no one more than he has made religion bow to life. In the height of his spiritual fervour, in the depth of his materialism, in the satisfaction of his soul by mysticism, in the gratification of his body by luxury, he has surpassed the world. But India never had a citizen. For the saint is not national, or the voluptuary either.

The Asiatic, as we found him, cared for his women, his family, his caste, his co-religionists—in fact for all those whom his senses or his creed recommended, but for his "neighbour" no more than for a dog. In Renan's phrase, there were never Assyrian patriots. This want of public spirit was the reason why India fell so easily into

our hands. John Stuart Mill once wrote that our government in India is "not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act ever known among mankind." So far as history can testify, no native government before our coming was pure in intention or beneficent in act at all. *Misereor super turbam*—this was what Asia never knew.

Into a world thus constituted came the Englishman. He offered trade—and the Indian traded; order—and the Indian was orderly; prosperity—and the Indian did not decline. But, though he would accept prosperity, he is still not satisfied.

The restless, far-thinking mind of the Asiatic had studied the Englishman very close. It suspected that in the English pharmacopeia was a much more valuable ingredient, some universal specific, some wonder-working potion, freedom. The Asiatic knew, or thought he knew, the Englishman to have made this freedom his divinity. For it appeared that, for the sake of freedom, he was ever losing the world that he had conquered, and was seemingly content to lose it. If India adopted that divinity, she might prosper mightily on the one hand, and, on the other, would be rid of the Englishman in due course. True, freedom is not in her pantheon, but in that countless company of godheads one more or less would not count.

Indian experts have sometimes contended that representative government, and elections, and constitutional procedure, and divisions, are utterly

alien and antipathetic to the Indian. But that is open to doubt. Hinduism no more objects to receive all this into its system than a valetudinarian to take a tonic. A parliamentary, an extra, god is welcome. Indeed, a living M.P. has recently been suggested for that position. For Hinduism stocks itself with theogonies. It slips a new divinity with pleasure into its aquarium, to be fed at stated times with the rest.

The Englishman, on his side, does not take the same view, naturally, though he agrees, it is true, to a limited extent. In fact, he has a deeper idea and a better vision. For he intends to gain India, not to lose it, by the gift of sufficient freedom. And if he gains India, he has gained the leadership of the world.

What, then, precisely is this policy of the fourth phase, on which so much hinges? Current ideas, English and Indian alike, need a fair examination.

In the first place, it is thought by many that we are to prepare India to stand entirely by herself. On this theory we are to occupy the responsible, but not very profitable, post of a college tutor who gives the last push to the fledgling over the edge of the nest.

Undoubtedly, that would not be an irrational forecast if one condition were fulfilled. That condition is the adoption by India of Christianity and of all that it implies. As it is, religion in India has a threefold choice. Firstly, the Indian peoples will remain as they are in religion, that is,

roughly divided into Hindus and Mohammedans. In that case complete freedom is impracticable, for as soon as we retired, civil war would ensue between the creeds. The result of this anarchy would be, of course, the victory of one party. If the Mohammedans won, India would be unfortunately placed. For Islam is so ill adapted to modern government, that to-day nearly nine-tenths of the whole vast body of Islamites have accepted non-Islamite rulers. Three Moslem states claim, indeed, the imperial title, Morocco, Persia, and Turkey, but we all know whether they are governed tolerably. On the other hand, if the Hindus won, the caste system, the negation of progress, would reassert itself unchecked, and would render civilised government a dead letter.

The second religious possibility is that Indian pessimism, uprooted by western culture, will become atheistical. There are, no doubt, some signs of that mischief. The best Moslem and the best Hindus agree in dreading it, and they feel that our government, in its total religious abstinence, has unconsciously fostered this danger to some degree. As late as 1904, the Education Resolution laid down that "in government institutions the instruction is, and must continue to be, exclusively secular," though the natives would welcome more freedom for their religious teaching in our schools. But a good proof that the future is not with atheism in India, lies in the fact that, as Sir Andrew Fraser has stated, "the genius of

Indian thought, the demands of Indian parents, and the strong representations of Indian chiefs are all in favour of religious education." No doubt "the ingenuous youths," as Gibbon called them, in many cases, "reject and despise the religion of the multitude." But even supposing that such views became those of the majority, and that atheism gained a wide footing, no nation would be constituted which we could justifiably abandon to itself.

The third religious choice before India is to embrace the truths of Christianity. India has been familiar with our faith from time out of mind, and the Indian branch of the Church is traced by tradition to the labours of St. Thomas himself. It was King Alfred who inaugurated our Indian connection by sending alms to the foundation that is consecrated by that Apostle's name.

It is a strange fact, for which history vouches, that, coincidently with our definite advent into Hindustan as a governing power, Christianity was struck with a decline. That opinion is founded on the evidence given at the parliamentary inquiry in 1832. As the Abbé Dubois pointed out on that occasion, "the Christian religion has been visibly on the decline during these past eighty years," and the priests were so abandoned, or so starving, as to make "a kind of traffic of the sacraments."

Perhaps this deterioration was hastened by the singular conduct of our government, who up to

1831, at any rate, treated Christianity worse than they treated the vilest of creeds. For instance, our regulations expressly provided that converts to Christianity should be liable to be deprived not only of property, but of children and wife. We obliged Christians to drag the cars of idols, and our magistrates caned them publicly if they disobeyed. Our officials were employed to pull down churches and to build mosques. Thus our administrative Jacobins attacked their own religion without scruple, their policy being the contemporary counterpart of our political atheism at home. They filled the rôle of ostlers to Juggernaut. They took India to be the tied-house of paganism.

Such a scandal could evidently not last, and since then the administration has endeavoured to be strictly impartial, equally friendly or equally indifferent to all sides, presenting itself as of the religion of all, and of the convictions of none. The Indian government, like some beatific Buddha, sits aloof in the enjoyment of theological nirvana. "When Malunka asked the Buddha whether the existence of the world is eternal or not eternal, he made him no reply; but the reason of this was that it was considered by the teacher to be an unprofitable inquiry."

Accordingly, Christianity has made its own way since then, without particular let or hindrance. Will it conquer India? On this matter we have valuable testimony in the shape of a small work

by the Bishop of Madras, published at the close of 1907, and marked by plain speaking.

The Bishop begins by acknowledging that the ideas and hopes with which he came out to India twenty-five years ago were mistaken. He points out that during the last fifty years a number of strong influences "have greatly modified the attitude of the educated classes towards Christianity." First, universities have been established with a purely secular course of studies. Then, as education spread, "Indians became aware that Christianity was by no means universally accepted by all thinking men in Europe and America." Thirdly, there has been the important revival in Hinduism itself, particularly in the shape of Vedantism, the most popular form of Hindu philosophy. Finally, political aspirations have come, concentrating the Indian mind on political aims. "The facts are obvious. The educated classes of India have steadily become more critical of their English rulers, and more directly opposed to English influence." And this has reacted directly upon Christianity. For five years past "the Oxford Mission to Calcutta have hardly made six converts, and it is stated in the last report of the Cambridge Mission to Delhi that there is not a single case of baptism to show as the result of twenty-five years of college work." Finally, the Bishop writes that, "I can see no evidence of any movement towards Christianity in the higher ranks of Hindu society at present,

nor any hope of it in the immediate future; on the contrary, the educated classes seem to me further off from the definite acceptance of the Christian faith to-day than they were when I first came out to India twenty-five years ago."

In these circumstances the Bishop would turn, if the analogy may be permitted, from Judæa to Galilee, from Capernaum to the villages. He would wish, in plain terms, Christian endeavour to concentrate itself on the outcasts, the pariahs, the depressed classes, among whom so much good work has been done already, in Southern India especially. In this aspect of affairs he claims that "the work in India, so far from being a failure, has been going forward for the last thirty years by leaps and bounds, and we have the definite prospect before us of creating and building up a powerful Church of some ten million Christians within the next fifty years."

I drew rein. It would have been no bad task to have analysed further the reasons of this history and of these hopes. But it was beyond my sphere and purpose. Besides, time pressed, and the night felt its way over London.

Enough to conclude that, at no date within the range of present consideration, will Christianity win India as a whole.

But if this be so; if Islam and Hinduism are still to divide that world; if all alike are to be immovably at one in the desire to settle old scores and see who is master; if unredeemed arrears of

wrong are still to be entered on all ledgers, and the account-books of history can never be totted up; if the Koran on the one side, and the Shastras on the other, are to be the fixed poles of inexhaustible hate—then the sword of England must still be girded to maintain a civilisation which must be still belligerent.

But it is said by others that Indian independence is not within their calculations, at least. They claim that something much more modest is wanted, colonial self-government—Swaraj. India is to be a Canada or Australia, only more so. This scheme has been sketched by an authoritative native hand. To begin with, the grant of colonial self-government is to be wrung from us by an extensive strike or boycott. What will be the first thing that India will do with Swaraj? "We will impose a heavy prohibitive tariff upon every inch of textile fabric from Manchester, upon every blade of knife that comes from Sheffield. We shall refuse to grant admittance to a British soul into our territory. We would not allow British capital to be engaged in the development of Indian resources, as it is now engaged. We shall want foreign capital. But we shall apply for foreign loans in the open market of the whole world, guaranteeing the credit of the Indian Government, the Indian nation, for the repayment of the loan." A pleasing prospect, till one remembers those fatal "locusts" of Pathans, always ready to disable able editors, or to "open their columns" to rich Bengalis, and

even to issue an edition, mutilated, of esteemed correspondents.

Or thirdly, it is suggested that India shall have self-government, but shall remain on very friendly terms with England. She is to have the privilege of independence within, but without, at sea, she is to be protected by our navy, for which she will be grateful, and on her frontier by our armies, for which she will be grateful too. That is really most amicable! But there is one objection to it, and a final one. We are not disposed to answer the advertisement. It is not part of Britannia's future to become the Indian maid-of-all-work on a starvation wage.

If, then, these ideas, which occupy so many earnest men, are to be put aside as impracticable, we must look elsewhere to see the development of the coming time. To begin with, it is necessary to look at the Indian constitution, for beneath the unprepossessing cowl of that constitution we may begin to discern the features of the future.

First, it has been the policy of England to govern with as few of our own civilians as possible, and to build up an executive and judicial service, manned by native public servants. For instance, magisterial work is mainly done by natives, and Indian judges sit in the High Court with English colleagues. In contrast with a tiny body of Englishmen, who retain the highest offices of control, the actual administration, in by far its greatest and most important part, is in the hands

of natives. It is calculated that these latter now number a million and a quarter.

We must be careful not to contemn this bureaucracy. Indeed, such contempt would lie ill in the mouths of us Englishmen, who are energetically framing our own government more and more on bureaucratic lines. This system of a native civil service has been justly called one of the most successful of our achievements, and is certainly unparalleled in Asia. As for its quality, those who can look back to the past assert, with Sir John Strachey, that, "nothing in the recent history of India has been more remarkable than the improvement that has taken place in the standard of morality among the higher classes of native officials." Those who can speak with scarcely less authority of the present, say, with Sir Bampfylde Fuller, that, "in all my experience of native Indian officials I have rarely met one who was not loyal to his salt. Indeed, devotion to one's chief and to one's service is one of India's most conspicuous virtues." On the other hand, it should be remembered that all this depends for its existence, and for its standard, on that band of men at the top.

Secondly, it has been our policy since the Mutiny to reinvigorate and fortify, by indirect methods of advice and control, the native states, which, of course, are solely administered by natives and comprise so large a part of India. Of their loyalty the Mutiny gave full evidence, for, as Lord

Canning described it, they were the breakwater against the storm which would otherwise have annihilated us. And they have furnished many proofs since then of the same spirit.

Up till quite recently not so much could be said of their administration. As late as the 1880's it could still be described as a wilderness of misrule; and even to-day, with some few shining exceptions, if we wish to think of them as a whole in that capacity, it must be as of states emerging from the Middle Ages.

A third feature of our constitutional development is well worth attention. In the long course of history the three old Presidencies have of course disappeared. In their place a new organisation has been gradually making its way, and has been considerably enlarged quite recently. Practically, British India now consists of nine great provinces or, in reality, different countries: Bombay, Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the Punjab, Burmah, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the Central Provinces, and finally the North-West Frontier Province. The fact that the first two of these are administered by governors, the next five by lieutenant-governors, and the last two by chief commissioners, must not conceal from us that here are a set of what may be termed separate nations in embryo.

A fourth feature is that, since the abolition of the old constitution of the Company, India has been brought strictly within the purview of our

democracy. No need to dwell upon that machinery, worked by the Secretary of State for India, and so familar to the minds of all of us. Sufficient to say that, as Lord Morley has stated, "the democratic constituencies of this kingdom are the rulers of India."

The last feature of the constitution is the one that has been so much before the public eye since the Act of 1909. At home, a powerful hand had seized the rudder and shaken out more sail. Lord Morley inaugurated a momentous departure in the highest departments of state. At the close of 1908 the King-Emperor himself, by proclamation to the princes and peoples of India, took occasion to explain its purport: "From the first, the principle of representative institutions began to be gradually introduced, and the time has come when that principle may be prudently extended. Important classes among you, representing the ideas that have been fostered and encouraged by British rule, claim equality of citizenship and a greater share in legislation and government. The politic satisfaction of such a claim will strengthen, not impair, existing authority and power."

It is desirable to attend to the precise bearing of the changes thus indicated upon the central and culminating authority of the government of India.

From the earliest times of the Indian constitution, from 1773 at any rate, there existed under statute a governor-general and a small council, in

whom the supreme executive and legislative power yonder was vested. But under the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the governor-general was directed to nominate certain members "additional" to this council, for purposes of legislation only. It is material to observe that half of these additional members were to be non-officials, and that, as a matter of practice, most of these non-officials were always natives of India. Presumably, it is mainly to this statute that the King-Emperor referred in signifying that, from the first, representative institutions had been recognised in principle. Further, it is to be seen that the old executive council began to acknowledge a division of its functions by widening its personnel for legislative occasions.

The Act of 1892 went further, but on the same lines. The numbers and the powers of the legislative council were increased. Thus gradually the legislative council asserts itself, and becomes, in a certain modified measure, representative.

And now we arrive at the Indian Councils Act of 1909. Under this measure the viceroy's legislative council loses its name altogether to become the Imperial Council. It is now to have no less than sixty additional members, of whom thirty-five are nominated by the governor-general. But the remaining twenty-five are to be actually elected by specified electorates, and every three years there is to be a general election. Evidently, representative institutions of a species have been definitely inaugurated, especially as the general principles animating

these changes have been followed, with variations, in the provincial administrations. Above all, it should be added that, even on the executive council of the governor-general, which is the very stronghold and central keep of our position, an Indian member has been introduced, together with similar appointments to the provincial executive councils. Finally, we have the appointment of two Indian gentlemen on the Indian council in Whitehall.

This is indeed, as Lord Morley has termed it, "the opening of a very important chapter" in the history of our relations with India. The most recent official information furnished in July 1911 is that "it is the opinion of all concerned in the government of India that this scheme has been a complete success, and that the standard of work in the new legislative councils is worthy of the highest praise." Perhaps hard facts are not quite of this roseate bloom: suffice it that, in spite of several acknowledged drawbacks, the experiment so far has done well.

It has been stated recently by the representative of India in the House of Commons that the country is not "ripe" for any further modification, and that henceforth "Indians must turn their attention to organising an industrial population." But, after all, this enlargement of the councils so that more Indians may be responsibly associated with ourselves, is a policy which, however excellent, must not conceal from view the wider proportions of the future.

For example, Lord Curzon has told us that our connection with India "is still in its youth, and has in it the vitality of an unexhausted purpose." And he has added that, "I believe that we have it in our power to weld the people of India to a unity greater than they have hitherto dreamed of." Let us endeavour to frame a rational conception of this "larger vision and fuller hope," and look ahead.

If we do so, it must seem very obvious that the next matter to which India will address herself is her position in the world and the nature of her freedom. She will not be satisfied with prosperity, with a commercial system, with social amelioration, or even with legislative councils. She has never had a place in the sun, politically, for even the rulership of the Moghuls was not of international significance. Before our coming she was either a mere arena for despots, or a mere running track for barbarians. She was dead or sleeping. But the sleeper will wake. The corpse of the Indian body politic will spring to its feet.

When that time comes, as it will undoubtedly, we shall have to remember the great words of Lord Beaconsfield, uttered originally with reference to India. "Touch and satisfy the imagination of nations," he said, "for that is an element which no government can despise." Thus, security and splendour are the two imperial elements. For India's sake, and for our own, it is our future to combine them.

To comprehend how this will come about, we have to look again, this time more critically, at the Indian constitution and the forces that are moulding it.

It is to be remarked that, in all our domestic discussions as to the reorganisation of the government of India, the position of the native states seems, relatively speaking, to have attracted small attention. Lord Morley is certainly not open to any such criticism, for he wrote at the close of 1908 that "no one with any part to play in Indian government can doubt the manifold advantages of still further developing not only amicable, but confidential, relations with the rulers of India." The minister was writing with reference to a scheme that had emanated from Lord Minto himself, who had proposed to establish no less a body than an Imperial Advisory Council of the princes and chiefs of India. For the moment this scheme has passed into the background, and nothing has come of it. It is certain in some shape to revive. For to omit, as we practically do at present, from the imperial constitution the whole body of these rulers is a flaw too obvious, and too glaring, to stand unremedied for long. For, even as long ago as 1899, Lord Curzon said at Gwalior, that "the native chief has become, by our policy, an integral factor in the imperial organisation of India. He is concerned not less than the viceroy or the lieutenant-governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as

my colleague and partner." It is to that doctrine that the constitution will have eventually to conform.

But if, on the one hand, the signs of the time point to the necessity of adding dignity and breadth to the imperial central government, on the other, they point no less emphatically to the necessity of freeing it from many of the duties that now appear progressively to entangle and overwhelm it.

The functions of the central government of India seem to be not only unusually onerous, but to be growing fast. For instance, claiming a share of the produce of the land, it is increasingly brought into the complexities of the land question. It manages landed estates. It undertakes relief works. It administers vast forests. It manufactures salt. It owns the bulk of the railways, and operates a large part of them. It maintains a colossal system of irrigation. It monopolises the note issue, and acts, for the most part, as its own banker. It regulates the balance of external trade through the action of the India Council's drawings. It lends money. Many other are the paternal duties which it performs more and more fully for a fifth of the human race. No wonder that the recent Royal Commission upon Decentralisation in India declared, in 1909, that the central administration has now become "an extremely heavy burden, and one which is constantly increasing with the economic development of the country and the

growing needs of populations of diverse nationality, language, and creed."

And then, added to all this, is the further tendency of government "to override" in Lord Morley's words, "local authority, and to force administration to run in official grooves." The Commissioners say the same. They declare, in their roundabout circumspect way, that government has hitherto been too much dominated by considerations of administrative efficiency, has paid too little regard to developing responsibility among subordinate agents, and to giving weight to local sentiment and tradition. All this "results, in large measure, in administrative authority in India having to do over again work already accomplished at a stage below. Future policy should be directed to steadily enlarging the spheres of detailed administration entrusted to provincial governments."

Larger principles thus begin to appear above the mass of details, and to dominate the outlook into the future. If, on the one hand, in the old words of Bright, "what you want is to decentralise your government," perhaps to federalise it, on the other, it is desirable to bring native rulers towards the sphere and circle of responsibility. As it is, we are in danger of creating a central government too busy in detail, too close to business, too anxious for what has been done already, too dusty with archives and precedents, too much engrossed with the anise and cummin of public affairs.

Long ago, Lord Wellesley remarked of the secretaries of the government of India that they combined the industry of clerks with the talent of statesmen. But clerks will not command the allegiance of old and haughty nations, steeped in the immemorial pride of race and religion. Government needs to go higher in these days when the tides are at flood, and the waters out, and the file affords no precedent. Otherwise, it will not touch "the imagination of nations," which "no government can despise." And, what is of chief concern to the oriental who traces power to divinity, in the end it will not be strong.

An administration, then, will in time be constituted adequate to give scope to India's wishes, and to lead her to that high office in the world's affairs which she has never yet occupied, but which, it is certain, she will one day fill. Here is by no means a speculation at haphazard. There are already many signs and recorded omens of what the future will produce in this respect. When Natal was in danger of being overrun by an enemy, England applied to India for that help which was promptly and efficiently given. When it was necessary to rescue the Pekin legations from massacre, we turned to India, who despatched a successful expedition. When war broke out in East Africa, an Indian general and Indian troops were found most effective for the task. When it was necessary to man and defend the extreme outposts or coaling stations of the empire, such as Aden, Mauritius, Singapore, or

Hongkong, we turned to the Indian army for men. Railways in Uganda or the Soudan are constructed by the help of Indian labour. The plantations of Demerara or Natal are exploited by Indian industry. Egypt is irrigated, and the Nile dammed, by officers trained in India. Indian forest officers tap the resources of Central Africa and Siam, and Indian surveyors explore the earth.

In a word, the future of India is to co-operate with the future of England.

Therefore, when we are justly told, by those who know, that India is not, and never will be, a nation, and that she consists of many nations at eternal variance with one another and parted by the profound abysses of race, creed, language, and history, we can assent. But that assent must not be taken to imply that, ruled by many governments co-ordinated into one common focus, she cannot pursue a definite policy and stand as a clear unity in the future before mankind.

Therefore, too, when we are assured, by those who know, that the Indian will never "love" our government, and that his almost sacred preoccupation is against it, and that there is in his heart an unconquerable and immitigable distaste for its presence, we may agree. But then, we may ask what Englishman "loves" our domestic government, or is "loyal" to its too inquisitive functionaries, or does not feel an innate aversion to the rule of his political opponents, half the nation at least.

It is more to the point to remember, in the

words of Sir Andrew Fraser, that as regards social intercourse, "what is required to secure cordial relations between Europeans and Indians is that they should study each other's customs, and that they should keep their hearts open to receive friendships."

Rising to the highest issues of public policy, we may be certain that if India hitherto, with eyes turned introspectively upon herself, and debilitated by the anæmia of her own metaphysics, and embittered by her unparalleled disasters, has not only nourished too much hatred against the stranger within her gates, but has sanctioned too much mutual animosity among her own offspring; if she has, in her despondency, too often regarded life as useless, a mere fitful fever with a recurring attack; if she, who was great when we were barbarous, has become weak when we are strong; then no treatment can be more salutary, and no cure more efficacious, than that she should ascend into the high places of imperial statesmanship, and into the healthful air of freedom, where she and ourselves can grow great together in a never-ending partnership.

CHAPTER XI

OUR FINAL FUTURE

ENGLAND, then, has led the modern world in freedom first, and next, in industrialism. With us, the former gave birth to the latter movement, which, with all its imperfections and with all its promise, is as yet but half-way. Putting aside those who would take advantage of its imperfections for unwise and even revolutionary ends, we shall see to it that its promise is fulfilled, and that its essential purpose, a prosperity fairly and generally diffused, is finally accomplished.

Yet, beyond this prospect, another is opening before us. To-day, science asks to be the partner of policy. It says, with an ever-increasing weight, that the care of the individual, the cure of the race, the culture of mind and body, the provision of health in its widest meaning, are the most urgent work of domestic statesmanship. The masses, to whom the twentieth century will belong, will ask for nothing less of nationality than to be free, prosperous, and well.

But England is not only a nation to herself, she is also a part of Christendom. So the second great issue for England is what part she shall play

in the West. Shall she stand, as far as possible, in abeyance, or shall she adopt a more active rôle? There is no doubt that she will take the latter decision.

The reason necessitating this is that it is far too dangerous to act otherwise. For the nations will infallibly combine to penalise us, if we are bent on malingering in Europe. And besides, we have an urgent interest of our own in that quarter, to see to it that they abate their suicidal animosities. For, on the death of nationality, we might have Cæsarism back, and we want no more Cæsars.

But, Christendom being but a fraction of the whole, we have to consider our future in the world outside it, and it is here that England approaches her highest end, and the consummation of her destiny.

Entrusted with a fifth of the human species, she has given them trade first, and then order, and next prosperity. Yet they will not be satisfied even with all these things. So, last of all, with slow and due precaution, she will give them, too, nationality within the safe bounds of Imperialism. For she wants their friendship above all things, and she reckons that she will be justified of her faith in the long event.

She looks to the distant hour, when the princes and peoples of India, and the princes and peoples of Africa in their train, shall share to the full in the Imperial partnership.

The world of our day is thus darkened and oppressed by three evils which civilisation must remedy, or go down. Within each nation, labour is at odds with life. Within the wider orbit of Christendom, there is the standing disgrace of national animosities. Lastly, co-extensive with the globe itself, is the wide estrangement of the White, the Black, the Brown, and the Yellow races.

To lead the world in combating, and even in overcoming, these evils, is the Future of England.

INDEX

Adonais, cited, 195
Agricultural labourers, wages of, 58
Agriculture in England, 56-60
Alfred, King, 205
Aligarh College, 195
America, South, 162
Anarchy in 1911, 38
Anne, Queen, 25
Aragon, 22
Arbitration, Anglo-French, 157
  International, 156-157
  La Fontaine on, 156
  Renault on, 157
Arelate, the, 22
Arndt, cited, 140
Arnold, Matthew, cited, 98, 175
Asiatic empire of England, 171
Asiatics and nationality, 201-203
Asquith, Prime Minister, cited, 158
Athens and freedom, 19-20
Augustine, Saint, 108
Aurungzebe, Emperor, 178
Austria, characteristics of, 10-13, 22

Bacon, cited, 33
Bajazet, cited, 173
Balfour, Mr., cited, 114, 157
Beaconsfield, Lord, cited, 131-132, 184, 216
Beluchistan, pacification of, 177
Bentham, Jeremy, cited, 122
Bentinck, Lord William, cited, 188
Berlin Conference, 125
Bishop of Madras on Indian Christianity, 207-208
Bismarck, cited, 11, 12, 16, 115, 134, 140, 144-145, 167
Boers, policy of, 115
Bohemia, 22
Boileau, 13
Boniface VIII., cited, 21
Bossuet, 13
  cited, 16
Brandenburg, 22
Brienne, 24
Bright, cited, 219
Bryce, Mr., cited, 121
Buddha, cited, 195
Buddhism, 194-195
Bulgaria and independence, 128-129
Bülow, Prince, on Poland, 140
Burgundy, 22
Burke, cited, 9, 25, 111, 121
Burma, Upper, pacification of, 177
Burns, Mr. John, cited, 91

Calcutta, 185
Canning, Lord, cited, 212
  and America, 165
Castile, 22
Catherine II., Empress, 132
Central government of India, 218-220
Chailley, M., cited, 183
Chamberlain, Mr., cited, 70-71, 148-149, 153, 184
Child legislation, 86-88
Children, physical condition of, 90-91
Children's Act of 1908, 88
China, break-up of, 145-146
Chirol, Mr., cited, 182
Christianity in India, 205-208
Church and State, 19-26
Coal, usefulness of, 46
Code, Penal, 110
Commission of 1842-1843, 84-85
  on Land, India, 179-184
  upon decentralisation, 218-219
Committee of 1908, on children, 88-89
  on oriental studies, 175
Comte, cited, 92, 196

Concert of Europe, 168
Condé, 9
Co-operation, 78
Corneille, 13
Corps Législatif of France, 9
Cotton trade, 53-56
Councils Act of 1861, Indian, 214
of 1892, Indian, 214
of 1909, Indian, 213-214
Cromer, Lord, 172
Cromwell, cited, 133
Curzon, Lord, cited, 154, 174, 181, 183, 216, 217-218

Dalhousie, Lord, cited, 174
Democracy and peace, 118 *et seq.*
in Austria, 138
Derby, Lord, cited, 127
Descartes, 13
De Witt, 16
Dominions and armaments, 166-167
Dual Alliance, 145
Dubois, Abbé, cited, 205

Economy in expenditure, 32
Education, Indian, 204
in London, 96
secondary, 97-103
university, 102-103
Educational epochs, 93
Electrical Engineers, President of Institution of, cited, 64
Electricity and industry, 62-64
Elizabeth, Queen, 15
England, Asiatic opinion of, 17
capital of, 50
coalfields of, 46
European view of, 15-17
and France, 154
greatness of, 17-18
inventive power of, 28-29
militarism in, 8-9
progress of, since 1842, 34
religion in, 6-7
rise of, 29
and Russia, 132
and Spain, 132-133
and United States, 164-165
wealth of, 5
English agricultural labourers, 57-60
English stock, 57
Epictetus, cited, 20, 103
Europe, races of south-eastern, 118

Exports, distribution of, 48
growth of, 48

Family, breakdown of the, 105-106
Ferdinand and Isabella, 23
Ferdinand, Emperor, 12
Fleury, 24
Florence, 22
Forest cantons, 22
France, empire of, 126
influence of, 13-14
in India, 176
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, cited, 141
Fraser, Sir Andrew, cited, 204-205
Frederick the Great, cited, 11, 135
Free Trade, 32
Froissart, cited, 16
Fuller, Sir Bampfylde, cited, 191, 211

Gaekwar of Baroda, cited, 190
German Emperor and France, 149
Germany and education, 99-101
and Poles, 116
Gibbon, cited, 159, 172, 205
Gladstone, 33
and income tax, 32
cited, 32, 114
Goethe, 14
Gold output, 77
Goldie, Sir George, 172
Goluchowski, Count, cited, 148
Gordon, General, 40
Gortchakoff, cited, 139
Gregory VII., cited, 20
Grey, Sir Edward, cited, 116, 162
on United States, 165

Hague Conference of 1907, 131
Haldane, Lord, cited, 155, 166
Hapsburg, House of, 10-12
Hegel, 14
Herder, 14
Herzegovina, 128
Hindustan in eighteenth century, 176
History of Trade-Unionism, cited, 35-36
Hobbes, cited, 122
Holland, 22

Imperial Advisory Council, 217
Imperial medical staff, 187

India, boys of, 189
caste in, 190-191
and Christianity, 205-208
education in, 187-190
medical colleges in, 185
plague in, 186
provinces of, 212
public finance of, 180
sanitation in, 185-187
services of, to England, 220-221
Indian colleges, 189
constitution, 210-220
empire, toleration in, 6
factories, 188
frontier, 177
women, status of, 192-193
Industrial demand, 66
demand and empire, 69
Industrial Efficiency, cited, 49
Industrial organisation, 31
revolution, 30
causes of, 27-28
Industrial Syndicalist, cited, 37
Industrial system, amendments of, 53 *et seq.*
soundness of, 35
twofold influence in, 38-39
Industrialism, purpose of, 30
Industry, speeding up of, 73
Infantile mortality, 91-92
Innocent III., cited, 21
Investments, foreign, 68-69

James II., 8
Japanese alliance of 1902, 163
Joseph II., emperor, 11

Kant, 14
King-Emperor, cited, 213
Kitchener, Lord, 172

Labour, casual, 39-40, 71-72, 106
Labouring classes, condition of, 32
La Fontaine, 13
on arbitration, 156
Lancashire, wages in, 55, 74
Lansdowne, Lord, cited, 150-151, 154
Law in Asia, 179
Lessing, 14
Liberty, nature of, 26
three stages of, 19
Life and Labour in London, cited, 39
Liverpool and labour, 72
Lollards, 25
London artisans, 49
industries, 51
Louis XI., 23
Louis XIV., 13, 23
Lugard, Sir F., 171
Lyall, Sir Alfred, 197

Maine, Sir H., cited, 131, 179
Maistre, Joseph de, cited, 130
Malherbe, 13
Mann, Mr. Tom, 37, 41
Mazarin, 24
Mazzini, cited, 119
Metternich, Prince, cited, 124,135
Michelet, cited, 16
Mill, James, cited, 123
Mill, J. S., cited, 202
Minimum, the national, 75-76
Minto, Lord, cited, 182
Mirabeau, cited, 124
Mohammed el Tounsy, cited, 173
Mohammedan Asiatics, 174
Molière, 13
Moltke, cited, 119
Monarchy, English, 14-15
Monroe doctrine, 122
Montaigne, 13
Montesquieu, cited, 19
Moriscoes, 23
Morley, Lord, cited, 213, 215, 217, 219
Mortality, infantile, 91-92

Napoleon, 12
cited, 135, 169, 197
National character, effect of, 10
Nationality, nature of, 3
Native states of India, 182
Nesselrode, cited, 163-164
Netherlands, 23
and Europe, 130
Nivedita, Sister, 192

Ollivier, cited, 16
Omar, cited, 195
Othman and Foulah empire, 173

Palmerston, cited, 131
Pan-Germanism, 140-141
Pan-Slavism, 137-139
Parma, 9
Peel, Sir Robert, 110
and economy, 33
cited, 114, 146

Penal Code, 110
Pepys, cited, 133
Peter the Great, cited, 16
Pitt, cited, 131
Plato, cited, 94
Poland, 22
Poor Law Commission of 1909, 39, 97
Prices, rise of, 76-78
Prussia, 11

Racine, 13
Ramsay, Sir William, 46
Rangoon, 184
Reformation, the, 108
Renan, cited, 201
Renault on arbitration, 157
Revolutions in Europe, 125
Richelieu, 24
Rosebery, Lord, cited, 126, 149
Ross, Professor Ronald, cited, 186
Rural exodus, 58-59
Russia, economics of, 136-137

Salisbury, Lord, cited, 15, 120, 128, 147
  and concert of Europe, 155-156
Schilling, 14
Schopenhauer, cited, 199
Science and industry, 61-65
Scindia, 194
Sentimentalism, danger of, 111
Shipping industry, 73-74
Sivaji, 194
Skobeleff, cited, 138
Socialism defined, 36
  and industry, 52
  municipal, 33
Socrates, cited, 92
Spain, policy of, 23
Spencer, Herbert, cited, 35
State and religion, 107-112
Stephen, Sir James, cited, 179
Stoics, 20
Strachey, Sir John, cited, 183, 196-197, 211
Strike, the general, 42
Swaraj, 209-210
Syad Ahmad Khan, cited, 192
Syndicalism defined, 37
  and industry, 53

Taine, cited, 133-134
Talleyrand, cited, 119
Tariffs, foreign, 47
Technical high schools, 100
  instruction, Commission on, 45
Thirty Years' War, 11-12
Thomas, Saint, 205
Tocqueville, cited, 131
Torcy, cited, 16
Tolstoi on education, 97
Trade-Unionism defined, 36
Travancore, Maharajah of, 194
Treaty of Paris, 1782, 165
  of Vienna, 131
  of Westphalia, 130-131
Treitschke, cited, 134
Triple Alliance, 145
Tudors, the, 30
Turenne, 9
Turkey and Europe, 128-129

Udaipur, Maharana of, 194
United States and England, 164-165
  and peace, 121-122

Vauban, 9
Vedantism, 207
Vergennes, cited, 16
Victoria, Queen, 15
Vivekananda, the Swami, cited, 199
Voltaire, cited, 13

Walpole, Spencer, cited, 32
War, the South African, 123
Wellesley, Lord, cited, 220
William III., 25

Yorkshire, wages in, 74

THE END

Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, *Edinburgh.*

NEW WORKS ON
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIOLOGY

VOX CLAMANTIS. By NUMA MINIMUS. Extra Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.

This series of essays attempts to deal on impartial and historical lines with the fundamental conceptions of modern political, economic, and social thought. Starting from an examination of the three ideals of the French Revolution, Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality, touching on the two principles of modern government, Aristocracy and Democracy, the author proceeds to present Individualism and Socialism as two complementary systems, each necessary to the efficiency of the other. The work concludes with an examination of the modern panacea—a State based on collective ownership of all land, capital, and business undertakings.

SEEMS SO! A Working-Class View of Politics. By STEPHEN REYNOLDS and BOB and TOM WOOLLEY. With Frontispiece. Extra Crown 8vo. 5s. net.

INDIA AND THE DURBAR. A Reprint of the Indian Articles in the "Empire Day" Edition of *The Times*, May 24, 1911. 8vo. 5s. net.

THE MAKING OF NORTHERN NIGERIA. By Captain C. W. J. ORR, late Political Department, Northern Nigeria. With Maps. 8vo. 8s. 6d. net.

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. By F. W. TAUSSIG, Henry Lee Professor of Economics in Harvard University. 2 vols. 8vo. 17s. net.

MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION. A Study in English Industrial Organisation. By HERMANN LEVY, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Heidelberg. 8vo. 10s. net.

UNEMPLOYMENT. A Social Study. By B. S. ROWNTREE and BRUNO LASKER. 8vo. 5s. net.

THE MODERN PRISON CURRICULUM. A General Review of our Penal System. By R. F. QUINTON, M.D., late Governor and Medical Officer of H.M. Prison, Holloway. Crown 8vo.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON.

A SELECTION OF STANDARD WORKS

THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH. By JAMES BRYCE. New edition, completely revised. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s. net.

FRANCE. By JOHN EDWARD COURTENAY BODLEY. Extra Crown 8vo. 10s. net.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND. By Prof. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL. 2 vols. 8vo. 17s. net.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION. By A. V. DICEY, D.C.L. Seventh Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

MODERN EGYPT. By THE EARL OF CROMER. With Portrait and a Map. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. net. 1 vol. 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

INDIAN UNREST. By VALENTINE CHIROL. With an Introduction by Sir ALFRED LYALL. 8vo. 5s. net.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF BRITISH INDIA. By JOSEPH CHAILLEY. Translated by Sir WILLIAM MEYER. 8vo. 10s. net.

INDIA: ITS ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESS. By Sir JOHN STRACHEY, G.C.S.I. Fourth edition, revised by Sir THOMAS W. HOLDERNESS, K.C.S.I. 8vo. 10s. net.

THE BROAD STONE OF EMPIRE. Problems of Crown Colony Administration. With Records of Personal Experience. By Sir CHARLES BRUCE, G.C.M.G. With Maps and Portrait. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s. net.

THE CONFLICT OF COLOUR. Being a Detailed Examination of Racial Problems throughout the World. By PUTNAM WEALE. 8vo. 10s. net.

A PROJECT OF EMPIRE. A Critical Study of the Economics of Imperialism, with Special Reference to the Ideas of Adam Smith. By Prof. J. SHIELD NICHOLSON, M.A., D.Sc. 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

AN OLIVE BRANCH IN IRELAND AND ITS HISTORY. By WILLIAM O'BRIEN. 8vo. 10s. net.

THE WORKING FAITH OF THE SOCIAL REFORMER, and other Essays. By Prof. HENRY JONES. 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON.

DA
18
P44

Peel, George
The future of England

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY